

## The complaint

Mrs R complains that Revolut Ltd won't refund money she lost when she fell victim to an investment scam.

Mrs R is being represented by a claims management company in this complaint.

## What happened

The detailed background to this complaint is well known to the parties and has been previously set out by the investigator. I'll only provide an overview and focus on giving my reasons for my decision.

The complaint concerns four debit card payments totalling around £24,500 which Mrs R made from a newly created Revolut account in January 2023. They were made in connection with an investment opportunity Mrs R came across on a popular social media platform which she states had been recommended by a media personality. After leaving her details, Mrs R was contacted by a representative of the company who said they were her 'personal finance adviser'. Mrs R understood she would get the maximum profit of 60% for an investment of £10,000.

Mrs R made a small initial deposit from her main bank. Encouraged by the profits that it made, under the instructions of her adviser, Mrs R set up an e-money account with Revolut and transferred funds from her account with her bank to the new account. The money was then used to purchase cryptocurrency from a well-known cryptocurrency provider, before being sent to cryptocurrency wallets as instructed. The use of remote access software was involved. Some of the deposits into the investment were funded by a loan taken out with a third-party lender. When Mrs R was unable to make a withdrawal and was told she needed to make further payments, she realised she'd fallen victim to a scam and reported it to Revolut.

Mrs R made the following disputed payments using her Revolut debit card –

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Payment 1	23 January	£9,000
Payment 2	23 January	£790
Payment 3	25 January	£9,800
Payment 4	26 January	£5,000
	<b>Total payments</b>	<b>£24,590</b>

Revolut declined to refund any of the disputed payments, saying that Mrs R had authorised them. Unhappy with this, she referred her complaint to our service.

Our investigator concluded that Revolut ought to have provided a written warning tailored to cryptocurrency investment scams when Mrs R made Payment 1. Had it done so, the investigator was persuaded that Mrs R would have stopped in her tracks and losses prevented. They asked Revolut to refund Mrs R's losses along with interest but with a 50%

deduction for contributory negligence. The investigator thought returns promised were too good to be true and Mrs R would likely have lied about the loan purpose when she took out the loan.

Revolut accepted the investigator's recommendations, but Mrs R didn't agree that 50% deduction was fair. She said the scammer took out the loan without her consent and the lender didn't contact her at any point. Her representative also submitted that the maximum profit wasn't guaranteed.

While the complaint was awaiting an ombudsman's decision, the investigator contacted the third-party lender. It said it rejected Mrs R's fraud claim as she was aware a loan was being applied for in her name after being advised of this by the scammer. The application was made using Mrs R's genuine details and loan funds paid into her account, from where they were transferred out.

The investigator also contacted the bank from where the remaining funds originated. It confirmed that Mrs R selected 'property/large purchase' as the reason for the £10,000 transfer she made to her Revolut account. A scam warning was displayed during the payment journey. The bank also confirmed that Mrs R phoned the bank later that day, although the call recording and system notes were no longer available. The bank did say that Mrs R would have only needed to call if the payment was declined after it had been authorised.

In addition to these enquiries, the investigator also reached out to Mrs R's representative and queried the additional loan applications (which were subsequently declined) which were referenced in her chat correspondence with the scammer. Mrs R explained that one of the loan applications was also completed by the scammer but declined when she didn't sign the paperwork. The other loan application was made by her husband in his name, but it was declined following credit checks. Both applications had the loan purpose as home improvements.

The investigator contacted Revolut and it confirmed that it still accepted their original recommendation of refunding 50% of Mrs R's payments along with interest. But it said it would only agree to paying interest up till the date it accepted the investigator's findings.

Given the additional information received and Revolut's position on limiting the interest award, the investigator issued a revised assessment. They were satisfied that Mrs R was aware of the loan being taken out in her name and gave consent to the scammer to do so. The investigator also remained persuaded that it was fair to make a 50% deduction for contributory negligence, given Mrs R wasn't honest with her bank about the reason for making the transfer to Revolut – both at the time of making the payment ('investment' and 'crypto' were included in the list of payment reasons) and later when she needed to phone the bank (given it would likely have uncovered the scam if she'd explained what she was doing).

With regards to the interest award, the investigator didn't think limiting it to the date of acceptance of the initial outcome was fair. So, they recommended Revolut to add interest until the date of settlement.

Mrs R accepted the investigator's revised findings. But Revolut asked for the complaint to be determined by an ombudsman. In summary, it said the payments were self to self and the scam didn't occur on Revolut's platform. And that it may be applicable for the Financial Ombudsman Service to exercise its powers under DISP to inform Mrs R that it could be appropriate to make a complaint against another respondent if necessary. As well as to consider possible interventions by other banks in the multi-stage fraud.

## What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

I'd like to start by thanking both parties for their continued patience while waiting for the complaint to be reviewed by an ombudsman.

In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (in this case the 2017 regulations) and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

And, as the Supreme Court has recently reiterated in *Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC*, subject to some limited exceptions banks have a contractual duty to make payments in compliance with the customer's instructions.

In that case, the Supreme Court considered the nature and extent of the contractual duties owed by banks to their customers when making payments. Among other things, it said, in summary:

- The starting position is that it is an implied term of any current account contract that, where a customer has authorised and instructed a bank to make a payment, it must carry out the instruction promptly. It is not for the bank to concern itself with the wisdom or risk of its customer's payment decisions.
- At paragraph 114 of the judgment the court noted that express terms of the current account contract may modify or alter that position. In *Philipp*, the contract permitted Barclays not to follow its consumer's instructions where it reasonably believed the payment instruction was the result of APP fraud; but the court said having the right to decline to carry out an instruction was not the same as being under a legal duty to do so.

In this case, the terms of Revolut's contract with Mrs R modified the starting position described in *Philipp*, by – among other things – expressly requiring Revolut to refuse or delay a payment *"if legal or regulatory requirements prevent us from making the payment or mean that we need to carry out further checks"* (section 20).

So Revolut was required by the terms of its contract to refuse payments in certain circumstances, including to comply with regulatory requirements such as the Financial Conduct Authority's Principle for Businesses 6, which required financial services firms to pay due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly. I'm satisfied that paying due regard to the interests of its customers and treating them fairly meant Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and refused card payments in some circumstances to carry out further checks.

In practice Revolut did in some instances refuse or delay payments at the time where it suspected its customer might be at risk of falling victim to a scam.

I must also take into account that the basis on which I am required to decide complaints is broader than the simple application of contractual terms and the regulatory requirements referenced in those contractual terms. I must determine the complaint by reference to what is, in my opinion, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case (DISP 3.6.1R) taking into account the considerations set out at DISP 3.6.4R.

While the relevant regulations and law (including the law of contract) are both things I must take into account in deciding this complaint, I'm also obliged to take into account regulator's guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time: see DISP 3.6.4R. So, in addition to taking into account the legal position created by Revolut's standard contractual terms, I also must have regard to these other matters in reaching my decision.

Looking at what is fair and reasonable on the basis set out at DISP 3.6.4R, I consider that Revolut should in January 2023 have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances.

In reaching the view that Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances, I'm mindful that in practice all banks and EMI's like Revolut did in fact seek to take those steps, often by:

- using algorithms to identify transactions presenting an increased risk of fraud<sup>1</sup>;
- requiring consumers to provide additional information about the purpose of transactions during the payment authorisation process;
- using the confirmation of payee system for authorised push payments;
- providing increasingly tailored and specific automated warnings, or in some circumstances human intervention, when an increased risk of fraud is identified.

For example, it is my understanding that in January 2023, Revolut, whereby if it identified a scam risk associated with a card payment through its automated systems, could (and sometimes did) initially decline to make that payment, in order to ask some additional questions (for example through its in-app chat).

I'm also mindful that:

- Electronic Money Institutions like Revolut are required to conduct their business with "due skill, care and diligence" (FCA Principle for Businesses 2), "integrity" (FCA Principle for Businesses 1) and a firm "must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems" (FCA Principle for Businesses 3)<sup>2</sup>.
- Over the years, the FCA, and its predecessor the FSA, have published a series of publications setting out non-exhaustive examples of good and poor practice found when reviewing measures taken by firms to counter financial crime, including various iterations of the "Financial crime: a guide for firms".
- Regulated firms are required to comply with legal and regulatory anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism requirements. Those

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Revolut's website explains it launched an automated anti-fraud system in August 2018: [https://www.revolut.com/news/revolut\\_unveils\\_new\\_fleet\\_of\\_machine\\_learning\\_technology\\_that\\_has\\_seen\\_a\\_fourfold\\_reduction\\_in\\_card\\_fraud\\_and\\_had\\_offers\\_from\\_banks/](https://www.revolut.com/news/revolut_unveils_new_fleet_of_machine_learning_technology_that_has_seen_a_fourfold_reduction_in_card_fraud_and_had_offers_from_banks/)

<sup>2</sup> Since 31 July 2023 under the FCA's new Consumer Duty package of measures, banks and other regulated firms must act to deliver good outcomes for customers (Principle 12), but the circumstances of this complaint pre-date the Consumer Duty and so it does not apply.

requirements include maintaining proportionate and risk-sensitive policies and procedures to identify, assess and manage money laundering risk – for example through customer due-diligence measures and the ongoing monitoring of the business relationship (including through the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship). I don't suggest that Revolut ought to have had concerns about money laundering or financing terrorism here, but I nevertheless consider these requirements to be relevant to the consideration of Revolut's obligation to monitor its customer's accounts and scrutinise transactions.

- The October 2017, BSI Code<sup>3</sup>, which a number of banks and trade associations were involved in the development of, recommended firms look to identify and help prevent transactions – particularly unusual or out of character transactions – that could involve fraud or be the result of a scam. Not all firms signed the BSI Code (and Revolut was not a signatory), but the standards and expectations it referred to represented a fair articulation of what was, in my opinion, already good industry practice in October 2017 particularly around fraud prevention, and it remains a starting point for what I consider to be the minimum standards of good industry practice now (regardless of the fact the BSI was withdrawn in 2022).
- Revolut should also have been aware of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency when considering the scams that its customers might become victim to. Multi-stage fraud involves money passing through more than one account under the consumer's control before being sent to a fraudster. Our service has seen a significant increase in this type of fraud over the past few years – particularly where the immediate destination of funds is a cryptocurrency wallet held in the consumer's own name. And, increasingly, we have seen the use of an EMI (like Revolut) as an intermediate step between a high street bank account and cryptocurrency wallet.
- The main card networks, Visa and Mastercard, don't allow for a delay between receipt of a payment instruction and its acceptance: the card issuer has to choose straight away whether to accept or refuse the payment. They also place certain restrictions on their card issuers' right to decline payment instructions. The essential effect of these restrictions is to prevent indiscriminate refusal of whole classes of transaction, such as by location. The network rules did not, however, prevent card issuers from declining particular payment instructions from a customer, based on a perceived risk of fraud that arose from that customer's pattern of usage. So it was open to Revolut to decline card payments where it suspected fraud, as indeed Revolut does in practice (see above).

Overall, taking into account relevant law, regulators rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time, I consider it fair and reasonable in January 2023 that Revolut should:

- have been monitoring accounts and any payments made or received to counter various risks, including preventing fraud and scams;
- have had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate that its customers were at risk of fraud (among other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which firms are generally more familiar with than the average customer;

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<sup>3</sup> BSI: PAS 17271: 2017" Protecting customers from financial harm as result of fraud or financial abuse"

- in some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, or provided additional warnings, before processing a payment – (as in practice Revolut sometimes does); and
- have been mindful of – among other things – common scam scenarios, how the fraudulent practices are evolving (including for example the common use of multi-stage fraud by scammers, including the use of payments to cryptocurrency accounts as a step to defraud consumers) and the different risks these can present to consumers, when deciding whether to intervene.

While I'm required to take into account the matters set out at DISP 3.6.4R when deciding what is fair and reasonable, I'm satisfied that to comply with the regulatory requirements that were in place in January 2023, Revolut should in any event have taken these steps.

*Should Revolut have recognised that Mrs R was at risk of financial harm from fraud?*

It isn't in dispute that Mrs R has fallen victim to a cruel scam here, nor that she authorised the payments she made to her cryptocurrency wallet (from where that cryptocurrency was subsequently transferred to the scammer).

I'm aware that cryptocurrency exchanges generally stipulate that the card used to purchase cryptocurrency at its exchange must be held in the name of the account holder, as must the account used to receive cash payments from the exchange. Revolut would likely have been aware of this fact too. So, it could have reasonably assumed that most of the disputed payments would be credited to a cryptocurrency wallet held in Mrs R's name.

By January 2023, when these transactions started, firms like Revolut had been aware of the risk of multi-stage scams involving cryptocurrency for some time. Scams involving cryptocurrency have increased over time. The FCA and Action Fraud published warnings about cryptocurrency scams in mid-2018 and figures published by the latter show that losses suffered to cryptocurrency scams have continued to increase since. They reached record levels in 2022. During that time, cryptocurrency was typically allowed to be purchased through many high street banks with few restrictions.

By the end of 2022, however, many of the high street banks had taken steps to either limit their customer's ability to purchase cryptocurrency using their bank accounts or increase friction in relation to cryptocurrency related payments, owing to the elevated risk associated with such transactions<sup>4</sup>. This left a smaller number of payment service providers, including Revolut, that allowed customers to use their accounts to purchase cryptocurrency with few restrictions. These restrictions – and the reasons for them – would have been well known across the industry.

I recognise that, as a result of the actions of other payment service providers, many customers who wish to purchase cryptocurrency for legitimate purposes will be more likely to use the services of an EMI, such as Revolut. And I'm also mindful that a significant majority of cryptocurrency purchases made using a Revolut account will be legitimate and not related to any kind of fraud (as Revolut has told our service). However, our service has also seen numerous examples of consumers being directed by fraudsters to use Revolut accounts in order to facilitate the movement of the victim's money from their high street bank account to a cryptocurrency provider, a fact that Revolut is aware of.

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<sup>4</sup> See for example, Santander's limit of £1,000 per transaction and £3,000 in any 30-day rolling period introduced in November 2022.

NatWest Group, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and Santander had all introduced some restrictions on specific cryptocurrency exchanges by August 2021.

So, taking into account all of the above I'm satisfied that by the end of 2022, prior to the payments Mrs R made, Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have recognised that its customers could be at an increased risk of fraud when using its services to purchase cryptocurrency, notwithstanding that the payment would often be made to a cryptocurrency wallet in the consumer's own name.

Taking all of the above into account, and in light of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency, I don't think that the fact the payments in this case were going to an account held in Mrs R's own name should have led Revolut to believe there wasn't a risk of fraud.

So I've gone on to consider, taking into account what Revolut knew about the payments, at what point, if any, it ought to have identified that Mrs R might be at a heightened risk of fraud that merited its intervention.

I think Revolut should have identified that the payments were going to a cryptocurrency provider (the merchant involved is a well-known cryptocurrency provider). Given the amount involved and what Revolut knew about the destination of the payment, I think that the circumstances should have led Revolut to consider that Mrs R was at heightened risk of financial harm from fraud when she attempted to make Payment 1. In line with good industry practice and regulatory requirements, I'm satisfied that it is fair and reasonable to conclude that Revolut should have warned its customer before this payment went ahead.

#### What did Revolut do to warn Mrs R?

Revolut didn't provide any warnings to Mrs R before executing her authorised instructions in relation to the disputed payments.

#### What kind of warning should Revolut have provided?

I've thought carefully about what a proportionate warning in light of the risk presented would be in these circumstances. In doing so, I've taken into account that many payments that look very similar to this one will be entirely genuine. I've given due consideration to Revolut's duty to make payments promptly, as well as what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time this payment was made.

Taking that into account, I think Revolut ought, when Mrs R attempted to make Payment 1, knowing (or strongly suspecting) that the payment was going to a cryptocurrency provider, to have provided a warning (whether automated or in some other form) that was specifically about the risk of cryptocurrency scams, given how prevalent they had become by the end of 2022. In doing so, I recognise that it would be difficult for such a warning to cover off every permutation and variation of cryptocurrency scam, without significantly losing impact.

So, at this point in time, I think that such a warning should have addressed the key risks and features of the most common cryptocurrency scams – cryptocurrency investment scams. The warning Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have provided should have highlighted, in clear and understandable terms, the key features of common cryptocurrency investment scams, for example referring to: an advertisement on social media, promoted by a celebrity or public figure; an 'account manager', 'broker' or 'trader' acting on their behalf; returns that are too good to be true; the use of remote access software; and a small initial deposit which quickly increases in value.

I recognise that a warning of that kind could not have covered off all scenarios. But I think it would have been a proportionate way for Revolut to minimise the risk of financial harm to

Mrs R by covering the key features of scams affecting many customers but not imposing a level of friction disproportionate to the risk the payment presented.

*If Revolut had provided a warning of the type described, would that have prevented the losses Mrs R suffered from Payment 1?*

I've thought carefully about whether a specific warning covering off the key features of cryptocurrency investment scams would have likely prevented any further loss in this case. And on the balance of probabilities, I think it would have. There were several key hallmarks of common cryptocurrency investment scams present in the circumstances of Miss R's payments, such as an advertisement on social media, which was promoted by a well-known public figure, being assisted by a broker, and being asked to download remote access software so they could help her.

I've also reviewed the text conversation between Mrs R and the scammer (though I note that Mrs R appears to have also spoken to them, not just communicated by instant message, and I haven't heard those conversations). I've found nothing within those conversations that suggests Mrs R was asked, or agreed to, disregard any warning provided by Revolut. I've also seen no indication that Mrs R expressed mistrust of Revolut or financial firms in general. Neither do I think that the conversation demonstrates a closeness of relationship that Revolut would have found difficult to counter through a warning.

Mrs R's bank has told our service that it did provide a scam warning when she transferred £10,000 to Revolut on 21 January, i.e., two days prior to Payment 1. I've reviewed a screenshot of the warning the bank says Mrs R would have seen. It covers key features of impersonation and interception scams. As such, I wouldn't have expected it to have resonated with Mrs R.

I've kept in mind that Mrs R's bank didn't have the same information available to it as Revolut. At the time of making the transfer to Revolut, the most appropriate payment reason wasn't selected. So, the bank couldn't reasonably have known that Mrs R's payment was intended to purchase cryptocurrency. But as I've mentioned above, Revolut ought to have been aware that Mrs R's payment was going to a cryptocurrency provider. So, I would have expected it to have provided a warning specific to that.

On the balance of probabilities, had Revolut provided Mrs R with an impactful warning that gave details about cryptocurrency investment scams and how she could protect herself from the risk of fraud, I believe it would have resonated with her. She could have, for instance, paused and looked more closely into the broker before proceeding, as well as making further enquiries into cryptocurrency scams and whether or not the broker was regulated in the UK or abroad. I'm satisfied that a timely warning to Mrs R from Revolut would very likely have caused her to decide not to go ahead with Payment 1.

*Is it fair and reasonable for Revolut to be held responsible for Mrs R's loss?*

In reaching my decision about what is fair and reasonable, I've taken into account that Mrs R purchased cryptocurrency which credited an e-wallet held in her own name, rather than making a payment directly to the scammer. So, she remained in control of her money after she made the payments from her Revolut account, and it took further steps before the money was lost to the fraudsters.

I've carefully considered Revolut's view that in a multi-stage fraud, a complaint should also be considered against the firm where the funds originated – that is the account in which the funds were prior to the scam commencing.



But as I've set out in some detail above, I think that Revolut still should have recognised that Mrs R might have been at risk of financial harm from fraud when she made Payment 1, and in those circumstances it should have declined the payment and made further enquiries. If it had taken those steps, I'm satisfied it would have prevented the losses Mrs R suffered. The fact that the money used to fund the scam came from elsewhere and/or wasn't lost at the point it was transferred to Mrs R's own account does not alter that fact and I think Revolut can fairly be held responsible for her loss in such circumstances. I don't think there is any point of law or principle that says that a complaint should only be considered against either the firm that is the origin of the funds or the point of loss.

I've also considered that Mrs R has only complained against Revolut. I accept that it's possible that other firms might also have missed the opportunity to intervene or failed to act fairly and reasonably in some other way, and Miss M could instead, or in addition, have sought to complain against those firms. But she hasn't chosen to do that and ultimately, I can't compel her to. In those circumstances, I can only make an award against Revolut.

I'm also not persuaded it would be fair to reduce Mrs R's compensation in circumstances where: the consumer has only complained about one respondent from which they are entitled to recover their losses in full; has not complained against the other firm (and so is unlikely to recover any amounts apportioned to that firm); and where it is appropriate to hold a business such as Revolut responsible (that could have prevented the loss and is responsible for failing to do so). That isn't, to my mind, wrong in law or irrational but reflects the facts of the case and my view of the fair and reasonable position.

Ultimately, I must consider the complaint that has been referred to me (not those which haven't been or couldn't be referred to me) and for the reasons I have set out above, I'm satisfied that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for Mrs R's loss from Payment 1 (subject to a deduction for her own contribution which I will consider below).

As Revolut will be aware, where this service upholds a complaint, we look to put the consumer in the position they would be in if things had happened as they should. Our general approach is to tell the business to add simple interest at 8% per year to the refund, calculated from the date of payments to the date of settlement. I see no reason to depart from that approach when deciding what's fair in this case.

#### *Should Mrs R bear any responsibility for her losses?*

Mrs R has already accepted that she should share equal responsibility for what happened here. But for completeness, I'll explain why I agree that it would be both fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint that Revolut's liability is reduced by 50%.

There's a general principle in law that consumers must take responsibility for their decisions. I recognise that, as a layperson who claims to have little investment experience, there were aspects to the scam that would have appeared convincing. Mrs R was introduced to it through an advert on social media which appeared to be recommended by a well-known media personality. I haven't seen this particular advert, but I've seen other examples. In my experience, they often appear as paid adverts on social media websites and a reasonable person might expect such adverts to be vetted in some way before being published. Those adverts also can be very convincing – often linking to what appears to be a trusted and familiar news source.

I've also taken into account the provision of the trading platform (which, I understand, used genuine, albeit manipulated, software to demonstrate the apparent success of trades). I know that the scammer used the apparent success of early trades to encourage increasingly large deposits. I can understand how what might have seemed like taking a

chance with a relatively small sum of money snowballed into losing a life changing amount of money.

So I've taken all of that into account when deciding whether it would be fair for the reimbursement due to Mrs R to be reduced. I think it should.

Mrs R doesn't appear to have done any research into the investment opportunity before she invested. That fact alone wouldn't necessarily be enough for me to consider that there should be a deduction to the amount awarded. But I'm concerned by the offer of return of 60% on an investment of £10,000. And Mrs R being advised not to worry about the loan taken out in her name as it would be paid directly by the company she was investing with. Reading the chat correspondence, the scammer goes on to say there was no risk at all as the money would stay in Mrs R's crypto wallet. I think this should, despite the overall plausibility of the scam, put her on notice that the scheme might not be genuine.

Also, as the investigator highlighted, Mrs R didn't select the correct payment purpose when her bank asked her the reason for transferring money to her Revolut account on 21 January. Had the most appropriate purpose been selected, the bank would likely have provided a warning that was more relevant to the scam type Mrs R was falling victim to. Moreover, the chat correspondence with the scammer confirms that the transfer was subsequently blocked by the bank and Mrs R phoned to discuss it. Although I can't say for certain what was discussed during the call, I can see from the chat correspondence that the scammer instructed Mrs R not to leave the conversation unless the bank does what she's asked them. On balance, I think it's unlikely Mrs R would have disclosed her intentions to the bank.

Weighing the fault that I've found on both sides, I think a fair deduction is 50%.

### **Putting things right**

Revolut Ltd needs to refund all the disputed payments, making a 50% deduction for contributory negligence.

Revolut Ltd also needs to add simple interest at 8% per year to the refunded amount, calculated from the date of loss to the date of settlement<sup>5</sup>.

### **My final decision**

For the reasons given, my final decision is that I uphold this complaint. I require Revolut Ltd to put things right for Mrs R as set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs R to accept or reject my decision before 6 January 2025.

Gagandeep Singh  
**Ombudsman**

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<sup>5</sup> If Revolut considers that it's required by HM Revenue & Customs to deduct income tax from that interest, it should tell Mrs R how much it's taken off. It should also give her a tax deduction certificate if she asks for one, so she can reclaim the tax from HM Revenue & Customs if appropriate.