

## **The complaint**

Mrs R's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

## **What happened**

Mrs R was the member of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 11 March 2014 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 10,000 fractional points at a cost of £8,800 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs R more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mrs R paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £8,800 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mrs R – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 8 June 2022 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mrs R's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 12 September 2022, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs R disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') dated 18 December 2025. In that decision, I said:

### ***What I've provisionally decided – and why***

*I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.*

*And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.*

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale**

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

As a general rule, I think it's reasonable for creditors to reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 ("LA"), as it wouldn't be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would have been available in court. So, it's relevant to consider whether Mrs R's Section 75 claim was time-barred under the LA before the PR put the claim to the Lender on their behalf.

As I mentioned above, a claim under Section 75 is a "like claim". This means it mirrors the claim Mrs R could have made against the Supplier.

A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. A claim for breach of contract against the Supplier would also be subject to a limitation period of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Any claim against a lender under Section 75 is also "an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment" under Section 9 of the LA. Such claims also have a time limit of six years from the date the cause of action accrued.

In claims for misrepresentation, the cause of action accrues at the point a loss is incurred. In Mrs R's case, that's when she entered the agreement to purchase the timeshare, and the related Credit Agreement, on 11 March 2014. This would be mirrored in the claim against the Lender.

Mrs R first notified the lender of their Section 75 claim in 2022, more than six years after the cause of action accrued in relation to her claims for misrepresentation. So, I don't think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to decline the part of the claim relating to the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations.

Even if I was able to consider this aspect of the complaint, I would not be persuaded from the evidence provided to date that there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract**

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

*Mrs R says that she could not holiday where and when she wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.*

*Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mrs R states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like she made use of their fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that she may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.*

*So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mrs R any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.*

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

*I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.*

*Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:*

- 1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
- 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;*
- 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant*
- 5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.*

*I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender.*

### ***The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale***

*Mrs R's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.*

*The PR says, for instance that:*

- 1. the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs R; and*
- 2. Mrs R was pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale.*

*However, as things currently stand, neither of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.*

*I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs R was actually unaffordable, before also concluding that she lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs R.*

*I acknowledge that Mrs R may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But she says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made her feel as if she had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when she simply did not want to. She was also given a 14-day cooling off period and she has not provided a credible explanation for why she did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs R made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because her ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.*

*Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs R's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to her under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.*

#### *The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations*

*A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs R the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what she first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.*

*In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.*

*To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs R as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.*

*And there is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.*

*On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs R, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.*

*But on the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs R as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).*

*However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.*

*Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs R have been rendered unfair to her had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?*

*Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach (if there was one) had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.*

*Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.*

*But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mrs R decided to go ahead with her purchase.*

*I say this after careful consideration of Mrs R's witness statement. In this statement Mrs R details an earlier sale and then states "Exactly the same as above" regarding the 2014 sale this complaint concerns. As such I've taken the description of the earlier sale as a reflection of what Mrs R feels she was also told in 2014.*

*But even in doing so I'm not persuaded that profit was the motivation for her 2014 purchase. I say this because whilst she does suggest that she would "get her money back" as well as "expect a return on my investment" this only appears to vaguely describe what she was potentially told at the Time of Sale rather than what motivated her to make the purchase. Whereas, after stating "Exactly the same as above" Mrs R then also says, "Had to take more because I didn't have enough points to buy the next share of fractional and to get the holidays I wanted". I'm persuaded from the evidence available that Mrs R's motivation for the purchase was the holiday aspect of the product (and the fact that she required more points for the holidays she wanted).*

*That doesn't mean she wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs R doesn't persuade me that her purchase was motivated by her share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision she ultimately made.*

*On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs R's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the*

contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with her purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender was unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

### **The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale**

The PR says that Mrs R was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier in order to make an informed choice.

It isn't clear what information the PR thinks the Supplier failed to provide at the Time of Sale. But as I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

So, while I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mrs R sufficient information, in good time, in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'), even if that was the case, neither Mrs R nor the PR have persuaded me that she was deprived of information that would have led her to make a different purchasing decision at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why they led to an unfair credit relationship as a result.

The PR also says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd*, *Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd* and *Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

*From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').*

*But I don't think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs R in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.*

*As the Supreme Court said in paragraph 326 of its judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it's not possible to simply apply the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61 ('Plevin') to this complaint (as the PR does) when it's concerned with a product and marketplace that were very different to those in Plevin. What's more, Mrs R was provided with information as to the price of Fractional Club membership and the cost of the Credit Agreement (interest rate, fees, APR and monthly repayments). So, she was at least in a position from which she could understand the cost of the Credit Agreement and compare it with other options that might have been available at the Time of Sale.*

*I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs R, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs R into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.*

*I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.*

*And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs R.*

*In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs R entered into wasn't high. At £704, it was only 8% of the amount borrowed. So, had she known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not currently persuaded that she either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs R wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for a timeshare she wanted*

*doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.*

*What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs R but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.*

*Overall, therefore, I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs R.*

### **Section 140A: Conclusion**

*Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.*

### **Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint**

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*While I've found that Mrs R credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs R complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.*

*The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs R (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.*

*However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs R a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to her. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.*

### **Overall Conclusion**

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*In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs R's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.*

### ***My provisional decision***

*For the reasons set out above, I don't intend to uphold this complaint.*

*Both sides now have until the deadline I set at the beginning to submit new evidence and/or arguments before I consider this complaint for a Final Decision.*

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs R's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded – they confirmed they had nothing further to add.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

### **The legal and regulatory context**

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

#### The Office of Fair Trading's Irresponsible Lending Guidance – 31 March 2010

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide greater clarity for businesses and consumer representatives as to the business practices that the Office of Fair Trading (the 'OFT') thought might have constituted irresponsible lending for the purposes of Section 25(2B) of the CCA. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 2.3
- Paragraph 5.5

#### The OFT's Guidance for Credit Brokers and Intermediaries - 24 November 2011

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide clarity for credit brokers and credit intermediaries as to the standards expected of them by the OFT when they dealt with actual or prospective borrowers. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 3.7
- Paragraph 4.8

### **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

As the Lender has accepted my PD and the PR has confirmed it has nothing further to add, I can confirm that I see no reason to depart from my provisional findings.

So in conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs R's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

### **My final decision**

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs R to accept or reject my decision before 19 February 2026.

Paul Clarke  
**Ombudsman**