

The complaint

The estate of Mr W's complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna¹ (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with Mr W under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

This complaint was originally brought by Mr W himself as the loan agreement in question was in his sole name, but he has sadly since died. As such the complaint is now brought by his estate. Whilst being cognisant of this, I shall refer to both Mr W and his wife Mrs W throughout where applicable, as the timeshare in question was bought in their joint names.

What happened

Mr and Mrs W purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 18 July 2013 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 747 fractional points at a cost of £10,999 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs W more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on their Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr W paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £10,999 from the Lender in his sole name (the 'Credit Agreement'). This Credit Agreement was cleared in April 2016.

On 25 March 2014 Mr and Mrs W traded in their Fractional Club membership (the 'Time of Sale 2') towards the purchase of 1,820 fractional points from the Supplier (the 'Fractional Club 2'). This purchase was funded by a new finance agreement with another lender (and is the subject of a different complaint).

Mr W – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 17 July 2019 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to complain about:

1. Misrepresentations by the Supplier at the Time of Sale giving him a claim against the Lender under Section 75 of the CCA, which the Lender failed to accept and pay.
2. The Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA.
3. The decision to lend being irresponsible because the Lender did not carry out the right creditworthiness assessment.

(1) Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

Mr W said that the Supplier made a number of pre-contractual misrepresentations at the Time of Sale – namely that the Supplier:

¹ At the time of the sale the Lender was trading as 'Hitachi'

- Told them that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true.
- Told them that they were buying an interest in a specific piece of property when that was not true.
- Told them that Fractional Club membership was an “investment” when that was not true.
- Told them that the points would offer them excellent worldwide resorts which were exclusive to its members when that was not true.

Mr W said that he has a claim against the Supplier in respect of one or more of the misrepresentations set out above, and therefore, under Section 75 of the CCA, he has a like claim against the Lender, who, with the Supplier, is jointly and severally liable to him².

(2) Section 140A of the CCA: the Lender’s participation in an unfair credit relationship

The Letter of Complaint set out several reasons why Mr W said that the credit relationship between him and the Lender was unfair to him under Section 140A of the CCA. In summary, they included the following:

- Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (the ‘Timeshare Regulations’).
- They were pressured into purchasing Fractional Club membership by the Supplier.
- The decision to lend was irresponsible because the Lender didn’t carry out the right creditworthiness assessment.
- The Supplier failed to disclose to them how much commission it was receiving from the Lender resulting from this Credit Agreement.

The Lender dealt with Mr W’s concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 15 May 2020, rejecting it on every ground.

Mr W, via his PR, then referred the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. And as part of the submissions, alongside the relevant sales documentation, were two witness statements made by Mrs W, dated 17 July 2019 and 15 August 2019. These set out her memories of the circumstances surrounding the Time of Sale, and their subsequent further purchase from the Supplier.

Mr W’s complaint was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, upheld the complaint on its merits.

The Investigator thought that the Supplier had marketed and sold Fractional Club membership as an investment to Mr and Mrs W at the Time of Sale in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. And given the impact of that breach on their purchasing decision, the Investigator concluded that the resultant credit relationship between the Lender and Mr W was rendered unfair to him for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA.

The Lender disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me.

The legal and regulatory context

² Since Mr W has now sadly died, the Lender is, with the Supplier, jointly and severally liable to the estate of Mr W.

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

I will refer to and set out several regulatory requirements, legal concepts and guidance in this decision, but I am satisfied that of particular relevance to this complaint is:

- The CCA (including Section 75 and Sections 140A-140C).
- The law on misrepresentation.
- The Timeshare Regulations.
- Case law on Section 140A of the CCA – including, in particular:
 - The Supreme Court's judgment in *Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd* [2014] UKSC 61 ('*Plevin*') (which remains the leading case in this area).
 - *Scotland v British Credit Trust* [2014] EWCA Civ 790 ('*Scotland and Reast*').
 - *Patel v Patel* [2009] EWHC 3264 (QB) ('*Patel*').
 - The Supreme Court's judgment in *Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc* [2023] UKSC 34 ('*Smith*').
 - *Carney v NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd* [2018] EWHC 958 ('*Carney*').
 - *Kerrigan v Elevate Credit International Ltd* [2020] EWHC 2169 (Comm) ('*Kerrigan*').
 - *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('*Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*').

Good industry practice – the RDO Code

The Timeshare Regulations provided a regulatory framework. But as the parties to this complaint already know, I am also required to take into account, when appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time – which, in this complaint, includes the Resort Development Organisation's Code of Conduct dated 1 January 2010 (the 'RDO Code').

My provisional findings

On 8 October 2024 I set out my provisional thoughts that Mr W's complaint ought to be upheld, as I agreed with the findings of the Investigator, but I expanded on the reasoning somewhat. In my provisional decision I said:

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I currently think that this complaint should be upheld because the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations by marketing and/or selling Fractional Club membership to Mr and Mrs W as an investment, which, in the circumstances of this complaint, rendered the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, while I recognise that there are a

number of aspects to Mr W's complaint, it isn't necessary to make formal findings on all of them. This includes the allegations that the Supplier misrepresented the nature of the Fractional Club, and the other aspects of his complaint which he says rendered his relationship with the Lender unfair to him, because, even if those aspects of the complaint ought to succeed, the redress I'm currently proposing puts the estate of Mr W in the same or a better position than it would be if the redress was limited to those other aspects of Mr W's complaint.

What is more, I have made my decision on the balance of probabilities – which means I have based it on what I think is more likely than not to have happened given the available evidence and the wider circumstances.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

As Section 140A of the CCA is relevant law, I do have to consider it. So, in determining what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, I will consider whether the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender was unfair.

Under Section 140A of the CCA, a debtor-creditor relationship can be found to have been or be unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following: the terms of the credit agreement itself; how the creditor exercised or enforced its rights under the agreement; and any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement) (s.140A(1) CCA). Such a finding may also be based on the terms of any related agreement (which here, includes the Purchase Agreement) and, when combined with Section 56 of the CCA, on anything done or not done by the supplier on the creditor's behalf before the making of the credit agreement or any related agreement.

Section 56 plays an important role in the CCA because it defines the terms "antecedent negotiations" and "negotiator". As a result, it provides a foundation for a number of provisions that follow it. But it also creates a statutory agency in particular circumstances. And while Section 56(1) sets out three of them, the most relevant to this complaint are negotiations conducted by the supplier in relation to a transaction financed or proposed to be financed by a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement.

A debtor-creditor-supplier agreement is defined by Section 12(b) of the CCA as "a restricted-use credit agreement which falls within section 11(1)(b) and is made by the creditor under pre-existing arrangements, or in contemplation of future arrangements, between himself and the supplier [...]". And Section 11(1)(b) of the CCA says that a restricted-use credit agreement is a regulated credit agreement used to "finance a transaction between the debtor and a person (the 'supplier') other than the creditor [...]" and "restricted-use credit" shall be construed accordingly."

The Lender doesn't dispute that there was a pre-existing arrangement between it and the Supplier. So, the negotiations conducted by the Supplier during the sale of Mr and Mrs W's membership of the Fractional Club were conducted in relation to a transaction financed or proposed to be financed by a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement as defined by Section 12(b). That made them antecedent negotiations under Section 56(1)(c) – which, in turn, meant that they were conducted by the Supplier as an agent for the Lender as per Section 56(2). And such antecedent negotiations were "any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor" under s.140(1)(c) CCA.

Antecedent negotiations under Section 56 cover both the acts and omissions of the Supplier, as Lord Sumption made clear in *Plevin*, at paragraph 31:

"[Section] 56 provides that [when] antecedent negotiations for a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement are conducted by a credit-broker or the supplier, the negotiations are "deemed to be conducted by the negotiator in the capacity of agent of the creditor as well as in his actual capacity". The result is that the debtor's statutory rights of withdrawal from prospective agreements, cancellation and rescission may arise on account of the conduct of the negotiator whether or not he was the creditor's agent.' [...] Sections 56 and 140A(3) provide for a deemed agency, even in a case where there is no actual one. [...] These provisions are there because without them the creditor's responsibility would be engaged only by its own acts or omissions or those of its agents."

And this was recognised by Mrs Justice Collins Rice in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS at paragraph 135:

"By virtue of the deemed agency provision of s.56, therefore, acts or omissions 'by or on behalf of' the bank within s.140A(1)I may include acts or omissions of the timeshare company in 'antecedent negotiations' with the consumer".

In the case of Scotland & Reast, the Court of Appeal said, at paragraph 56, that the effect of Section 56(2) of the CCA meant that "negotiations are deemed to have been conducted by the negotiator as agent for the creditor, and that is so irrespective of what the position would have been at common law" before going on to say the following in paragraph 74:

"[...] there is nothing in the wording of s.56(2) to suggest any legislative intent to limit its application so as to exclude s.140A. Moreover, the words in s.140A(1)I "any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor" are entirely apposite to include antecedent negotiations falling within the scope of s.56(1)I and which are deemed by s.56(2) to have been conducted by the supplier as agent of the creditor. Indeed the purpose of s.56(2) is to render the creditor responsible for such statements made by the negotiator and so it seems to me wholly consistent with the scheme of the Act that, where appropriate, they should be taken into account in assessing whether the relationship between the creditor and the debtor is unfair."³

So, the Supplier is deemed to be Lender's statutory agent for the purpose of the pre-contractual negotiations.

What's more, the scope of that responsibility extends to both acts and omissions by the Supplier as the Supreme Court in Plevin made clear when it referred to 'acts or omissions' when discussing Section 56. And as Section 56(3)(b) says that an applicable agreement can't try to relieve a person from liability for 'acts or omissions' of any person acting as, or on behalf of, a negotiator, it must follow that the reference to 'omissions' would only be necessary because they can be attributed to the creditor under Section 56.

However, an assessment of unfairness under Section 140A isn't limited to what happened immediately before or at the time a credit agreement and related agreement were entered into. The High Court held in Patel (which was recently approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Smith), that determining whether or not the relationship complained of was unfair had to be made "having regard to the entirety of the relationship and all potentially relevant matters up to the time of making the determination" – which was the date of the trial in the case of an existing credit relationship or otherwise the date the credit relationship ended.

The breadth of the unfair relationship test under Section 140A, therefore, is stark. But it isn't a right afforded to a debtor simply because of a breach of a legal or equitable duty. As the Supreme Court said in Plevin (at paragraph 17):

³ The Court of Appeal's decision in *Scotland* was recently followed in *Smith*.

“Section 140A [...] does not impose any obligation and is not concerned with the question whether the creditor or anyone else is in breach of a duty. It is concerned with [...] whether the creditor’s relationship with the debtor was unfair.”

Instead, it was said by the Supreme Court in Plevin that the protection afforded to debtors by Section 140A is the consequence of all of the relevant facts.

I have considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint and I think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

- 1. The Supplier’s sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale – which includes training material that I think is likely to be relevant to the sale; and*
- 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;*
- 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender.

The Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr and Mrs W’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

“A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.”

But Mrs W, in her first witness statement, and Mr W, in the Letter of Complaint submitted by the PR on the same day, say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale. Mrs W says, as far as is relevant here:

“The representatives advised that if we purchased fractional points, we would be investing in a property that would be sold in the future and we would make a return on our investment. The fractional points would also offer us excellent availability to worldwide resorts that were exclusive to members. The representatives also offered a free week holidays [sic] if we signed the contracts on the day.”

And this is repeated in Mr W’s Letter of Complaint. The Lender may argue, in response to this provisional decision, that the wording used in Mrs W’s statement is simply a factual description of how the Fractional Club worked, and there is no explicit suggestion by Mrs W in her statement that they were led to expect a financial gain from the timeshare. But I can’t see what “...a return on our investment” could reasonably and realistically have meant in the context of the sale of an asset backed timeshare given everything else I know about the sale (which I shall expand on below) and Mr and Mrs W’s reasons for making the purchase.

I acknowledge that there are some inconsistencies in Mrs W's statement regarding how they came to be at the sales presentation and indeed where it was. But inconsistencies are a normal part of trying to recollect an event that happened a long time ago. So, even if Mrs M's recollections are questionable in places, this doesn't necessarily exclude the possibility that there is a core of acceptable evidence within the overall body of her testimony⁴.

The Lender may also argue that Mrs W's second statement, dated 15 August 2019, makes no mention of the Supplier saying anything about an investment. And I have considered this. But I do not see that this calls into question what she said in her first statement – on the contrary, I think it was written to add some further context to the other aspects of Mr W's complaint.

So, given the overall content of Mrs W's statements, and what is said in Mr W's Letter of Complaint, Mr W alleges, therefore, that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) at the Time of Sale because there were two aspects to their Fractional Club membership: holiday rights and a profit on the sale of the Allocated Property.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. In Shawbrook & BPF v FOS, the parties agreed that, by reference to the decided authorities, "an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit" at [56]. I will use the same definition.

Mr and Mrs W's share in the Allocated Property clearly, in my view, constituted an investment as it offered them the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs W in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is evidence in this complaint that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs W, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. There were, for instance, disclaimers in the contemporaneous paperwork that state that Fractional Club membership was not sold to Mr and Mrs W as an investment.

For example, in the Member's Declaration document, there are 15 statements, each initialled and then the page signed as having been read. These include:

"5. We understand that the purchase of our Fraction is for the primary purpose of holidays and is not specifically for direct purposes of a trade in and that [the Supplier] makes no representation as to the future price or value of the Fraction."

⁴ Smith v. Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWHC 1954 (QB)

And the Standard Information form, for example, stipulated the following on page 8 under the heading "Primary Purpose":

"The purchase of Fractional Rights is for the primary purpose of holidays and is neither specifically for direct purposes of a trade in nor as an investment in real estate. [The Supplier] makes no representation as to the future price or value of the Allocated Property or any Fractional rights."

When read on their own and together, these disclaimers go some way to making the point that the purchase of Fractional Rights shouldn't be viewed as an investment. But they weren't to be read on their own. They had to be read in conjunction with what else the Standard Information Form had to say, which included the following disclaimer:

11. Investment advice

The Vendor, any sales or marketing agent and the Manager and their related businesses (a) are not licenced investment advisors authorized by the Financial Services Authority to provide investment or financial advice; (b) all the information has been obtained solely from their own experience as investors and is provided as general information only and as such it is not intended for use as a source of investment advice and (c) all purchasers are advised to obtain competent advice from legal, accounting and investment advisors to determine their own specific investment needs; (d) no warranty is given as to any future values or returns in respect of an Allocated Property.

This disclaimer seems to have been aimed at distancing the Supplier from any investment advice that was given by its sales agents, telling customers to take their own investment advice, and repeating the point that the returns from membership from the Fractional Club weren't guaranteed.

Yet I think it would be fair to say that, while a prospective member who read the disclaimer in question might well have thought that they would be wise to seek professional investment advice in relation to membership of the Fractional Club, rather than rely on anything they might have been told by the Supplier, it wouldn't have done much to dissuade them from regarding membership as an investment. In fact, I think it would have achieved rather the opposite.

It's also difficult to explain why it was necessary to include such a disclaimer in the Standard Information Form if there wasn't a very real risk of the Supplier marketing and selling membership of the Fractional Club as an investment given the difficulty of articulating the benefit of fractional ownership in a way that distinguishes it from other timeshares from the viewpoint of prospective members.

However, weighing up what happened in practice is, in my view, rarely as simple as looking at the contemporaneous paperwork. And there are a number of strands to Mr W's allegation that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) at the Time of Sale, including (1) that membership of the Fractional Club was expressly described as an "investment" in several different contexts and (2) that membership of the Fractional Club could make them a financial gain and/or would retain or increase in value.

So, I have considered:

- (1) *whether it is more likely than not that the Supplier, at the Time of Sale, sold or marketed membership of the Fractional Club as an investment, i.e. told Mr and Mrs W or led them to believe during the marketing and/or sales process that membership of the Fractional Club was an investment and/or offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit); and, in turn*
- (2) *whether the Supplier's actions constituted a breach of Regulation 14(3).*

And for reasons I'll now come on to, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I think the answer to both of these questions is 'yes'.

How the Supplier marketed and sold the Fractional Club membership

During the course of the Financial Ombudsman Service's work on complaints about the sale of timeshares, the Supplier has provided training material used to prepare its sales representatives – including a document called "2011 Spain PTM FPOC 1 Practice Slides Manual" (the '2011 Fractional Training Manual').

As I understand it, the 2011 Fractional Training Manual was used throughout the sale of the Supplier's first version of a product called the Fractional Property Owners Club – which I've referred to and will continue to refer to as the Fractional Club. It isn't entirely clear whether Mr and Mrs W would have been shown the slides included in the Manual. But it seems to me to be reasonably indicative of:

- (1) *the training the Supplier's sales representatives would have got before selling Fractional Club membership; and*
- (2) *how the sales representatives would have framed the sale of Fractional Club membership to Mr and Mrs W.*

Having looked through the manual, my attention is drawn to page 6 (of 41) – which includes the following slide on it:



This slide titled "Why Fractional?" indicates that sales representatives would have taken Mr and Mrs W through three holidaying options along with their positives and negatives:

- (1) *"Rent Your Holidays"*
- (2) *"Buy a Holiday Home"*
- (3) *The "Best of Both Worlds"*

It was the first slide in the 2011 Fractional Training Manual to set out any information about Fractional Club membership and I think it suggests that sales representatives were likely to have made the point to Mr and Mrs W that membership combined the best of (1) and (2) –

which included choice, flexibility, convenience and, significantly, an investment they could use, enjoy and sell before getting money back.

The manual then moved on to two slides (on pages 7 and 8) concerned with how Fractional Club membership worked:



I'm aware that the Supplier says that 90-95% of its time during its sales presentations was focused on holidays rather than the sale of an allocated property. Having looked through the 2011 Fractional Training Manual, it seems to me that there were 10 slides on how Fractional Club membership worked before the slides moved onto to sections titled "Peace of Mind", "Resort Management" and "Which Fractional". And as 5 of the 10 slides look like they focused on holidays, there seems to me to have been a fairly even split during the Supplier's sales presentations between marketing membership of the Fractional Club as a way of buying an interest in property and as a way of taking holidays.

However, even if more time was spent on marketing membership of Fractional Club membership as a way of taking holidays rather than buying an interest in property, as the slides above suggest, in my view, that the Supplier's sales representatives would have probably led prospective members to believe that a share in an allocated property was an investment (after all, that's what the slide titled "Why Fractional" expressly described it as), I can't see why the Supplier wouldn't have been in breach of Regulation 14(3) in those circumstances.

I acknowledge that there was no comparison between the expected level of financial return and the purchase price of Fractional Club membership. However, if I were to only concern myself with express efforts to quantify to Mr and Mrs W the financial value of the proprietary interest they were offered, I think that would involve taking too narrow a view of the prohibition against marketing and selling timeshares as an investment in Regulation 14(3).

When the Government consulted on the implementation of the Timeshare Regulations, it discussed what marketing or selling a timeshare as an investment might look like – saying that '[a] trader must not market or sell a timeshare or [long-term] holiday product as an investment. For example, there should not be any inference that the cost of the contract would be recoupable at a profit in the future (see regulation 14(3)).'⁵ And in my view that must have been correct because it would defeat the consumer-protection purpose of Regulation 14(3) if the concepts of marketing and selling a timeshare as an investment were interpreted too restrictively.

So, if a supplier implied to consumers that future financial returns (in the sense of possible profits) from a timeshare were a good reason to purchase it, I think its conduct was likely to have fallen foul of the prohibition against marketing or selling the product as an investment.

Mrs W says, in her own words, that the Supplier positioned membership of the Fractional Club as an investment to them. And as I've said before, the slides I've referred to above seem to me to reflect the training the Supplier's sales representatives would have got before selling Fractional Club membership and, in turn, how they would have probably framed the sale of the Fractional Club to prospective members – including Mr and Mrs W. And as the slides clearly indicate that the Supplier's sales representative was likely to have led them to believe that membership of the Fractional Club was an investment that may lead to a financial gain (i.e., a profit) in the future, I don't find her either implausible or hard to believe when she says they were told "...if we purchased fractional points, we would be investing in a property that would be sold in the future and we would make a return on our investment". On the contrary, in the absence of evidence to persuade me otherwise, I think that's likely to be what Mr and Mrs W were led by the Supplier to believe at the relevant time. And for that reason, I think the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement.

As the Supreme Court's judgment in Plevin makes clear, it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of Section 140A. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

I am also mindful of what HHJ Waksman QC (as he then was) and HHJ Worster had to say in Carney and Kerrigan (respectively) on causation.

In Carney, HHJ Waksman QC said the following in paragraph 51:

"[...] In cases of wrong advice and misrepresentation, it would be odd if any relief could be considered if they did not have at least some material impact on the debtor when deciding whether or not to enter the agreement. [...] in a case like the one before me, if in fact the debtors would have entered into the agreement in any event, this must surely count against a finding of unfair relationship under s140A. [...]"

⁵ The Department for Business Innovation & Skills "Consultation on Implementation of EU Directive 2008/122/EC on Timeshare, Long-Term Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts (July 2010)". <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a78d54ded915d0422065b2a/10-500-consultation-directive-timeshare-holiday.pdf>

And in Kerrigan, HHJ Worster said this in paragraphs 213 and 214:

*“[...] The terms of section 140A(1) CCA do not impose a requirement of “causation” in the sense that the debtor must show that a breach caused a loss for an award of substantial damages to be made. The focus is on the unfairness of the relationship, and the court’s approach to the granting of relief is informed by that, rather than by a demonstration that a particular act caused a particular loss. Section 140A(1) provides only that the court **may** make an order **if** it determines that the relationship is unfair to the debtor. [...]*

[...] There is a link between (i) the failings of the creditor which lead to the unfairness in the relationship, (ii) the unfairness itself, and (iii) the relief. It is not to be analysed in the sort of linear terms which arise when considering causation proper. The court is to have regard to all the relevant circumstances when determining whether the relationship is unfair, and the same sort of approach applies when considering what relief is required to remedy that unfairness. [...]”

So, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr W and the Lender that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3)⁶ led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and Mr W into the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

On my reading of Mrs W’s testimony, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase. That doesn’t mean they were not interested in holidays. Her own testimony demonstrates that they quite clearly were, and that is not surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But I have not seen enough evidence to persuade me that the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was so insignificant, in their view, compared to the holiday rights that came with membership that their “desire” for holidays rendered the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) unimportant to the decision they ultimately made.

Neither Mr or Mrs W have said or suggested, for example, that they would have pressed ahead with the purchase in question had the Supplier not led them to believe that Fractional Club membership was an appealing investment opportunity. And as Mr W faced the prospect of borrowing and repaying a substantial sum of money while subjecting himself to long-term financial commitments, had they not been encouraged by the prospect of a financial gain from membership of the Fractional Club, I have not seen enough to persuade me that they would have pressed ahead with their purchase regardless.

As I’ve said, given that it was likely that the sale of Fractional Club was pitched as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), and I think it likely that the potential for an increased financial return was an important driver for Mr and Mrs S in their purchase of the Fractional Club membership, it follows that the associated credit relationship under the Credit Agreement with the Lender was rendered unfair to Mr W as a result.

Conclusion

Given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I think the Lender participated in and perpetuated an unfair credit relationship with Mr W under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement for the purposes of Section 140A. And with that being the case, taking everything into account, I think it is fair and reasonable that I uphold this complaint.

⁶ (which, having taken place during its antecedent negotiations with Mr W, is covered by Section 56 of the CCA, falls within the notion of “any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor” for the purposes of 140(1)(c) of the CCA and deemed to be something done by the Lender)

Did the unfairness caused by the purchase of Fractional Club end when it was traded in for a further purchase?

As I've said, on 25 March 2014, Mr and Mrs W traded in their Fractional Club membership, paying an additional sum and adding a further 1,073 fractional points to their existing 747 by entering into a different purchase agreement for Fractional Club 2, thereby 'upgrading' and replacing their original Purchase Agreement. The credit relationship Mr W had with the Lender continued until the balance was cleared in April 2016.

As a result of their purchase of Fractional Club 2, it is necessary to consider whether the unfairness caused to Mr W from the purchase of the original Fractional Club at the Time of Sale continued, and if it did continue, what were the ongoing consequences.

While the Supplier gave Mr and Mrs L £10,995 credit for their original Fractional Club membership, this credit wasn't the equivalent of cash. It was a deduction from a starting price set by the Supplier itself for Mr and Mrs W's upgrade to Fractional Club 2. And as there is no information to indicate what the market value was of the Allocated Property connected to their subsequent purchase, there is no evidence that the starting price of that 'upgrade' represented the objective value of the benefits under the new purchase agreement, as opposed to a commercial opening position from which the Supplier would and could profitably offer deductions or discounts. And as £10,995 was almost exactly the purchase price originally attached to their Fractional Club purchase, it cannot be said that the upgrade to Fractional Club 2 on 25 March 2014 improved Mr and Mrs L's position financially.

However, I have thought about the extent to which responsibility for the situation after their purchase of Fractional Club 2 must be attributed to the Supplier and the Lender. As the credit agreement associated with the Purchase of Fractional Club 2 was from a different provider, I cannot see it would be fair and reasonable to hold the Lender responsible for any aspect of the Time of Sale 2. So, I do not think that the Lender should have to answer for the financial consequences specifically associated with the 1,073 additional fractional points Mr and Mrs W purchased in March 2014.

Formally, the agreement Mr and Mrs W entered into in March 2014 was a new contract that superseded the old one. But I think the purpose of this upgrade was to continue and supplement their existing Fractional Club membership.

With all of that being the case, I therefore think that the upgrade was really just a top-up of Mr and Mrs W's fractional points by rolling over those that they had and providing them, as members of the Fractional Club 2, with enough points to enable them to take holidays in better and more luxurious accommodation, albeit while also holding an interest in the net sales proceeds of a different Allocated Property.

And as the function of the Supplier's £10,995 credit was to roll over Mr and Mrs W's existing fractional points into their upgrade, I'm not persuaded that the purchase of Fractional Club 2 ended the unfairness to Mr W in his credit relationship with the Lender. I think their original purchase of Fractional Club, and the associated Credit Agreement with the Lender had ongoing financial consequences for him, which continued the unfair relationship with the Lender. And for that reason, it is my view that the Lender is still answerable for them.

The PR, on behalf of the estate of Mr W, accepted my provisional findings, but the Lender did not respond.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable

in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done so, and having reconsidered everything afresh, I see no reason to depart from my provisional findings as set out above.

Putting things right

Fair Compensation

Having found that Mr and Mrs W would not have agreed to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale were it not for the breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations by the Supplier (as deemed agent for the Lender), and the impact of that breach meaning that, in my view, the relationship between the Lender and Mr W was unfair under section 140A of the CCA, I think it would be fair and reasonable to put the estate of Mr W back in the position it would have been in had Mr and Mrs W not purchased the Fractional Club membership (i.e., not entered into the Purchase Agreement), and therefore Mr W had not entered into the Credit Agreement. This is on the proviso that the estate of Mr W agrees to assign to the Lender 747 of its Fractional Points or hold them on trust for the Lender if that can be achieved.

Here's what I think needs to be done to compensate the estate of Mr W with that being the case – whether or not a court would award such compensation:

- (1) The Lender should refund the estate of Mr W the repayments that were made to it under the Credit Agreement.
- (2) The Lender can deduct
 - i. The value of any promotional giveaways that Mr and Mrs W used or took advantage of; and
 - ii. The market value of the holidays* Mr and Mrs W took using their Fractional Points (if any).

(the 'Net Repayments')

*I recognise that it can be difficult to reasonably and reliably determine the market value of holidays when they were taken a long time ago and might not have been available on the open market. So, if it isn't practical or possible to determine the market value of the holidays Mr and Mrs W took using their Fractional Points, deducting the relevant annual management charges (that correspond to the year(s) in which one or more holidays were taken) payable under the Purchase Agreement seems to me to be a practical and proportionate alternative in order to reasonably reflect their usage.

- (3) Simple interest⁷ at 8% per annum should be added to each of the Net Repayments from the date each one was made until the date the Lender settles this complaint.
- (4) The Lender should remove any adverse information recorded on the late Mr W's credit files in connection with the Credit Agreement.

However, as I don't think the effects of the unfairness in question ended when Mr and Mrs W upgraded their Fractional Club membership in March 2014, and as I think their original 747 fractional points were essentially rolled over into their upgrade and had ongoing financial consequences for them, the compensation needs to reflect that.

⁷ HM Revenue & Customs may require the Lender to take off tax from this interest. If that's the case, the Lender must give the consumer a certificate showing how much tax it's taken off if they ask for one.

So, in my view, the Lender also needs to refund to the estate of Mr W the proportion of the management charges that Mr and Mrs W actually paid after 25 March 2014 that relate to those 747 points. These equate to 41%⁸ of the 1,820 points Mr and Mrs W actually ended up with. So, in addition to the Net Repayments above:

- (1) The Lender should refund 41% of the annual management charge(s) paid by Mr and Mrs W from 25 March 2014 onwards (if any) less a deduction for any holiday⁹ they took using the fractional points relating to Fractional Club 2.
- (2) Simple interest at 8% per annum should be added to this amount from the date each charge was paid until the date of settlement.

It is possible that the Supplier might pursue the estate of Mr W for other costs in addition to the annual management charges arising from the Fractional Club 2 membership, so there is the possibility of continuing detriment that I think needs addressing. So, in keeping with what I've said above, the Lender should indemnify the estate of Mr W against 41% of any other liabilities accruing from 25 March 2014 onwards that result from Mr and Mrs W's ownership of Fractional Rights.

This, together with what I've said in the paragraphs above will achieve, as closely as I can in this complaint, the same financial position for the estate of Mr W as if Mr and Mrs W had never joined the Fractional Club in the first place.

My final decision

I uphold this complaint against that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna and direct it to pay fair compensation as set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask the estate of Mr W to accept or reject my decision before 21 November 2024.

Chris Riggs
Ombudsman

⁸ Rounded to the nearest whole number.

⁹ See Section (1) (ii) above