

The complaint

Mr C is unhappy that Revolut Ltd haven't refunded money he lost as a result of a scam.

Mr C is being represented by a claims management company but for ease of reference I'll only refer to Mr C here.

What happened

The detailed background to this complaint is well known to both parties. So, I'll only provide a brief overview of some of the key events here.

In early 2023 Mr C clicked on an advertisement for an investment and registered his interest. He was then contacted by a representative of a merchant who explained they could make trades on the stock market. Mr C was given access to a trading platform to see how it worked and started to send money from another account he held with a bank – I'll refer to as 'E'. He then made the following payments from his Revolut account before sending the funds via genuine cryptocurrency exchanges and onto the merchant;

	Date	Method	Amount
1	30 May 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
2	2 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
3	2 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
4	2 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
5	2 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
6	10 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
7	10 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
8	10 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
9	13 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
10	13 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
11	26 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
12	26 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
13	27 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
14	27 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency	£5,000

		exchange	
15	28 June 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
16	7 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£8,350
17	7 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
18	18 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
19	18 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£4,000
20	18 July 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£50
21	18 July 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£4,950
22	18 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
23	19 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£1,000
24	19 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£1,000
25	19 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
26	19 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£1,000
27	19 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£1,000
28	20 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
29	21 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
30	25 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
31	25 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
32	25 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£2,000
33	27 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
34	27 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
35	27 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
36	27 July 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
37	28 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
38	28 July 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£15,000
39	28 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
40	28 July 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£5,000
41	15 July 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency	£5,000

		exchange	
42	3 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£15,000
43	10 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£7,000
44	14 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£12,400
45	25 August 2023	Card Payment to cryptocurrency exchange	£2,300
46	25 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£20
47	25 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£6,150
48	27 August 2023	Transfer to cryptocurrency exchange	£60
		Total loss	£232,930

After four weeks Mr C was told that his profits exceeded £1m. Mr C wanted to withdraw some of his profits but was told that he needed to pay withdrawal fees. After making further payments towards some of the fees and being unable to make a withdrawal, he realised he had been scammed.

So, he raised a claim with Revolut to try and get his money back. Revolut considered the claim but said it hadn't done anything wrong so it wouldn't be offering Mr C a refund. Unhappy with this response, Mr C brought his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service.

Our investigator felt the complaint should be upheld in part. He said that Revolut should've stopped the third payment made towards this scam and provided a human intervention via its in-app chat. He said by that point Mr C had sent over £10,000 to a cryptocurrency exchange which should've seemed suspicious to Revolut. If Revolut had provided a human intervention at that point the scam would've more than likely been uncovered. That's because, although Revolut did intervene on a later payment here, it failed to provide an appropriate level of questioning to Mr C about why he was making the payment. Our investigator added that Revolut should fully refund Mr C from payments three to thirty-six and 50% of payments thirty-seven to forty-eight because Mr C contributed to his own losses after and including payment thirty-seven. Our investigator said that Mr C was having doubts about the investment by payment thirty-seven and sent a lot of money with little returns. Our investigator said that Mr C should've completed more research into the scam merchant at that point and then would've found adverse information about the scammer online.

Revolut disagreed and has asked for an Ombudsman's review. It said that the payments were sent on from the Revolut account to accounts in Mr C's name, so the loss didn't occur from this account because they were self to self. It said this service's reliance on *R v FOS* [2022] EWHC 710 is misconceived and amounts to a legal error because that decision was a permission decision that doesn't set a precedent like a judgment would. Revolut added that interventions by other banks (such as E here) should also be considered, and complaints made to those other institutions to share liability.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I agree with our investigator that this complaint should be upheld in part and for largely the same reasons.

In deciding what's fair and reasonable, I'm required to take into account relevant law and regulations; regulatory rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice; and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time.

I've read and considered the whole file. But I'll concentrate my comments on what I think is relevant. If I don't mention any specific point, it's not because I've failed to take it on board and think about it, but because I don't think I need to comment on it to reach what I think is a fair and reasonable outcome.

Revolut has addressed an Administrative Court judgment (R vs FOS), which was referred to in a decision on a separate complaint. As I have not referred to or relied on that judgment in reaching my conclusion in relation to the losses for which I consider it fair and reasonable to hold Revolut responsible, I do not intend to comment on it. I note that Revolut says that it has not asked me to analyse how damages would be apportioned in a hypothetical civil action but, rather, it is asking me to consider all of the facts of the case before me when considering what is fair and reasonable, including the role of all the other financial institutions involved.

In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (in this case the 2017 regulations) and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

And, as the Supreme Court has recently reiterated in *Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC*, subject to some limited exceptions banks have a contractual duty to make payments in compliance with the customer's instructions.

In that case, the Supreme Court considered the nature and extent of the contractual duties owed by banks to their customers when making payments. Among other things, it said, in summary:

- The starting position is that it is an implied term of any current account contract that, where a customer has authorised and instructed a bank to make a payment, it must carry out the instruction promptly. It is not for the bank to concern itself with the wisdom or risk of its customer's payment decisions.
- At paragraph 114 of the judgment the court noted that express terms of the current account contract may modify or alter that position. In *Philipp*, the contract permitted Barclays not to follow its consumer's instructions where it reasonably believed the payment instruction was the result of APP fraud; but the court said having the right to decline to carry out an instruction was not the same as being under a legal duty to do so.

In this case, the terms of Revolut's contract with Mr C modified the starting position described in *Philipp*, by – among other things – expressly requiring Revolut to refuse or delay a payment “*if legal or regulatory requirements prevent us from making the payment or mean that we need to carry out further checks*” (Section 19).

So Revolut was required by the terms of its contract to refuse payments in certain circumstances, including to comply with regulatory requirements such as the Financial Conduct Authority's Principle for Businesses 6, which required financial services firms to pay

due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly. I am satisfied that paying due regard to the interests of its customers and treating them fairly meant Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and refused card payments in some circumstances to carry out further checks.

In practice Revolut did in some instances refuse or delay payments at the time where it suspected its customer might be at risk of falling victim to a scam.

I must also take into account that the basis on which I am required to decide complaints is broader than the simple application of contractual terms and the regulatory requirements referenced in those contractual terms. I must determine the complaint by reference to what is, in my opinion, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case (DISP 3.6.1R) taking into account the considerations set out at DISP 3.6.4R.

Whilst the relevant regulations and law (including the law of contract) are both things I must take into account in deciding this complaint, I'm also obliged to take into account regulator's guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time: see DISP 3.6.4R. So, in addition to taking into account the legal position created by Revolut's standard contractual terms, I also must have regard to these other matters in reaching my decision.

Looking at what is fair and reasonable on the basis set out at DISP 3.6.4R, I consider that Revolut should between May and June 2023 have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances.

In reaching the view that Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances, I am mindful that in practice all banks and EMI's like Revolut did in fact seek to take those steps, often by:

- using algorithms to identify transactions presenting an increased risk of fraud;¹
- requiring consumers to provide additional information about the purpose of transactions during the payment authorisation process;
- using the confirmation of payee system for authorised push payments (APP);
- providing increasingly tailored and specific automated warnings, or in some circumstances human intervention, when an increased risk of fraud is identified.

For example, it is my understanding that in May and June 2023, Revolut, whereby if it identified a scam risk associated with a card payment through its automated systems, could (and sometimes did) initially decline to make that payment, in order to ask some additional questions (for example through its in-app chat).

I am also mindful that:

- Electronic Money Institutions like Revolut are required to conduct their business with "due skill, care and diligence" (FCA Principle for Businesses 2), "integrity" (FCA Principle for Businesses 1) and a firm "must take reasonable care to organise and

¹ For example, Revolut's website explains it launched an automated anti-fraud system in August 2018: <https://www.revolut.com/news/revolut-unveils-new-fleet-of-machine-learning-technology-that-has-seen-a-fourfold-reduction-in-card-fraud-and-had-offers-from-banks/>

control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems” (FCA Principle for Businesses 3)².

- Over the years, the FCA, and its predecessor the FSA, have published a series of publications setting out non-exhaustive examples of good and poor practice found when reviewing measures taken by firms to counter financial crime, including various iterations of the *“Financial crime: a guide for firms”*.
- Regulated firms are required to comply with legal and regulatory anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism requirements. Those requirements include maintaining proportionate and risk-sensitive policies and procedures to identify, assess and manage money laundering risk – for example through customer due-diligence measures and the ongoing monitoring of the business relationship (including through the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship). I do not suggest that Revolut ought to have had concerns about money laundering or financing terrorism here, but I nevertheless consider these requirements to be relevant to the consideration of Revolut’s obligation to monitor its customer’s accounts and scrutinise transactions.
- The October 2017, BSI Code³, which a number of banks and trade associations were involved in the development of, recommended firms look to identify and help prevent transactions – particularly unusual or out of character transactions – that could involve fraud or be the result of a scam. Not all firms signed the BSI Code (and Revolut was not a signatory), but the standards and expectations it referred to represented a fair articulation of what was, in my opinion, already good industry practice in October 2017 particularly around fraud prevention, and it remains a starting point for what I consider to be the minimum standards of good industry practice now (regardless of the fact the BSI was withdrawn in 2022).
- Revolut should also have been aware of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency when considering the scams that its customers might become victim to. Multi-stage fraud involves money passing through more than one account under the consumer’s control before being sent to a fraudster. Our service has seen a significant increase in this type of fraud over the past few years – particularly where the immediate destination of funds is a cryptocurrency wallet held in the consumer’s own name. And, increasingly, we have seen the use of an EMI (like Revolut) as an intermediate step between a high street bank account and cryptocurrency wallet.
- The main card networks, Visa and Mastercard, don’t allow for a delay between receipt of a payment instruction and its acceptance: the card issuer has to choose straight away whether to accept or refuse the payment. They also place certain restrictions on their card issuers’ right to decline payment instructions. The essential effect of these restrictions is to prevent indiscriminate refusal of whole classes of transaction, such as by location. The network rules did not, however, prevent card issuers from declining particular payment instructions from a customer, based on a perceived risk of fraud that arose from that customer’s pattern of usage. So it was

² Since 31 July 2023 under the FCA’s new Consumer Duty package of measures, banks and other regulated firms must act to deliver good outcomes for customers (Principle 12), but the circumstances of this complaint pre-date the Consumer Duty and so it does not apply.

³ BSI: PAS 17271: 2017” Protecting customers from financial harm as result of fraud or financial abuse”

open to Revolut to decline card payments where it suspected fraud, as indeed Revolut does in practice (see above).

Overall, taking into account relevant law, regulators rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time, I consider it fair and reasonable in May and June 2023 that Revolut should:

- have been monitoring accounts and any payments made or received to counter various risks, including preventing fraud and scams;
- have had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate that its customers were at risk of fraud (among other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which firms are generally more familiar with than the average customer;
- in some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, or provided additional warnings, before processing a payment – (as in practice Revolut sometimes does); and
- have been mindful of – among other things – common scam scenarios, how the fraudulent practices are evolving (including for example the common use of multi-stage fraud by scammers, including the use of payments to cryptocurrency accounts as a step to defraud consumers) and the different risks these can present to consumers, when deciding whether to intervene.

Whilst I am required to take into account the matters set out at DISP 3.6.4R when deciding what is fair and reasonable, I am satisfied that to comply with the regulatory requirements that were in place in May and June 2023, Revolut should in any event have taken these steps.

Should Revolut have recognised that Mr C was at risk of financial harm from fraud?

It isn't in dispute that Mr C has fallen victim to a cruel scam here, nor that he authorised the payments he made by card to his cryptocurrency wallet (from where that cryptocurrency was subsequently transferred to the scammer).

By May and June 2023, when these transactions took place, firms like Revolut had been aware of the risk of multi-stage scams involving cryptocurrency for some time. Scams involving cryptocurrency have increased over time. The FCA and Action Fraud published warnings about cryptocurrency scams in mid-2018 and figures published by the latter show that losses suffered to cryptocurrency scams have continued to increase since. They reached record levels in 2022. During that time, cryptocurrency was typically allowed to be purchased through many high street banks with few restrictions.

By the end of 2022, however, many of the high street banks had taken steps to either limit their customer's ability to purchase cryptocurrency using their bank accounts or increase friction in relation to cryptocurrency related payments, owing to the elevated risk associated with such transactions. And when these payments took place, further restrictions were in place. This left a smaller number of payment service providers, including Revolut, that allowed customers to use their accounts to purchase cryptocurrency with few restrictions. These restrictions – and the reasons for them – would have been well known across the industry.

I recognise that, as a result of the actions of other payment service providers, many customers who wish to purchase cryptocurrency for legitimate purposes will be more likely to

use the services of an EMI, such as Revolut. And I'm also mindful that a significant majority of cryptocurrency purchases made using a Revolut account will be legitimate and not related to any kind of fraud (as Revolut has told our service). However, our service has also seen numerous examples of consumers being directed by fraudsters to use Revolut accounts in order to facilitate the movement of the victim's money from their high street bank account to a cryptocurrency provider, a fact that Revolut is aware of.

So, taking into account all of the above I am satisfied that by the end of 2022, prior to the payments Mr C made in May and June 2023, Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have recognised that its customers could be at an increased risk of fraud when using its services to purchase cryptocurrency, notwithstanding that the payment would often be made to a cryptocurrency wallet in the consumer's own name.

To be clear, I'm not suggesting as Revolut argues that, as a general principle (under the Consumer Duty or otherwise), Revolut should have more concern about payments being made to a customer's own account than those which are being made to third party payees. As I've set out in some detail above, it is the specific risk associated with cryptocurrency in May and June 2023 that, in some circumstances, should have caused Revolut to consider transactions to cryptocurrency providers as carrying an increased risk of fraud and the associated harm.

In those circumstances, as a matter of what I consider to have been fair and reasonable, good practice and to comply with regulatory requirements, Revolut should have had appropriate systems for making checks and delivering warnings before it processed such payments. And as I have explained Revolut was also required by the terms of its contract to refuse or delay payments where regulatory requirements meant it needed to carry out further checks. Taking all of the above into account, and in light of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency, I don't think that the fact most of the payments in this case were going to an account held in Mr C's own name should have led Revolut to believe there wasn't a risk of fraud.

So, I've gone onto consider, taking into account what Revolut knew about the payments, at what point, if any, it ought to have identified that Mr C might be at a heightened risk of fraud that merited its intervention.

By the time of the third payment towards the scam here, (£5,000) I think Revolut should've reasonably had cause for concern about the activity of Mr C's account. By that point Mr C was attempting to send £5,000 to a cryptocurrency exchange. In total it was £15,000 in a few days and £10,000 in total for that day. According to the statements Revolut has provided, Mr C had sent money to cryptocurrency exchanges before and that same month. But given what Revolut knew about the destination of the payment and the high value, I think that the circumstances should've led Revolut to consider that Mr C was at heightened risk of financial harm from fraud. In line with good industry practice and regulatory requirements, I am satisfied that it is fair and reasonable to conclude that Revolut should have warned its customer before this payment went ahead.

What kind of warning should Revolut have provided?

Our investigator said that Revolut should've provided a human intervention when the third payment was made. I've decided that the most reasonable action would've been to provide a cryptocurrency investment scam warning. I'll explain why it should've provided that type of warning and why it leads to the same outcome here.

I've thought carefully about what a proportionate warning in light of the risk presented would be in these circumstances. In doing so, I've taken into account that many payments that look

very similar to this one will be entirely genuine. I've given due consideration to Revolut's duty to make payments promptly, as well as what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time this payment was made.

Taking that into account, I think Revolut ought, when Mr C attempted to make the third payment towards this scam, knowing that the payment was going to a cryptocurrency provider, to have provided a warning via the app that was specifically about the risk of cryptocurrency scams, given how prevalent they had become by the end of 2022. In doing so, I recognise that it would be difficult for such a warning to cover off every permutation and variation of cryptocurrency scam, without significantly losing impact.

So, at this point in time, I think that such a warning should have addressed the key risks and features of the most common cryptocurrency scams – cryptocurrency investment scams. The warning Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have provided should have highlighted, in clear and understandable terms, the key features of common cryptocurrency investment scams, for example referring to: an advertisement on social media, promoted by a celebrity or public figure; an 'account manager', 'broker' or 'trader' acting on their behalf; the use of remote access software and a small initial deposit which quickly increases in value. I recognise that a warning of that kind could not have covered off all scenarios. But I think it would have been a proportionate way for Revolut to minimise the risk of financial harm to Mr C by covering the key features of scams affecting many customers but not imposing a level of friction disproportionate to the risk the payment presented.

If Revolut had provided a cryptocurrency investment scam warning, would that have prevented the losses Mr C incurred after that point?

There were a few interventions that Revolut made here. So, I'll explain why these interventions didn't go far enough and why I think a cryptocurrency investment scam warning would've resonated with Mr C.

Revolut has said that it did decline the fourth payment Mr C made towards this scam and blocked his card before asking him to confirm it was him making the payment. After Mr C confirmed he was making the payment the card was unblocked and he was allowed to make further payments. But in the circumstances, I don't think this shows that Mr C wouldn't have listened to a cryptocurrency investment scam warning. This was a very light intervention, and I can understand why Mr C confirmed it was him making the payment in the circumstances.

Revolut also stopped a payment on 18 July 2023 (payment 21) and asked Mr C why he was making it. Mr C selected 'cryptocurrency' and was provided with a generic warning about APP scams. But I don't think this warning went far enough and failed to provide the level of information I've mentioned above. Instead, it merely stated that millions of pounds are lost every year to bank transfer scams and that fraudsters were professionals.

Revolut also stopped a payment on 25 August 2023. Mr C was asked why he was making the payment and was invited to the in-app chat. Mr C was asked some generic questions about why he was making the payment. Revolut initially asked Mr C to provide a selfie and a handwritten note which is what he did. It then provided a generic warning about safe account scams and asked him if this was the reason for the payment. Mr C said that wasn't the reason for the payment and was asked if he had been contacted unexpectedly and asked to move money out of his account. Mr C said that he hadn't. Mr C then said he was transferring money to a cryptocurrency exchange which he had done previously without any issue. Revolut again sent a message about safe account scams before saying that Mr C had selected a payment reason of 'something else' and asking him to confirm some generic

scam questions in relation to safe accounts and if he had downloaded any screensharing software.

Mr C understandably answered no to those questions. Revolut then warned Mr C about third parties telling him to lie to them about the payments and asked him to confirm that Revolut had warned him the payment was likely a scam and he would unlikely be able to recover his funds. I think these exchanges show that Mr C was happy to tell Revolut via the in-app chat that he was making a payment to cryptocurrency. But Revolut's agent failed to pick up on this. Instead, it appears they provided generic scam warnings instead of asking Mr C why he was making a payment to a cryptocurrency exchange with a payment reason of 'something else'.

In two of the interventions, Mr C mentioned cryptocurrency but wasn't asked any further questions about it. I'm satisfied he was happy to provide this information willingly and Revolut missed an opportunity to provide a detailed cryptocurrency investment warning. I've thought carefully about whether a specific warning covering off the key features of cryptocurrency investment scams would have likely prevented any further loss in this case. And on the balance of probabilities, I think it would have. There were several key hallmarks of common cryptocurrency investment scams present in the circumstances of Mr C's payments, such as being assisted by a broker to open cryptocurrency wallets, an advert online and an 'account manager', 'broker' or 'trader' acting on their behalf.

I've found no persuasive evidence to suggest that Mr C was asked, or agreed to, disregard any warning provided by Revolut. I've also seen no indication that he expressed mistrust of Revolut or financial firms in general. Neither do I think that the conversation demonstrates a closeness of relationship that Revolut would have found difficult to counter through a warning. I understand that Mr C did not agree to the fraudsters further demands for him to pay fees on any further withdrawals and, it was his difficulty in withdrawing his money that led him to realising he had been scammed.

Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, had Revolut provided Mr C with an impactful warning that gave details about cryptocurrency investment scams and how he could protect himself from the risk of fraud, I believe it would have resonated with him. He could have paused and looked more closely into this before proceeding, as well as making further enquiries into cryptocurrency scams. I'm satisfied that a timely warning to Mr C from Revolut would very likely have caused him to take the steps he did take later – revealing the scam and preventing his further losses.

Is it fair and reasonable for Revolut to be held responsible for Mr C's loss?

In reaching my decision about what is fair and reasonable, I have taken into account that Mr C paid money using his Revolut account to another account in his own name, rather than directly to the fraudster, so he remained in control of his money after he made the payments, and there were further steps before the money was lost to the scammer.

However, for the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for Mr C's losses from payment three, subject to a deduction for Mr C's own contribution towards his loss. As I have explained, the potential for multi-stage scams, particularly those involving cryptocurrency, ought to have been well known to Revolut. And as a matter of good practice, I consider it fair and reasonable that Revolut should have been on the look-out for payments presenting an additional scam risk including those involving multi-stage scams.

But as I've set out in some detail above, I think that Revolut still should have recognised that Mr C might have been at risk of financial harm from fraud when they made payment three,

and in those circumstances, it should have declined the payment and made further enquiries. If it had taken those steps, I am satisfied it would have prevented the losses Mr C suffered. The fact that the money used to fund the scam came from elsewhere and/or wasn't lost at the point it was transferred to Mr C's own account does not alter that fact and I think Revolut can fairly be held responsible for Mr C's loss in such circumstances. I don't think there is any point of law or principle that says that a complaint should only be considered against either the firm that is the origin of the funds or the point of loss.

I've also considered that Mr C has only complained against Revolut. I accept that it's *possible* that other firms might also have missed the opportunity to intervene or failed to act fairly and reasonably in some other way, and Mr C could instead, or in addition, have sought to complain against those firms. But Mr C has not chosen to do that and ultimately, I cannot compel him to. In those circumstances, I can only make an award against Revolut.

I'm also not persuaded it would be fair to reduce Mr C's compensation in circumstances where: the consumer has only complained about one respondent from which they are entitled to recover their losses in full; has not complained against E (and so is unlikely to recover any amounts apportioned to that firm); and where it is appropriate to hold a business such as Revolut responsible (that could have prevented the loss and is responsible for failing to do so). That isn't, to my mind, wrong in law or irrational but reflects the facts of the case and my view of the fair and reasonable position.

Ultimately, I must consider the complaint that has been referred to me (not those which haven't been or couldn't be referred to me) and for the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for Mr C's loss from payment three (subject to a deduction for Mr C's own contribution which I will consider below).

Should Mr C bear any responsibility for their losses?

In considering this point, I've taken into account what the law says about contributory negligence as well as what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Revolut has argued that Mr C's actions amount to gross negligence and so he should be solely responsible for his loss. But I don't agree. Mr C was taken in by a sophisticated scam and when he says he conducted his own research into the merchant before deciding to invest I've not seen any negative reviews online.

However, I agree with our investigator that the longer the scam went on the more suspicious Mr C grew and started to become worried that he wasn't receiving any profits and withdrawals despite being told he had made over £1m and repeat requests to withdraw some of it. I can see that by late July 2023 Mr C was increasingly unhappy and sent a message to say that he had been only sending money one way. And he was then met with the same excuses as before about margin trading and fees. At this point I think he should've realised that something wasn't right and done some further research. He would've then started to see some of the negative reviews that were online about the scammers in late July 2023 which mentioned issues withdrawing funds. So, I think that by payment 37, Mr C did contribute to his losses here.

As a result of the above I've concluded, on balance, that Revolut can fairly reduce the amount it pays to Mr C because of his role in what happened from payment 37. Weighing the fault that I've found on both sides, I think a fair deduction is 50% from that payment.

Could Revolut have done anything else to recover Mr C's money?

I've thought about whether Revolut did enough to attempt to recover the money Mr C lost, as there are some instances where debit card transactions can be refunded through making a chargeback claim.

A chargeback wouldn't have been successful for the debit card payments to the account in Mr C's name at the genuine cryptocurrency exchange, as Mr C was able to purchase the cryptocurrency and move the money onto the scammers. So, Mr C duly received the service he paid for on his debit card. The money was subsequently lost from his other account when it was moved by the scammers. So, he couldn't claim that he didn't receive the goods or services paid for from his Revolut account to the cryptocurrency exchange.

As a result, I don't think Revolut have acted unreasonably by failing to pursue a chargeback claim or try and recover Mr C's money here.

And because we know that Mr C also forwarded the transfers that he made to his cryptocurrency exchange to the scammers, Revolut wouldn't have reasonably been able to recover that money.

My final decision

For the reasons given above, I uphold in part this complaint and direct Revolut Ltd to pay Mr C:

- 100% of payments 3 to 36
- 50% of payments 37 to 48
- 8% simple interest per year on that amount from the date of the payments to the date of settlement.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 1 April 2025.

Mark Dobson
Ombudsman