

## The complaint

Mr and Mrs S' complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

## What happened

Mr and Mrs S purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 26 August 2015, having previously held a trial membership. They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,200 fractional points at a cost of £9,000. Mr and Mrs S paid for this membership by taking finance of £8,500 from another lender, paying a deposit of £500 separately.

This sale is the subject of a separate complaint and has been included for background information only.

Mr and Mrs S upgraded their Fractional Club membership on 13 April 2017 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy an additional 800 fractional points at a cost of £5,236 (the 'Purchase Agreement'). This sale is the subject of this complaint.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs S more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after the end of their membership term.

Mr and Mrs S paid for their Fractional Club upgrade by taking finance of £13,381 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). The amount borrowed exceeded the upgrade purchase price as they also consolidated £8,145 from the finance taken to fund their original Fractional Club membership into this loan.

Mr and Mrs S – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 4 November 2021 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr and Mrs S' concerns as a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. It wrote to the PR on 6 January 2022 to provide its reasons for refusing the claim.

The PR then referred Mr and Mrs S' concerns to the Financial Ombudsman Service. We informed the Lender that Mr and Mrs S were not satisfied with its response to their claim. The Lender subsequently issued a final response letter on 31 August 2022, explaining that having considered the claim afresh, it was still not prepared to accept it.

Mr and Mrs S' complaint was then assessed by one of our Investigators, who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr and Mrs S disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') dated 31 July 2025. In that decision, I said:

"I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale**

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The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under Section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that the Fractional Club upgrade had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr and Mrs S were:

1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value".
2. Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.
3. Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.
4. Made to believe that they would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for points 3 and 4, while it's *possible* that the Fractional Club upgrade was

misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don't think it's *probable*. They're given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrate that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that the Fractional Club upgrade was misrepresented for these reasons, I don't think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mr and Mrs S – and the PR – have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club upgrade was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

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I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that the Fractional Club upgrade was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender along with all the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender.

### **The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale**

Mr and Mrs S' complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr and Mrs S. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr and Mrs S was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr and Mrs S.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr and Mrs S knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for the Fractional Club upgrade. So, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr and Mrs S' financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair to them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs S in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs S may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to upgrade their Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. And with that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs S made the decision to upgrade their Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr and Mrs S' credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

### **The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations**

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr and Mrs S' Fractional Club upgrade met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr and Mrs S were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term 'investment' is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the

purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr and Mrs S the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that the Fractional Club upgrade included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold the upgrade to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that the Fractional Club upgrade offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs S, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned the Fractional Club upgrade as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

### **Was the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs S rendered unfair?**

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from the Fractional Club upgrade was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase.

During our investigation, the PR provided a statement from Mr and Mrs S to support their complaint. This included their recollections from the Time of Sale:

**"In 2016, [...] we received a call from [the Supplier] offering [sic] us a free holiday to their resort in Tenerife. Initially, we declined the holiday but eventually were persuaded when they changed the dates to accommodate us during school half term. We were advised we would need to attend a short presentation. We stayed at [a Supplier resort] in Tenerife in April 2017. Again, we were taken for breakfast by a representative and handed over to her colleague who explained to us that the fractions we purchased cannot meet our needs and that we should upgrade. We explained that the previous summer we booked a holiday in the UK with [the Supplier], only to find after we purchased the short break, that it was cheaper on [the resort's] website. We were advised it was an error and that we should not have been able to find the break cheaper. We reminded him that all our family holidays must be outside of school term time and he assured us that not only can we take our holidays outside of term time, but we can also get 2 weeks for one. We were there so long that we told them we had to go and get food for our children as it was past their dinner time. They insisted on getting the food so that we could continue with the meeting. They showed us several amazing resorts on their computer, that we can [sic] go to if we upgraded our membership in conjunction with [a holiday exchange provider]. We expressed our concerns about lack of availability on the dates we can [sic] travel and were shown several properties that they said were available at that time (school holidays). Eventually, after being there the whole day we [agreed to purchase the upgrade].**

[my emphasis]

The extract of the statement I have quoted above suggests that Mr and Mrs S were impressed by the standard of holiday accommodation available when they agreed to upgrade their membership. And that the ability to travel outside of school term time was a key consideration in their purchasing decision. Further, that Mr and Mrs S were offered an incentive of "2 weeks for one" if they agreed to upgrade. It appears that it was these factors, along with weariness from the lengthy sales process, that eventually led them to agree to upgrade their membership at the Time of Sale.

Although Mr and Mrs S did refer to the investment element of Fractional Club membership in their statement when explaining why the upgrade was misrepresented to them, they did not describe the share in the Allocated Property as a driving factor for their purchase:

#### **"Misrepresentation**

[...]

4. We were led to believe that when we joined the [Supplier's] holiday club we would have access to 5-star accommodation and discounted flights for the next 13 years. We were told that the product would increase in value and after the contract ended, we could sell it back to [the Supplier] for a profit. We were told that [Fractional Club membership] was valuable and [the Allocated Property] would be easy to sell at the end of the term."

Indeed, the investment element of the Fractional Club upgrade appears to have been secondary to the standard of accommodation and discounts available, given it was mentioned after this and only briefly within the statement.

That doesn't mean Mr and Mrs S weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs S themselves don't persuade me that the purchase of the Fractional Club upgrade was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mr and Mrs S ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club upgrade as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs S' decision to purchase the Fractional Club upgrade at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3)."

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs S' Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The PR responded that it did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence to be considered. The Lender accepted the PD and had no further comments.

I am now in a position to finalise my decision.

### **The legal and regulatory context**

In my provisional decision, I explained that the legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it was not necessary to set out that context in detail. But, following my provisional decision, I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 R
- CONC 4.5.3 R
- CONC 4.5.2 G

### The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

### **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

I've considered the case afresh following the response from the PR. Having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the upgrade was sold to Mr and Mrs S as an investment at the Time of Sale. It's now also argued for the first time that a contradiction in the purchasing documentation and the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As I outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in its response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions about those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in respect of those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions about them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

#### **The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations**

As I explained in my PD, Mr and Mrs S' statement suggests that they were impressed by the standard of holiday accommodation available when they agreed to upgrade their membership. And that the ability to travel outside of school term time was a key

consideration in their purchasing decision. Further, that they were offered an incentive of “2 weeks for one” if they agreed to upgrade. It therefore appears it was these factors, along with weariness from the lengthy sales process, that eventually led them to agree to upgrade their membership at the Time of Sale.

And although Mr and Mrs S did refer to the investment element of Fractional Club membership in their statement when explaining why the upgrade was misrepresented to them, they did not describe the share in the Allocated Property as a driving factor for their purchase. So, I was not, and still am not, persuaded that the evidence suggests that Mr and Mrs S purchased Fractional Club membership because of any breach of Regulation 14(3).

The PR said that as the Supplier’s pricing sheet refers to the “Unit Share %” provided under Mr and Mrs S’ Fractional Club upgrade, this shows the investment element was an “important part” of the sales process and “played quite an important role” in their purchasing decision. But I don’t agree. As I explained in my PD, it is not in dispute that the Fractional Club upgrade contained an investment element and it’s possible that it was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs S as an investment (although I have made no finding on this). However, the simple fact that Mr and Mrs S’ share in the Allocated Property was recorded on the pricing sheet does not offer an insight into their motivation for their purchase.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the upgrade as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I’m not persuaded Mr and Mrs S’ decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. And for that reason, I still don’t think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the Lender was unfair to them.

### **The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale**

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 ('Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench')*.

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471*, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by

the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship [...] was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the FCA's Dispute Resolution rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr and Mrs S in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr and Mrs S, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr and Mrs S into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr and Mrs S.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mr and Mrs S entered into wasn't high. At £669.05, it was only 5% of the amount borrowed and even less than that

(4.6%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had Mr and Mrs S known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not persuaded that they either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mr and Mrs S wanted the Fractional Club upgrade and had no obvious means of their own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit they needed for a timeshare they wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr and Mrs S but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr and Mrs S.

I will also address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mr and Mrs S in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2033. This same date will have been set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which will have been initialled and signed as being read by Mr and Mrs S. This date indicates that the membership has a term of around 16 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate."

[my emphasis]

It seems clear to me that the commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2033. This actual date will have been repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above.

So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

## **S140A conclusion**

Given all the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs S and the

Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

### **Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint**

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While I've found that Mr and Mrs S' credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to their complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr and Mrs S (i.e. secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr and Mrs S a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

### **Overall conclusion**

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In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs S' Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

## **My final decision**

My final decision is to not uphold Mr and Mrs S' complaint about Shawbrook Bank Limited for the reasons provided.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr and Mrs S to accept or reject my decision before 5 January 2026.

Alex Salton  
**Ombudsman**