

The complaint

Mr H is unhappy Revolut Ltd (“Revolut”) won’t reimburse him for the money he lost when he fell victim to a scam.

What happened

The details and facts of this case are well-known to both parties, so I don’t need to repeat them at length here.

In short, Mr H says he saw an advert for a trading company on social media that I will call “B”. Mr H completed an enquiry form and was contacted by a representative of B.

Subsequently, the following payments were made to two cryptocurrency exchanges. My understanding is that the funds were then converted to cryptocurrency and were transferred on to B.

The following transactions went from Revolut to the cryptocurrency exchanges.

Transaction Number	Date	Amount	Type of payment
1	13 April 2023	€1,134	Card Payment
2	18 April 2023	€5,000.11	Card Payment
3	18 April 2023	€1,456.35	Card Payment
4	28 April 2023	€1,499.40	Card Payment
5	2 May 2023	€4,200	Card Payment
6	2 May 2023	€1,400.7	Card Payment
7	3 May 2023	€3,410.4	Card Payment
8	5 May 2023	€4,084.50	Card Payment
9	9 May 2023	£2,240.32 transaction fee £6,42	Card Payment
10	10 May 2023	€4,096.05	Card Payment
11	15 May 2023	€5,100	Transfer

Mr H realised that he had been scammed when he was unable to withdraw the profits that he saw on B’s platform without paying additional fees.

He made a complaint via a representative to Revolut and requested that the above transactions be refunded. It declined to do this.

One of our investigators looked into this matter and he thought that Revolut should have intervened during transaction 2 and had it done so, it would have prevented the payments from being made. So they concluded that Revolut should therefore refund all of the above payments. He did though say that there should be a deduction of 50%, as he believed that Mr H was equally liable for his loss. Revolut did not agree and it said the following in summary;

- The scam only occurred after the funds were sent from the crypto exchanges to B so Revolut was not the point of loss.
- As Revolut is an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") and other financial institutions have limited payments to crypto exchanges then it is not uncommon for funds to be sent to Revolut and then on to a crypto exchange.
- Interventions from Mr H's other account providers should be considered and complaints should potentially be levied against these other providers.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

In deciding what's fair and reasonable, I am required to take into account relevant law and regulations, regulators' rules, guidance and standards, and codes of practice; and, where appropriate, I must also take into account what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time.

In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (in this case the 2017 regulations) and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

And, as the Supreme Court has recently reiterated in *Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC*, subject to some limited exceptions banks have a contractual duty to make payments in compliance with the customer's instructions.

In that case, the Supreme Court considered the nature and extent of the contractual duties owed by banks to their customers when making payments. Among other things, it said, in summary:

- The starting position is that it is an implied term of any current account contract that,

where a customer has authorised and instructed a bank to make a payment, it must carry out the instruction promptly. It is not for the bank to concern itself with the wisdom or risk of its customer's payment decisions.

- At paragraph 114 of the judgment the court noted that express terms of the current account contract may modify or alter that position. In *Philipp*, the contract permitted Barclays not to follow its consumer's instructions where it reasonably believed the payment instruction was the result of APP fraud; but the court said having the right to decline to carry out an instruction was not the same as being under a legal duty to do so.

In this case, the terms of Revolut's contract with Mr H modified the starting position described in *Philipp*, by expressly requiring Revolut to refuse or delay a payment "*if legal or regulatory requirements prevent us from making the payment or mean that we need to carry out further checks*".

So Revolut was required by the implied terms of its contract with Mr H and the Payment Services Regulations to carry out their instructions promptly, except in the circumstances set out in its contract, which included where regulatory requirements meant it needed to carry out further checks.

Whether or not Revolut was required to refuse or delay a payment for one of the reasons set out in its contract, the basic implied requirement to carry out an instruction promptly did not in any event mean Revolut was required to carry out the payments immediately¹. Revolut could comply with the requirement to carry out payments promptly while still giving fraud warnings, or making further enquiries, prior to making the payment.

And, I am satisfied that, taking into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements and what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time, Revolut should in April 2023 fairly and reasonably have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances (irrespective of whether it was also required by the express terms of its contract to do so).

In reaching the view that Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances, I am mindful that in practice all banks and EMI's like Revolut do in fact seek to take those steps, often by:

- using algorithms to identify transactions presenting an increased risk of fraud;²
- requiring consumers to provide additional information about the purpose of transactions during the payment authorisation process;
- using the confirmation of payee system for authorised push payments;
- providing increasingly tailored and specific automated warnings, or in some circumstances human intervention, when an increased risk of fraud is identified.

In reaching my conclusions about what Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have done, I am also mindful that:

- Electronic Money Institutions like Revolut are required to conduct their business with "due skill, care and diligence" (FCA Principle for Businesses 2), "integrity" (FCA Principle for Businesses 1) and a firm "must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems" (FCA Principle for Businesses 3).

¹ The Payment Services Regulation 2017 Reg. 86 states that "the payer's payment service provider must ensure that the amount of the payment transaction is credited to the payee's payment service provider's account **by the end of the business day following the time of receipt of the payment order**" (emphasis added).

² For example, Revolut's website explains it launched an automated anti-fraud system in August 2018: <https://www.revolut.com/news/revolut-unveils-new-fleet-of-machine-learning-technology-that-has-seen-a-fourfold-reduction-in-card-fraud-and-had-offers-from-banks/>

- Over the years, the FCA, and its predecessor the FSA, have published a series of publications setting out non-exhaustive examples of good and poor practice found when reviewing measures taken by firms to counter financial crime, including various iterations of the “Financial crime: a guide for firms”.
- Regulated firms are required to comply with legal and regulatory anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism requirements. Those requirements include maintaining proportionate and risk-sensitive policies and procedures to identify, assess and manage money laundering risk – for example through customer due-diligence measures and the ongoing monitoring of the business relationship (including through the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship). I do not suggest that Revolut ought to have had concerns about money laundering or financing terrorism here, but I nevertheless consider these requirements to be relevant to the consideration of Revolut’s obligation to monitor its customer’s accounts and scrutinise transactions.
- The October 2017, BSI Code³, which a number of banks and trade associations were involved in the development of, recommended firms look to identify and help prevent transactions – particularly unusual or out of character transactions – that could involve fraud or be the result of a scam. Not all firms signed the BSI Code (and Revolut was not a signatory), but the standards and expectations it referred to represented a fair articulation of what was, in my opinion, already good industry practice in October 2017 particularly around fraud prevention, and it remains a starting point for what I consider to be the minimum standards of good industry practice now (regardless of the fact the BSI was withdrawn in 2022).
- Revolut should also have been aware of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency when considering the scams that its customers might become victim to. Multi-stage fraud involves money passing through more than one account under the consumer’s control before being sent to a fraudster. Our service has seen a significant increase in this type of fraud over the past few years – particularly where the immediate destination of funds is a cryptocurrency wallet held in the consumer’s own name. And, increasingly, we have seen the use of an EMI (like Revolut) as an intermediate step between a high street bank account and cryptocurrency wallet.

Overall, taking into account relevant law, regulators rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time, I consider it fair and reasonable in April 2023 that Revolut should:

- have been monitoring accounts and any payments made or received to counter various risks, including preventing fraud and scams;
- have had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate that its customers were at risk of fraud (among other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which firms are generally more familiar with than the average customer;

³ BSI: PAS 17271: 2017” Protecting customers from financial harm as result of fraud or financial abuse”

- in some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, or provided additional warnings, before processing a payment – (as in practice Revolut sometimes does); and
- have been mindful of – among other things – common scam scenarios, how the fraudulent practices are evolving (including for example the common use of multi-stage fraud by scammers, including the use of payments to cryptocurrency accounts as a step to defraud consumers) and the different risks these can present to consumers, when deciding whether to intervene.

Should Revolut have recognised that Mr H was at risk of financial harm from fraud?

It isn't in dispute that Mr H has fallen victim to a cruel scam here, nor that he authorised the payments he made by transfers to his cryptocurrency wallets (from where that cryptocurrency was subsequently transferred to the scammer).

Whilst I have set out in detail in this decision the circumstances which led Mr H to make the payments using his Revolut account and the process by which that money ultimately fell into the hands of the fraudster, I am mindful that, at that time, Revolut had much less information available to it upon which to discern whether any of the payments presented an increased risk that Mr H might be the victim of a scam.

That said I think that Revolut needed to intervene during payment 2. I'm aware that cryptocurrency exchanges like B generally stipulate that transfers must go to an account held in the name of the account holder. Revolut would likely have been aware of this fact too. So, it could have reasonably assumed that the payments would be credited to a cryptocurrency wallet held in Mr H's name.

By April 2023, when these transactions took place, firms like Revolut had been aware of the risk of multi-stage scams involving cryptocurrency for some time. Scams involving cryptocurrency have increased over time. The FCA and Action Fraud published warnings about cryptocurrency scams in mid-2018 and figures published by the latter show that losses suffered to cryptocurrency scams have continued to increase since. They reached record levels in 2022. During that time, cryptocurrency was typically allowed to be purchased through many high street banks with few restrictions.

By the end of 2022, however, many of the high street banks had taken steps to either limit their customer's ability to purchase cryptocurrency using their bank accounts or increase friction in relation to cryptocurrency related payments, owing to the elevated risk associated with such transactions⁴. And by April 2023, when these payments took place, further restrictions were in place⁵. This left a smaller number of payment service providers, including Revolut, that allowed customers to use their accounts to purchase cryptocurrency with few restrictions. These restrictions – and the reasons for them – would have been well known across the industry.

⁴ See for example, Santander's limit of £1,000 per transaction and £3,000 in any 30-day rolling period introduced in November 2022.

NatWest Group, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and Santander had all introduced some restrictions on specific cryptocurrency exchanges by August 2021.

⁵ In March 2023, Both Nationwide and HSBC introduced similar restrictions to those introduced by Santander in November 2022

I recognise that, as a result of the actions of other payment service providers, many customers who wish to purchase cryptocurrency for legitimate purposes will be more likely to use the services of an EMI, such as Revolut. And I'm also mindful that a significant majority of cryptocurrency purchases made using a Revolut account will be legitimate and not related to any kind of fraud (as Revolut has told our service). However, our service has also seen numerous examples of consumers being directed by fraudsters to use Revolut accounts in order to facilitate the movement of the victim's money from their high street bank account to a cryptocurrency provider, a fact that Revolut is aware of.

So, taking into account all of the above I am satisfied that by the end of 2022, prior to the payments Mr H made in April 2023, Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have recognised that its customers could be at an increased risk of fraud when using its services to purchase cryptocurrency, notwithstanding that the payment would often be made to a cryptocurrency wallet in the consumer's own name.

To be clear, I'm not suggesting as Revolut argues that, as a general principle (under the Consumer Duty or otherwise), Revolut should have more concern about payments being made to a customer's own account than those which are being made to third party payees. As I've set out in some detail above, it is the specific risk associated with cryptocurrency in April 2023 that, in some circumstances, should have caused Revolut to consider transactions to cryptocurrency providers as carrying an increased risk of fraud and the associated harm.

In those circumstances, as a matter of what I consider to have been fair and reasonable, good practice and to comply with regulatory requirements (including the Consumer Duty), Revolut should have had appropriate systems for making checks and delivering warnings before it processed such payments. And as I have explained Revolut was also required by the terms of its contract to refuse or delay payments where regulatory requirements meant it needed to carry out further checks.

Taking all of the above into account, and in light of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency, I don't think that the fact most of the payments in this case were going to an account held in Mr H' own name should have led Revolut to believe there wasn't a risk of fraud.

So, I've gone onto consider, taking into account what Revolut knew about the payments, at what point, if any, it ought to have identified that Mr H might be at a heightened risk of fraud that merited its intervention.

Mr H's account was not a new account and Revolut did have a payment history to compare the payments to. Given this I think that payment 1 was not unusual as Mr H had made payments of a similar size before. But payment 2 was clearly to a cryptocurrency exchange and was large enough to be considered unusual compared to the transactions Mr H normally made. Given this, I think it ought to have prompted an intervention from Revolut. So, I think that Revolut should have really been aware that Mr H was at a heightened risk of financial harm.

To be clear, I do not suggest that Revolut should provide a warning for every payment made to cryptocurrency. Instead, as I've explained, I think it was a combination of the characteristics of this payment which ought to have prompted an intervention. I think a proportionate intervention at this point would have been a warning setting out the general features of a crypto scam.

What did Revolut do to warn Mr H?

My understanding is that Revolut did provide a warning on the transfer that Mr H made, though this warning was not related to crypto scams because of the payment reasons Revolut say was provided by Mr H (safe account). However, I think that Revolut should have intervened earlier than it did – and specifically during payment 2.

What kind of warning should Revolut have provided?

I've thought carefully about what a proportionate warning in light of the risk presented would be in these circumstances. In doing so, I've taken into account that many payments that look very similar to this one will be entirely genuine. I've given due consideration to Revolut's duty to make payments promptly, as well as what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time this payment was made.

Taking that into account, I think Revolut ought, when Mr H attempted the second payment, knowing (or strongly suspecting) that the payment was going to a cryptocurrency provider, to have provided a warning (whether automated or in some other form) that was specifically about the risk of cryptocurrency scams, given how prevalent they had become by 2023. In doing so, I recognise that it would be difficult for such a warning to cover off every permutation and variation of cryptocurrency scam, without significantly losing impact.

So, at this point in time, I think that such a warning should have addressed the key risks and features of the most common cryptocurrency scams – cryptocurrency investment scams. The warning Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have provided should have highlighted, in clear and understandable terms, the key features of common cryptocurrency investment scams, for example referring to: an advertisement on social media; an 'account manager', 'broker' or 'trader' acting on their behalf; the use of remote access software and a small initial deposit which quickly increases in value.

I recognise that a warning of that kind could not have covered off all scenarios. But I think it would have been a proportionate way for Revolut to minimise the risk of financial harm to Mr H, by covering the key features of scams affecting many customers, but not imposing a level of friction disproportionate to the risk the payment presented.

I've thought carefully about whether a specific warning covering off the key features of cryptocurrency investment scams would have likely prevented any further loss in this case. And on the balance of probabilities, I think it would have. There were several key hallmarks of common cryptocurrency investment scams present in the circumstances of Mr H's payments. For example, Mr H finding the investment through social media, being assisted by a broker and being asked to download remote access software so they could help him open cryptocurrency wallet.

I've also reviewed the chat between Mr H and B. I've found nothing within those conversations that suggests Mr H was asked, or agreed to, disregard any warning provided by Revolut. I've also seen no indication that Mr H expressed mistrust of Revolut or financial firms in general.

Neither do I think that the conversation demonstrates a closeness of relationship that Revolut would have found difficult to counter through a warning.

In addition, Mr H did not receive any detailed cryptocurrency investment related specific warnings from Revolut – so there's no evidence he ignored a specific warning.

So, I think, albeit on balance, that a tailored cryptocurrency warning setting out the common features of cryptocurrency scams would have prevented the scam if it had been provided on payment 2.

I note that Mr H did receive a warning when the transfer was made to a crypto exchange later in the scam. Revolut has said that the reason that Mr H gave for this payment was “safe account”. So it is possible this is the reason that Mr H may have given if questioned about earlier payments rather than him saying he was sending funds for an investment. But given where the funds were going, I think that a general crypto warning should have been provided regardless of the reasons provided for the transaction.

Is it fair and reasonable for Revolut to be held responsible for Mr H's loss?

In reaching my decision about what is fair and reasonable, I have taken into account that Mr H purchased cryptocurrency which credited an e-wallet held in his own name, rather than making a payment directly to the fraudsters. So, he remained in control of his money after he made the payments from his Revolut account, and it took further steps before the money was lost to the fraudsters.

I am also mindful that the funds came from a different financial institution before they were paid into Mr H's Revolut account.

I have carefully considered Revolut's view that in a multi-stage fraud, a complaint should be properly considered only against either the firm that is a) the 'point of loss' – the last point at which the money (or cryptocurrency) remains under the victim's control; or b) the origin of the funds – that is the account in which the funds were in, prior to the scam commencing. It says it is (in this case and others) merely an intermediate link – being neither the origin of the funds nor the point of loss. It therefore says it is irrational to hold it responsible for any loss.

In reaching my decision, I have taken into account that payment 2 was made to another financial business (a cryptocurrency exchange based in another country) and that the payments that funded the scam were originally made from an account at a regulated financial business.

But as I've set out above, I think that Revolut still should have recognised that Mr H might have been at risk of financial harm from fraud when he made payment 2, and in those circumstances, Revolut should have made further enquiries about the payment before processing it. If it had done that, I am satisfied it would have prevented the losses Mr H suffered. The fact that the money used to fund the scam came from elsewhere and wasn't lost at the point it was transferred to Mr H's own account does not alter that fact. And I think Revolut can fairly be held responsible for Mr H's loss in such circumstances. I don't think there is any point of law or principle that says that a complaint should only be considered against either the firm that is the origin of the funds or firm where the point of loss occurred.

I've also considered that Mr H has only complained against Revolut. I accept that it's *possible* that other firms might also have missed the opportunity to intervene or failed to act fairly and reasonably in some other way, and Mr H could instead, or in addition, have sought to complain against those firms. But Mr H has not chosen to do that and ultimately, I cannot compel him to. In these circumstances, I can only make an award against Revolut.

I'm also not persuaded it would be fair to reduce Mr H's compensation in circumstances where: the consumer has only complained about one respondent from which they are entitled to recover their losses in full; has not complained against the other firm (and so is unlikely to recover any amounts apportioned to that firm); and where it is appropriate to hold a business such as Revolut responsible (that could have prevented the loss and is responsible for failing to do so). That isn't, to my mind, wrong in law or irrational but reflects the facts of the case and my view of the fair and reasonable position.

Ultimately, I must consider the complaint that has been referred to me (not those which haven't been or couldn't be referred to me). And for the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for Mr H's loss from payment 2 (subject to a deduction for Mr H's own contribution which I will consider below).

Should Mr H bear any responsibility for his losses?

I've thought about whether Mr H should bear any responsibility for his loss connected to the scam. In doing so, I've considered what the law says about contributory negligence, as well as what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances of this complaint. This includes taking into account Mr H's own actions and responsibility for the losses he has suffered.

In this instance, Mr H responded to an advert on social media and without much research, installed remote access software and invested considerable sums of money in a short period of time.

I can also see that Mr H indicated that he was guaranteed a profit. I think this should have prompted him to question if B was a legitimate firm, as no legitimate firm would guarantee a profit. He also has indicated that he was encouraged to take out loans by B, which again is not something that a legitimate firm would do.

I also can see that the correspondence between the scammer and Mr H was very informal and in between trading recommendations, there were many memes and emoticons. I find it unlikely that a professional trading firm would issue its trading recommendations in such a way. I am also mindful that Mr H seems to have carried on despite him saying that his wife thought he was being scammed.

So I've concluded, on balance, that Revolut can fairly reduce the amount it pays to Mr H because of his role in what happened. Weighing the fault that I've found on both sides, I think a fair deduction is 50%.

Could Revolut have done anything else to recover Mr H's money?

I've also thought about whether Revolut could have done more to recover the funds after Mr H reported the scam. In this instance the funds were transferred to crypto exchanges and then on to the scammer. So I don't think Revolut could have recovered the funds. Also, the Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) does not apply, as Revolut is not part of it.

I also don't think that a chargeback would be successful as essentially the card payments were a means of putting funds onto Mr H's crypto exchange account and this is what happened. So he got what he paid for.

So overall I don't think that the funds could have been recovered via other means.

Putting things right

For the reasons I've explained, I uphold this complaint about Revolut Ltd in part and instruct it to do the following:

- 1) Refund 50% of the money Mr H lost to the scam, from and including payment 2.
- 2) Pay 8% simple interest per year on the remaining amount of each payment, from the date of each payment was made to the date of settlement.

If Revolut Ltd considers that it's required by HM Revenue & Customs to deduct income tax from that interest, it should tell Mr H how much it's taken off. It should also give Mr H a tax deduction certificate if he asks for one, so he can reclaim the tax from HM Revenue & Customs if appropriate.

My final decision

My decision is that I uphold this complaint against Revolut Ltd in part and instruct it to do What I have set out above to put matters right, in full and final settlement of this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr H to accept or reject my decision before 9 January 2025.

Charlie Newton
Ombudsman