

## The complaint

Mr R, who is a director of K, complains on their behalf that HSBC UK Bank Plc ('HSBC') won't refund the money they say was lost as the result of a scam.

## What happened

Mr R says he saw an advertisement for an investment with a company I'll refer to as B, and attended a webinar presented by B's director.

Mr R was told B would purchase cars with investors funds, then lease the cars out to individuals who might not otherwise be able to access a leased vehicle. Mr R was told he would receive a monthly return and, on maturity, a lump sum of capital and interest.

Mr R checked online reviews for B and saw positive reviews from previous investors who said they'd received their promised returns.

Mr R, on behalf of K, decided to invest and made the following payments from K's account.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Details of transaction</b>	<b>Amount</b>
21.8.2019	Payment to B	£4,000
22.8.2019	Payment to B	£10,000
28.10.2019	Payment to B	£4,000
29.10.2019	Payment to B	£10,000
27.2.2020	Payment to B	£7,000
28.2.2020	Payment to B	£7,000
22.12.2020	Payment to B	£100
22.12.2020	Payment to B	£7,900
23.12.2020	Payment to B	£10,000
24.12.2020	Payment to B	£10,000
18.2.2021	Payment to B	£4,000
19.2.2021	Payment to B	£5,000
21.2.2021	Payment to B	£5,000
	<b>Total payments</b>	<b>£84,000</b>

K received monthly returns between September 2019 and January 2021 of £11,529.39. In March 2021, B went into administration.

K didn't receive any further monthly returns or the lump sum payable on maturity.

Mr R believes the investment was a scam, and through a professional representative, raised a fraud claim with HSBC in 2023.

HSBC investigated K's fraud claim but declined to refund them. HSBC say as the payments weren't unusual or out of character, they didn't intervene when Mr R made them.

Mr R wasn't happy with HSBC's response, so he brought a complaint on behalf of K to our service.

An investigator looked into K's complaint and recommended HSBC refund their outstanding loss. The investigator said the evidence shows that K's funds weren't used for their intended purpose and were obtained by dishonest deception, so their claim is covered by the Contingent Reimbursement Model Code (CRM Code).

HSBC disagreed with the investigator's opinion and provided a substantive response, which included the following points:

- It is incorrect to assume that all investor's would receive security for their payments. Information provided by the administrators about different categories of investments has been overlooked.
- The opinion overly relies on the charges brought by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and conflates that development with the different CRM Code test for what is an APP scam.
- The opinion reaches unsafe conclusions on the application of the CRM Code
- It is premature for an opinion to be reached as there is insufficient evidence to reach liable conclusions.

HSBC also provided evidence which they say supports the points they've raised. The investigator provided a detailed response to the points HSBC raised post view.

As the case couldn't be resolved informally, it was passed to me to review.

### **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

In broad terms, the starting position in law is that HSBC are expected to process payments that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the customer's account and the Payment Services Regulations (PSR's).

#### Are K entitled to a refund under the CRM Code?

HSBC are a signatory of the CRM Code, which requires firms to reimburse customers who have been the victims of Authorised Push Payment (APP) scams, in all but a limited number of circumstances.

But, the CRM Code does not apply to private civil disputes, such as where a customer has paid a legitimate supplier for goods, services or digital content but has not received them, they are defective in some way, or the customer is otherwise dissatisfied with the supplier.

The CRM Code defines what is considered an APP scam as, "where the customer transferred funds to another person for what they believed were legitimate purposes, but which were in fact fraudulent".

In order to decide whether the circumstances under which Mr R made the payments for K, meets the definition of an APP scam, I need to consider:

- The purpose of the payment and whether Mr R thought this purpose was legitimate.

- The purpose the recipient (B) had in mind at the time of the payment and whether this was broadly in line with what Mr R understood the purpose to be.
- And, if I decide there was a significant difference in these purposes, whether I'm satisfied that was as a result of dishonest deception.

Mr R was making the payments to B as part of an investment. Based on the evidence that Mr R had available at the time, I haven't seen anything to suggest he didn't think this was a legitimate purpose.

So, I've gone on to consider what purpose B had in mind and whether it was in line with what Mr R thought.

In reaching an answer on what purpose B had in mind, I've considered the wider circumstances surrounding B, and the linked companies involved in the investment. The key information is:

- Following their investigation, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) said the defendants had provided false information to investors, "encouraging people to pay in whilst knowing that investments are not in reality backed up by the cars they had been promised".
- One of the linked companies (R) told the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) that it owned 1,200 cars, but the number of charges registered at Companies House was 69. The cars purchased were supposed to be new cars, but DVLA checks showed that 55 cars appeared to be second-hand. The business model relied to a large extent on securing deep discounts on new vehicles and such discounts would not be available on second-hand cars. There were other discrepancies found between what R told the FCA and what the DVLA checks showed.
- Administrators of one of the linked companies found that it entered into 3,600 investment agreements with individuals, which should've had specific secured vehicles. But the company only had title to approximately 600 vehicles.
- There is no evidence that cars were purchased with K's funds, or that security was registered at Companies House, as set out in the welcome letter and the vehicle funding form.

Based on this, I'm satisfied that K's funds weren't used for the intended purpose and that B obtained the funds through dishonest deception. So, I'm satisfied that K's payments meet the definition of an APP scam and are covered by the CRM Code.

The CRM Code says that K is entitled to a full refund unless HSBC can establish that an exception to reimbursement applies.

HSBC haven't provided any evidence or arguments that an exception to reimbursement applies, but for completeness, I have considered this point.

#### Does an exception to reimbursement apply?

Under the CRM Code, a bank may choose not to reimburse a customer if it can establish that\*:

- The customer made payments without having a reasonable basis for believing that the payee was the person the customer was expecting to pay; the payment was for genuine goods or service; and/or the person or business with whom they transacted was legitimate.
- The customer ignored effective warnings, by failing to take appropriate action in response to such an effective warning.

*\* There are further exceptions outlined in the CRM Code, but they don't apply to this case.*

I'm satisfied that Mr R had a reasonable basis for believing the investment was legitimate. I say this because he'd attended a webinar presented by a director of B. Also, B were an active company on Companies House, had positive reviews online and provided professional marketing material. Mr R also says he saw reviews from previous investors who had received the promised returns. I haven't seen any evidence that suggests there were warning signs that B wasn't offering a genuine investment when Mr R made the payments to B. So, HSBC couldn't rely on basis for belief as an exception to reimbursement.

HSBC say Mr R wasn't provided with a warning when he made the payments, as they weren't unusual or out of character. So, I can't fairly say he ignored an effective warning and HSBC can't rely on this exception to reimbursement either.

As, I'm not satisfied that HSBC can rely on an exception to reimbursement, K is entitled to a full refund of £84,000. HSBC can deduct from that refund the returns that K received (which total £11,529.39), meaning the net refund should be £72,470.61.

#### The interest award

Prior to the SFO completing their investigation, K's payments wouldn't have been covered by the CRM Code.

However, on the conclusion of the SFO's investigation on 19 January 2024, HSBC should've considered the available evidence and given K an answer under the CRM Code within 15 business days - as per R3 (1) (c) of the CRM Code.

This means interest should be calculated from 15 business days after 19 January 2024 (when the SFO investigation concluded) until the date of settlement. Interest is awarded at 8% simple per year.

It's possible that funds could be recovered at a later date through the administrators and HSBC are entitled to ask Mr R, on behalf of K, to sign an indemnity to cover this eventuality.

#### The points HSBC have raised

HSBC have raised a number of points in response to the view, which the investigator responded to in detail.

I'd like to reassure HSBC that I have considered all the points they've raised. But I've focused my decision on what I consider to be the crux of the complaint and how I've reached my decision.

The vehicle funding form, which is signed by Mr R and a representative of B, has an area for the completion of vehicle specifics including make, model, chassis, registration no, and date of registration. Also, the welcome letter specifically says that K's funds would be used to fund a vehicle with that security registered in their favour through Companies House. The lack of security registration isn't the sole reason I'm satisfied this is an APP scam but is one of the factors that I've taken into account. It's clear from the SFO's investigation and the charges against the directors, that the SFO are satisfied that the investment was fraudulent from the start.

Based on all the evidence that I've seen, I'm satisfied that I can reach a decision that K's payments are covered by the CRM Code for the reasons explained above. I'm not

persuaded I need to wait for any further updates from external parties or organisations to reach my decision.

### Claims made to the FSCS

The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is accepting customer claims submitted to it against Raedex Consortium Ltd. More information about FSCS's position on claims submitted to FSCS against Raedex can be found here:

<https://www.fscs.org.uk/making-a-claim/failed-firms/raedex/>

The FSCS is also aware that we have issued recent decisions upholding complaints against banks related to the Raedex investment scheme. Whether the FSCS pays any compensation to anyone who submits a claim to it is a matter for FSCS to determine, and under their rules. It might be that Raedex Consortium Ltd has conducted activities that have contributed to the same loss K is now complaining to us about in connection with the activities of HSBC.

As I have determined that this complaint should be upheld K should know that as they will be recovering compensation from HSBC, they cannot claim again for the same loss by making a claim at FSCS (however, if the overall loss is greater than the amount they recover from HSBC they may be able to recover that further compensation by making a claim to FSCS, but that will be a matter for the FSCS to consider and under their rules.) Further, if K has already made a claim at FSCS in connection with B, and in the event the FSCS pays compensation, K are required to repay any further compensation they receive from their complaint against HSBC, up to the amount received in compensation from FSCS.

FOS and FSCS operate independently, however in these circumstances, it is important that FSCS and FOS are working together and sharing information to ensure that fair compensation is awarded. More information about how FOS shares information with other public bodies can be found in our privacy notice here: <https://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/privacy-policy/consumer-privacy-notice>"

### **Putting things right**

To put things right I require HSBC UK Bank Plc to:

- Refund K £72,470.61 and
- Pay 8% simple interest per year on the refund, calculated from 15 business days after 19 January 2024 until the date of settlement.\*
- In order to avoid the risk of double recovery the HSBC are entitled to take, if it wishes, an assignment of the rights to all future distributions under the administrative process before paying the award.

\* If HSBC considers that it's required by HM Revenue & Customs to deduct income tax from that interest, it should tell K how much it's taken off. It should also give K a tax deduction certificate if they ask for one, so they can reclaim the tax from HM Revenue & Customs if appropriate.

### **My final decision**

My final decision is that I uphold this complaint against HSBC UK Bank Plc and require them to compensate K, as set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask K to accept or reject my decision before 3 February 2025.

Lisa Lowe  
**Ombudsman**