

The complaint

Mr M complains that Revolut Ltd won't refund him the money he lost in a work-tasks scam.

Mr M is being represented by a professional representative, but for ease of reading I'll just refer to Mr M.

What happened

Mr M says he was introduced to a work tasks opportunity by a friend. The friend introduced him to the scam after several months of corresponding over a messaging application. She provided some information about the work and he says he conducted some research and couldn't find any negative information or reviews and so he signed-up.

He was able to complete his tasks and make two small withdrawals - £20 and 500USDT on 25 and 26 December 2024 respectively. As the scam continued, he was asked to deposit money with the scammers before he could complete each set of tasks, but when each set of tasks was complete, more tasks would appear, requiring further money to be deposited. Mr M was told he could only withdraw his earnings when tasks were complete. Mr M realised he had been scammed when he couldn't make withdrawals and was asked to pay further amounts in tax on his earnings. He reported the scam to Revolut but it didn't refund him.

Mr M made the following payments to his own cryptocurrency accounts as part of this scam:

Transaction	Date	Amount	Payment type
1	26/12/2024	£30	Card payment – completed
2	26/12/2024	£100	Card payment – completed
3	26/12/2024	£150	Card payment – completed
4	26/12/2024	£250	Card payment – completed
5	26/12/2024	£1,450	Card payment – declined
6	27/12/2024	£1,000	Card payment – completed
7	28/12/2024	£2,500	Card payment – completed
8	31/12/2024	£850	Card payment – completed
9	02/01/2025	£2,000	Card payment – completed
10	06/01/2025	£6,550	Card payment – completed
11	07/01/2025	£820	Card payment – declined

Mr M says he made numerous large payments to new payees, which Revolut should have detected and challenged, providing him with warnings. The final payment in particular was large and should have prompted intervention from Revolut. If correct intervention took place Mr M would have been able to avoid losing his money.

Revolut says the payments were authorised. It says Mr M was negligent because he didn't do sufficient research into the company he was dealing with. He should have been wary about making payments as part of a job where he was expecting to be paid, rather than making payments to unknown people who had initiated contact over messaging applications.

Revolut says it declined a payment on 26 December 2024 and sent a warning to Mr M. Further payments were blocked that day. Further payment attempts were declined from 7 January 2025 onwards and warnings were provided (I have not listed all the declined transactions from 7 January onwards).

When Revolut intervened on 26 December, it asked him what the purpose of the payment was. He chose "It's part of an investment" but there were other options, including "It's related to a job opportunity". He was asked further questions, based on the payment reason he had selected, including "Have you been asked to install software, how did you discover this opportunity, have you researched the company" amongst others. Revolut warned Mr M that this might be a cryptocurrency scam. If Mr M had given a more accurate payment reason, Revolut says he would have received warnings that were more relevant to his circumstances.

Our investigator didn't uphold Mr M's complaint. She thought Revolut have intervened appropriately and proportionately on 26 December 2024 in relation to payment five. She thought Revolut ought to have intervened again at payment seven and ten, but she didn't think this would have made a difference. She said this because she noted that Revolut intervened in payment eleven and the responses from Mr M were similar to his responses to the questions Revolut asked in relation to payment five. So she thought any responses he might have given if Revolut had intervened in payments seven and ten are likely to have been similar. When Revolut asked Mr M questions in relation to payments five and eleven, Mr M hadn't given accurate answers, which meant Revolut couldn't provide warnings that were more relevant to his circumstances. She was also aware that Mr M had provided inaccurate answers when his bank had spoken to him on the phone in connection with some related transactions. Overall, she thought it was unlikely that further or better intervention would have uncovered the scam.

Mr M didn't agree. He said the interventions fell short. He should have received human intervention by a member of staff and it would then have become apparent that he was falling for a work tasks scam. Revolut would have been in a position to provide a warning tailored to Mr M's circumstances, which would likely have prevented his loss.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having taken into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, I agree Revolut ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances.

I don't think the first four payments Mr M made warranted intervention, mainly because they were relatively small in value and wouldn't have caused Revolut to be concerned. As a pattern of transactions emerged, with payments being made to a cryptocurrency platform, frequent payments being made and the value of transactions escalating, I consider Revolut was right to intervene in transaction five. I consider the type of intervention – a written warning that attempted to narrow-down the particular risks Mr M was facing, by asking questions and then providing relevant risk warnings – was proportionate to the risk, considering the number of payments made and their value, which were still relatively low at that point. I don't consider human intervention would have been proportionate, considering that many similar transactions are likely to occur each day and be unconnected with fraud. I find that the questions Revolut asked and the warnings it gave were relevant to the payment reason Mr M provided.

The answer Mr M gave Revolut was not accurate, in my view. He wasn't making the payments as part of an investment and the option "It's related to a job opportunity" appears closer to his situation. Had he provided more accurate information, Revolut might have been in a better position to identify the risk he was facing and provide appropriate warnings.

I consider Revolut ought to have intervened when Mr M made a payment for £6,550 on 6 January 2025, but I don't think further or better intervention would have made a difference. While Mr M says he thinks earlier intervention or human intervention would have led to the scam being discovered, I don't agree. Revolut intervened early in the series of payments and I have listened to recordings of calls Mr M had with his bank, which was the source of the money he transferred to his cryptocurrency account from Revolut. Mr M gave similarly inaccurate answers to his bank during those calls. His answers were consistent, that he was investing in cryptocurrency and that he planned to buy it and sell it. But he wasn't doing that, he was making payments in cryptocurrency as part of a job. As Mr M's answers were consistent whether the interventions were made by his bank or EMI, early in the series or later on, and whether the intervention was automated or by a member of staff, I'm not persuaded any intervention would have been effective.

As Mr M made payments to his own cryptocurrency accounts, I do not consider it would have been possible to successfully chargeback the payments. These would have been considered to have been correctly completed upon the transfer of money from Mr M's Revolut account to his cryptocurrency account, as he had authorised.

I understand that Mr M has been the victim of a very cruel and sophisticated scam. The scam appears to have involved him being befriended over a messaging application some months before the scam was introduced to him and also involved him receiving some commission payments to begin with. I can understand this would have made the scam appear more believable. However, despite my natural sympathy for Mr M, for the reasons I've given, I don't consider that further intervention, or human intervention would have prevented his losses.

My final decision

I don't uphold Mr M's complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr M to accept or reject my decision before 18 September 2025.

Greg Barham
Ombudsman