

The complaint

Mr H complains that Revolut Ltd won't refund money he lost when he fell victim to a cryptocurrency investment scam.

Mr H is being represented by solicitors in this complaint.

What happened

In early 2023, Mr H came across a firm, "T", which promoted itself as an investment broker. He states his wife sent him a website link which featured an advertisement from T. He looked into the company further and registered his interest. Shortly after, a representative contacted Mr H and persuaded him to start investing with a small deposit – which he did from his account with another firm. Mr H says he researched T and found mixed reviews. He also found a 'genuine' website.

Mr H's 'financial adviser' contacted him shortly after and they told him they would place trades on his behalf. Mr H doesn't recall specifics of the returns promised but remembers being advised that profits would go up over the course of a long period of time and that this was a long-term investment.

Encouraged by the profits made on his initial investment, under his financial adviser's instructions, Mr H opened an e-money account with Revolut. He transferred funds from his account with another firm to Revolut, before purchasing cryptocurrency from a cryptocurrency provider. The cryptocurrency was then sent to wallets as instructed. At the time, Mr H believed he was depositing cryptocurrency into his investment account given its balance went up accordingly. He also installed a remote access software, although he doesn't recall it ever working.

Mr H's chat correspondence with the scammer shows that a withdrawal request was made around the time of the second transaction. Our service recently sought clarification on whether Mr H was able to withdraw any funds, and it was confirmed that no credits were received. A final transaction was made around a week later and when Mr H subsequently requested a withdrawal, he was informed that the funds couldn't be released due to anti-money laundering requirements. Mr H was told he needed to pay a fee to register the 'money movements' and comply with requirements. It was at this point that he realised he'd been scammed and reported the matter to Revolut.

The following payments, made using Mr H's Revolut debit card, are being disputed –

	Date	Amount
Payment 1	24 February	£20
Payment 2	28 February	£5,000
Payment 3	6 March	£15,000
	Total payments	£20,020

Revolut declined to refund any of the disputed payments, saying that Mr H had authorised them. Unhappy with this, he referred his complaint to our service.

Our investigator concluded that Revolut ought to have provided a written warning tailored to cryptocurrency investment scams when Mr H made Payment 2. They also thought that the next payment warranted a 'human intervention', such as direct contact via live chat. But had Revolut done so, the investigator wasn't persuaded that Mr H would have stopped in his tracks and losses prevented. They noted that Mr H had carried out due diligence prior to investing and not found any scam warnings. So, an intervention wouldn't have led to a different decision-making on his part.

I issued my provisional decision earlier this month and gave reasons for why I intended upholding Mr H's complaint in part. I gave both parties an opportunity to provide any further comments or information for my consideration. Mr H's representative replied and said he accepted my provisional findings. Revolut said it didn't have any further comments to make and looked forward to receiving my final decision.

As neither party has provided any further comments or information for me to consider, I see no reason to change the outcome reached in my provisional decision. What follows is my provisional decision made final.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (in this case the 2017 regulations) and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

And, as the Supreme Court has recently reiterated in *Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC*, subject to some limited exceptions banks have a contractual duty to make payments in compliance with the customer's instructions.

In that case, the Supreme Court considered the nature and extent of the contractual duties owed by banks to their customers when making payments. Among other things, it said, in summary:

- The starting position is that it is an implied term of any current account contract that, where a customer has authorised and instructed a bank to make a payment, it must carry out the instruction promptly. It is not for the bank to concern itself with the wisdom or risk of its customer's payment decisions.
- At paragraph 114 of the judgment the court noted that express terms of the current account contract may modify or alter that position. In *Philipp*, the contract permitted Barclays not to follow its consumer's instructions where it reasonably believed the payment instruction was the result of APP fraud; but the court said having the right to decline to carry out an instruction was not the same as being under a legal duty to do so.

In this case, the terms of Revolut's contract with Mr H modified the starting position described in *Philipp*, by – among other things – expressly requiring Revolut to refuse or delay a payment "*if legal or regulatory requirements prevent us from making the payment or mean that we need to carry out further checks*" (section 20).

So, Revolut was required by the terms of its contract to refuse payments in certain circumstances, including to comply with regulatory requirements such as the Financial Conduct Authority's Principle for Businesses 6, which required financial services firms to pay due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly. I'm satisfied that paying due regard to the interests of its customers and treating them fairly meant Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and refused card payments in some circumstances to carry out further checks.

In practice Revolut did in some instances refuse or delay payments at the time where it suspected its customer might be at risk of falling victim to a scam.

I must also take into account that the basis on which I'm required to decide complaints is broader than the simple application of contractual terms and the regulatory requirements referenced in those contractual terms. I must determine the complaint by reference to what is, in my opinion, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case (DISP 3.6.1R) taking into account the considerations set out at DISP 3.6.4R.

While the relevant regulations and law (including the law of contract) are both things I must take into account in deciding this complaint, I'm also obliged to take into account regulator's guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time: see DISP 3.6.4R. So, in addition to taking into account the legal position created by Revolut's standard contractual terms, I also must have regard to these other matters in reaching my decision.

Looking at what is fair and reasonable on the basis set out at DISP 3.6.4R, I consider that Revolut should, at the time of these payments, have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances.

In reaching the view that Revolut should have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing payments in some circumstances, I'm mindful that in practice all banks and EMIs, like Revolut, did in fact seek to take those steps, often by:

- using algorithms to identify transactions presenting an increased risk of fraud¹;
- requiring consumers to provide additional information about the purpose of transactions during the payment authorisation process;
- using the confirmation of payee system for authorised push payments;
- providing increasingly tailored and specific automated warnings, or in some circumstances human intervention, when an increased risk of fraud is identified.

For example, it is my understanding that at the time of these payments, Revolut, whereby if it identified a scam risk associated with a card payment through its automated systems, could (and sometimes did) initially decline to make that payment, in order to ask some additional questions (for example through its in-app chat).

I'm also mindful that:

¹ For example, Revolut's website explains it launched an automated anti-fraud system in August 2018:https://www.revolut.com/news/revolut_unveils_new_fleet_of_machine_learning_technology_that_has_seen_a_fourfold_reduction_in_card_fraud_and_had_offers_from_banks/

- Electronic Money Institutions like Revolut are required to conduct their business with “due skill, care and diligence” (FCA Principle for Businesses 2), “integrity” (FCA Principle for Businesses 1) and a firm “must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems” (FCA Principle for Businesses 3)².
- Over the years, the FCA, and its predecessor the FSA, have published a series of publications setting out non-exhaustive examples of good and poor practice found when reviewing measures taken by firms to counter financial crime, including various iterations of the “Financial crime: a guide for firms”.
- Regulated firms are required to comply with legal and regulatory anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism requirements. Those requirements include maintaining proportionate and risk-sensitive policies and procedures to identify, assess and manage money laundering risk – for example through customer due-diligence measures and the ongoing monitoring of the business relationship (including through the scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship). I don’t suggest that Revolut ought to have had concerns about money laundering or financing terrorism here, but I nevertheless consider these requirements to be relevant to the consideration of Revolut’s obligation to monitor its customer’s accounts and scrutinise transactions.
- The October 2017, BSI Code³, which a number of banks and trade associations were involved in the development of, recommended firms look to identify and help prevent transactions – particularly unusual or out of character transactions – that could involve fraud or be the result of a scam. Not all firms signed the BSI Code (and Revolut was not a signatory), but the standards and expectations it referred to represented a fair articulation of what was, in my opinion, already good industry practice in October 2017 particularly around fraud prevention, and it remains a starting point for what I consider to be the minimum standards of good industry practice now (regardless of the fact the BSI was withdrawn in 2022).
- Revolut should also have been aware of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency when considering the scams that its customers might become victim to. Multi-stage fraud involves money passing through more than one account under the consumer’s control before being sent to a fraudster. Our service has seen a significant increase in this type of fraud over the past few years – particularly where the immediate destination of funds is a cryptocurrency wallet held in the consumer’s own name. And, increasingly, we have seen the use of an EMI (like Revolut) as an intermediate step between a high street bank account and cryptocurrency wallet.
- The main card networks, Visa and Mastercard, don’t allow for a delay between receipt of a payment instruction and its acceptance: the card issuer must choose straight away whether to accept or refuse the payment. They also place certain restrictions on their card issuers’ right to decline payment instructions. The essential effect of these restrictions is to prevent indiscriminate refusal of whole classes of transaction, such as by location. The network rules did not, however, prevent card

² Since 31 July 2023 under the FCA’s new Consumer Duty package of measures, banks and other regulated firms must act to deliver good outcomes for customers (Principle 12), but the circumstances of this complaint pre-date the Consumer Duty and so it does not apply.

³ BSI: PAS 17271: 2017” Protecting customers from financial harm as result of fraud or financial abuse”

issuers from declining particular payment instructions from a customer, based on a perceived risk of fraud that arose from that customer's pattern of usage. So, it was open to Revolut to decline card payments where it suspected fraud, as indeed Revolut does in practice (see above).

Overall, taking into account relevant law, regulators rules and guidance, relevant codes of practice and what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time, I consider it fair and reasonable in February 2023 that Revolut should:

- have been monitoring accounts and any payments made or received to counter various risks, including preventing fraud and scams;
- have had systems in place to look out for unusual transactions or other signs that might indicate that its customers were at risk of fraud (among other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which firms are generally more familiar with than the average customer;
- in some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, or provided additional warnings, before processing a payment – (as in practice Revolut sometimes does); and
- have been mindful of – among other things – common scam scenarios, how the fraudulent practices are evolving (including for example the common use of multi-stage fraud by scammers, including the use of payments to cryptocurrency accounts as a step to defraud consumers) and the different risks these can present to consumers, when deciding whether to intervene.

While I'm required to take into account the matters set out at DISP 3.6.4R when deciding what is fair and reasonable, I'm satisfied that to comply with the regulatory requirements that were in place in February 2023, Revolut should in any event have taken these steps.

Should Revolut have recognised that Mr H was at risk of financial harm from fraud?

It isn't in dispute that Mr H has fallen victim to a cruel scam here, nor that he authorised the payments he made to his cryptocurrency wallet (from where that cryptocurrency was subsequently transferred to the scammer).

I'm aware that cryptocurrency exchanges generally stipulate that the card used to purchase cryptocurrency at its exchange must be held in the name of the account holder, as must the account used to receive cash payments from the exchange. Revolut would likely have been aware of this fact too. So, it could have reasonably assumed that most of the disputed payments would be credited to a cryptocurrency wallet held in Mr H's name.

By February 2023, when these transactions started, firms like Revolut had been aware of the risk of multi-stage scams involving cryptocurrency for some time. Scams involving cryptocurrency have increased over time. The FCA and Action Fraud published warnings about cryptocurrency scams in mid-2018 and figures published by the latter show that losses suffered to cryptocurrency scams have continued to increase since. They reached record levels in 2022. During that time, cryptocurrency was typically allowed to be purchased through many high street banks with few restrictions.

By the end of 2022, however, many of the high street banks had taken steps to either limit their customer's ability to purchase cryptocurrency using their bank accounts or increase friction in relation to cryptocurrency related payments, owing to the elevated risk associated

with such transactions⁴. This left a smaller number of payment service providers, including Revolut, that allowed customers to use their accounts to purchase cryptocurrency with few restrictions. These restrictions – and the reasons for them – would have been well known across the industry.

I recognise that, as a result of the actions of other payment service providers, many customers who wish to purchase cryptocurrency for legitimate purposes will be more likely to use the services of an EMI, such as Revolut. And I'm also mindful that a significant majority of cryptocurrency purchases made using a Revolut account will be legitimate and not related to any kind of fraud (as Revolut has told our service). However, our service has also seen numerous examples of consumers being directed by fraudsters to use Revolut accounts in order to facilitate the movement of the victim's money from their high street bank account to a cryptocurrency provider, a fact that Revolut is aware of.

So, taking into account all of the above I'm satisfied that by the end of 2022, prior to the payments Mr H made, Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have recognised that its customers could be at an increased risk of fraud when using its services to purchase cryptocurrency, notwithstanding that the payment would often be made to a cryptocurrency wallet in the consumer's own name.

Taking all of the above into account, and in light of the increase in multi-stage fraud, particularly involving cryptocurrency, I don't think that the fact the payments in this case were going to an account held in Mr H's own name should have led Revolut to believe there wasn't a risk of fraud.

So, I've gone on to consider, taking into account what Revolut knew about the payments, at what point, if any, it ought to have identified that Mr H might be at a heightened risk of fraud that merited its intervention.

I think Revolut should have identified that the payments were going to a cryptocurrency exchange (the merchant involved was a well-known cryptocurrency exchange). I don't think there was anything particularly unusual about Payment 1 such that I consider Revolut should have had cause for concern.

By the time Mr H authorised Payment 2, given the increased spending on cryptocurrency, I think that the circumstances should have led Revolut to consider that he was at heightened risk of financial harm from fraud. And by the time he authorised Payment 3, there was a significant jump in cryptocurrency-related spending compared to the initial and second payments. In line with good industry practice and regulatory requirements, I'm satisfied that it is fair and reasonable to conclude that Revolut should have warned its customer before both the payments went ahead.

What did Revolut do to warn Mr H?

Revolut didn't provide any scam warnings to Mr H before executing his authorised instructions in relation to any of the disputed payments.

What kind of warning should Revolut have provided?

I've thought carefully about what a proportionate warning in light of the risk presented would be in these circumstances. In doing so, I've taken into account that many payments that look

⁴ See for example, Santander's limit of £1,000 per transaction and £3,000 in any 30-day rolling period introduced in November 2022. NatWest Group, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and Santander had all introduced some restrictions on specific cryptocurrency exchanges by August 2021.

very similar to these ones will be entirely genuine. I've given due consideration to Revolut's duty to make payments promptly, as well as what I consider good industry practice at the time this payment was made.

Taking that into account, I think Revolut ought, when Mr H attempted to make Payment 2, knowing (or strongly suspecting) that the payment was going to a cryptocurrency provider, to have provided an automated warning that was specifically about the risk of cryptocurrency scams, given how prevalent they had become by the end of 2022. In doing so, I recognise that it would be difficult for such a warning to cover off every permutation and variation of cryptocurrency scam, without significantly losing impact.

So, at this point in time, I think that such a warning should have addressed the key risks and features of the most common cryptocurrency scams – cryptocurrency investment scams. The warning Revolut ought fairly and reasonably to have provided should have highlighted, the key features of common cryptocurrency investment scams, such as an advertisement on social media, an 'account manager' acting on their behalf, promises of returns that are too good to be true, and withdrawal requests often being met with excuses.

I recognise that a warning of that kind could not have covered off all scenarios. But I think it would have been a proportionate way for Revolut to minimise the risk of financial harm to Mr H by covering the key features of scams affecting many customers but not imposing a level of friction disproportionate to the risk the payment presented.

And when Mr H attempted to make Payment 3, given the value of cryptocurrency spending had trebled (to £15,000), I think a proportionate response to the risk stemming from that payment would be for Revolut to have attempted to establish the circumstances surrounding the payment before allowing it to debit the account. I think it should have done this by, for example, directing Mr H to its in-app chat to discuss the payment further.

If Revolut had provided a warning of the type described, would that have prevented the losses Mr H suffered?

I've thought carefully about whether a specific automated warning at the time of Payment 2, covering off the key features of cryptocurrency investment scams, would have likely prevented Mr H from going ahead with it. Having done so, on the balance of probabilities, I'm inclined to agree with the investigator that it's likely Mr H would still have wanted to go ahead with the payment.

I say this not because I think he would have disregarded Revolut's warning, but because I think it wouldn't have resonated with him. Mr H hadn't come across T on social media, nor had he been unsuccessful in making a withdrawal at that point (although it appears a request was made later that day). While he would have noted that T had offered to invest on his behalf, on balance, I think Mr H would have felt comfortable with going ahead with the payment. Particularly as he had done some research into T specifically prior to making the payments.

But had Revolut attempted to establish the circumstances around Payment 3 and asked questions, on balance, I'm satisfied that such kind of intervention would have positively impacted Mr H's decision-making. I've reviewed the chat correspondence between Mr H and the scammer, and I've found nothing within those conversations that suggests he was asked, or agreed, to mislead Revolut or disregard any warnings provided. I've also seen no indication that Mr H expressed mistrust of Revolut or financial firms in general.

What this means is that I think Mr H would likely have explained how he found out about T (clicked on a link which appears to be for an erstwhile lifestyle website) and the offer it had

made (long-term investment in cryptocurrency). I also think Mr H would have told Revolut that he had been asked and agreed to download remote access software for investment purposes. And, as recently confirmed, a withdrawal request made prior to Payment 3 had been denied.

I think the responses provided would have been red flags for Revolut and it would have identified that there was a very high possibility that Mr H was falling victim to a scam. Had it provided him with an impactful warning that gave even further details about cryptocurrency investment scams and how he could protect himself from the risk of fraud, I'm persuaded that it would have resonated with him. For instance, he could have noticed that he'd been advised his small initial deposit had made substantial gains. And although the remote access software didn't work, he had still been asked to install it when this and placing trades on behalf of clients wasn't the usual process.

Also, while Mr H hadn't come across scam warnings about T specifically during his research, following a discussion with Revolut he could have investigated cryptocurrency scams in general and seen the various warnings published by regulators about them. I'm satisfied that a warning to him from Revolut following a discussion with one of its agents would have had the desired impact and would very likely have caused Mr H to decide not to go ahead with Payment 3.

Is it fair and reasonable for Revolut to be held responsible for Mr H's loss?

In reaching my decision about what is fair and reasonable, I've taken into account that Mr H purchased cryptocurrency which credited a cryptocurrency wallet held in his own name, rather than making a payment directly to the scammer. So, he remained in control of his money after he made the payments from his Revolut account, and it took further steps before the money was lost.

I've carefully considered Revolut's view that it shouldn't be held responsible for losses that occurred on a third-party site. But as I've explained, the potential for multi-stage scams, particularly those involving cryptocurrency, ought to have been well known to Revolut. And as a matter of good practice, I consider it fair and reasonable that Revolut should have been on the look-out for payments presenting an additional scam risk including those involving multi-stage scams.

So, I think that Revolut still should have recognised that Mr H might have been at risk of financial harm from fraud when he made Payment 3, and in those circumstances, it should have taken additional steps before processing it. If it had taken those steps, I'm satisfied that it would have limited the losses that Mr H suffered.

The fact that the money wasn't lost at the point Mr H used his Revolut card to purchase cryptocurrency doesn't alter that fact and I think Revolut can fairly be held responsible for Mr H's loss in such circumstances. I don't think there is any point of law or principle that says that a complaint should only be considered against the firm that is the point of loss.

Our service did contact the firm Mr H sent the money to Revolut from and there were no claims or interventions to note. I've also considered that Mr H has only asked us to consider his complaint against Revolut. He hasn't chosen to complain to any other firms involved and ultimately, I can't compel him to.

I'm also not persuaded that it would be fair to reduce Mr H's compensation in circumstances where: the consumer has only complained about one respondent from which they are entitled to recover their losses in full; hasn't complained against the other firm (and so is unlikely to recover any amounts apportioned to that firm); and where it is appropriate to hold

a business such as Revolut responsible (that could have prevented the loss and is responsible for failing to do so). That isn't, to my mind, wrong in law or irrational but reflects the facts of the case and my view of the fair and reasonable position.

Ultimately, I must consider the complaint that has been referred to me (not those which haven't been or couldn't be referred to me) and for the reasons I've set out above, I'm satisfied that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for Mr H's loss from Payment 3, subject to a deduction for his role in what happened which I'll consider below.

Should Mr H bear any responsibility for his losses?

There's a general principle in law that consumers must take responsibility for their decisions. I recognise that there were aspects to the scam that would have appeared convincing. For instance, the provision of the trading platform (which, I understand, used genuine, albeit manipulated, software to demonstrate the apparent success of trades). I know that the scammer used the apparent success of early trades to encourage increasingly large later deposits.

So, I've taken that into account when deciding whether it would be fair for the reimbursement due to Mr H to be reduced. I think it should.

As I've mentioned, between Payments 2 and 3 Mr H requested a withdrawal. But this wasn't successful despite his financial adviser initially telling him they wanted him to take some profits before investing further. Mr H proceeded to make Payment 3, which was three times Payment 2, without questioning why he couldn't make a withdrawal.

Given he realised he'd been scammed as soon as a withdrawal request after Payment 3 was met with a payment demand (to meet money laundering requirements), and I think it's most likely that a similar excuse would have been given had he questioned the initial withdrawal request, I think Mr H could have also prevented the losses he suffered from making Payment 3.

Weighing the liability that I've found on both sides, I think a fair deduction is 50%.

Could Revolut have done anything else to recover Mr H's money?

Mr H made card payments to purchase cryptocurrency. I'm not persuaded there would have been any reasonable prospect for a chargeback claim to succeed, as the merchant would be able to demonstrate that it had provided the goods/services that had been purchased using the card (in this case, the cryptocurrency that Mr H then sent on to the scammer). So, I don't think there was anything more Revolut could've done to recover the money in these circumstances.

Putting things right

Revolut Ltd needs to refund Payment 3, making a 50% deduction to account for Mr H's role in what happened.

It also needs to add simple interest at 8% per year to the refunded amount, calculated from the date of loss to the date of settlement⁵.

⁵ If Revolut considers that it's required by HM Revenue & Customs to deduct income tax from that interest, it should tell Mr H how much it's taken off. It should also give him a tax deduction certificate if he asks for one, so he can reclaim the tax from HM Revenue & Customs if appropriate.

My final decision

For the reasons given, my final decision is that I uphold this complaint in part. I require Revolut Ltd to put things right for Mr H as set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr H to accept or reject my decision before 26 June 2025.

Gagandeep Singh
Ombudsman