

The complaint

X's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

X (and his wife Mrs A) purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 10 April 2015 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,500 fractional points at a cost of £12,494 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave X and Mrs A more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

X and Mrs A paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £12,494 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'), in X's sole name (as such, he is the only eligible complainant here). This loan was settled in July 2016.

X – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 25 January 2022 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with X's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 11 March 2022, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, initially said they didn't think our Service could consider some parts of it, and that the remaining merits of the complaint should be rejected.

Having received the responses from both parties, the Investigator then re-assessed the complaint and said that while our Service could consider all aspects of it, they rejected the complaint on its merits.

X disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') dated 6 August 2025. In that decision, I said:

“Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under Section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

In short, a claim against the Lender under Section 75 essentially mirrors the claim X could make against the Supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Further, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they’re first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the ‘LA’). The reason being, that it wouldn’t be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court.

Having considered everything, I think X’s claim for misrepresentation is likely to have been made too late under the relevant provisions of the LA, which means it would have been fair for the Lender to have turned down his Section 75 claim for this reason.

A claim under Section 75 is a ‘like’ claim against the creditor. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, as per Section 2 of the LA.

But a claim like this one under Section 75 is also “an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment” under Section 9 of the LA. The limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued for the claim was the Time of Sale, which was 10 April 2015. I say this because X entered into the membership at that time based on the alleged misrepresentations by the Supplier, which X says he and Mrs A relied on. And, as the loan from the Lender was used to finance this membership, it was when X entered into the Credit Agreement, on 10 April 2015, that he suffered a loss.

X first notified the Lender of his Section 75 claim on 25 January 2022. Since this was more than six years after the Time of Sale, I don’t think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject X’s concerns about the Supplier’s alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

There are also other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between X and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

- 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
- 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;*
- 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant*
- 5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between X and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

X's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to X. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to X was actually unaffordable before also concluding that he lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for X.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like X knew, amongst other things, how much he was borrowing and repaying each month, who he was borrowing from and that he was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for him, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to X's financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on him as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate him, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against X in practice, nor that any such terms led him to behave in a certain way to his detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that X and Mrs A may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr (and Mrs) A made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that X's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him (and Mrs A) as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that X and Mrs A's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that X and Mrs A were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered X and Mrs A the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to X and Mrs A as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as X and Mrs A, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

Neither the PR nor X and Mrs A provided any evidence to support this particular allegation at the time of making their complaint or referring it to our Service. The PR then did provide a witness statement from them in August 2023. I acknowledge the PR has said this statement was drafted in May 2021, but they haven't provided any evidence to support that, and the statement itself is not signed or dated.

But I acknowledge that in this statement, they've said:

“Later that night we had our doubts, so we called the representative and to our surprise we were told that there was another option of a bi-annual membership available which would be cheaper.

So, we went to the sales office next morning and spent another whole morning with [sales representative]. He reluctantly agreed to change the membership to a bi-annual one. We signed a new contract for 1500 points every second year for the same property in [Supplier resort] but with a lesser value of share. We saw it as an investment, to enjoy quality holidays – and we were advised that we would have the option to sell our fractional ownership back to [the Supplier] after 19 years.

[...]

We were also told that the ownership would be for 19 years after which [the Supplier] will buy the property and we will even get a small amount of profit from the sale.”

And I also acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to X and Mrs A as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between X and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between X and the Lender that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led him to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

Again, I’ve considered X and Mrs A’s testimony here. After their description of the sales presentation (where it seems any potential breach by the Supplier took place), they’ve explained that they actually ‘had their doubts’ and after speaking to the sales representative again they found out they could purchase membership on a bi-annual basis and this would be cheaper for them. So, they returned to the sales environment the next day and changed their membership to a bi-annual basis. And, I think this suggests they were interested in holidays, particularly the type of holidays the Supplier could provide.

X and Mrs A have also gone to explain why they’re unhappy with the membership now and their reasons for this relate to how it functions as a holiday product. For example, they’ve described in some detail difficulties with availability and the exclusivity of the resorts.

So, on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go

ahead with their purchase. That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as X and Mrs A themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision X and Mrs A ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that X and Mrs A's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between X and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3)."

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with X's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it. The PR also responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between X and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to X as an investment at the Time of Sale. They've also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship along with contradictions they say were present in the sales paperwork in relation to the sale date of the Allocated Property.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven't said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In my provisional decision I explained that on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when X (and Mrs A) decided to go ahead with their purchase. That did not mean they were not interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that would not be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as X and Mrs A themselves did not persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I did not think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

I said this because of the evidence X and Mrs A had provided. In their testimony, after their description of the sales presentation (where it seems any potential breach by the Supplier took place), they've explained that they actually 'had their doubts' and after speaking to the sales representative again they found out they could purchase membership on a bi-annual basis, and this would be cheaper for them. So, they returned to the sales environment the next day and changed their membership to a bi-annual basis. And I thought this suggests they were interested in holidays, particularly the type of holidays the Supplier could provide.

X and Mrs A also went on to explain why they're unhappy with the membership now and their reasons for this relate to how it functions as a holiday product. For example, they've described in some detail difficulties with availability and the exclusivity of the resorts. Taken as a whole, I could not conclude that Mr T and Mrs A's purchase at the Time of Sale was motivated by any investment element in Fractional Club membership. And for that reason, I did not think the credit relationship between X and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The PR responded to my provisional decision to make, in summary, the following points:

- The fact that X and Mrs A were also interested in taking holidays did not change the fact that the prospect of a profit from their membership influenced their purchasing decision.
- The PR submitted that the evidence showed that the Supplier did sell membership as an investment and that was a motivating factor in their purchasing decision.

I have considered PR's submissions here, but I have not changed my mind from my provisional findings.

In my view, the PR's submissions seem to be conflating the issue of whether there was a breach of Regulation 14(3) at the Time of Sale and whether this was material to X and Mrs A's purchasing decision. And, they appear to be suggesting that if there was a breach of Regulation 14(3) at the Time of Sale, this is sufficient reason in and of itself to uphold this complaint. But I don't agree with that - as I explained in my PD, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision.

And, for all of the reasons I already explained in my PD, I'm simply not persuaded that any such breach by the Supplier at the Time of Sale was material to X and Mrs A's purchasing decision.

I agree with PR that just because a purchaser was also interested in taking holidays with the Supplier, that does not preclude them also being motivated to take out Fractional Club membership by any investment element – indeed I would find it surprising if any members were not interested in taking holidays, given the nature of the product. However, for the reasons set out in this decision and in my PD, I do not find any such investment motivation.

The PR says that as the Supplier's pricing sheet set out the "unit share" X and Mrs A acquired under their Fractional Club membership, this shows the investment element played "quite an important role" in convincing them to purchase it. But I don't agree with that analysis. The pricing sheet was a proforma document that captured a number of details about the purchase in a standardised format. And the Supplier would have recorded that information irrespective of the customer's motivations for purchasing. So, I don't consider this document offers any insight into X and Mrs A's motivation for making their purchase.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances. So just because the complaints that were subject to

judicial review were upheld, it does not follow I must (or should) also uphold X and Mrs A's complaint.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I'm not persuaded X's decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between X and the Lender was unfair to him for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd*, *Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd* and *Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft*, *Johnson* and *Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors* and *Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "*so high*" and "*a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair*" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists X in arguing that his credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

Based on what I've seen, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of X but as the supplier of contractual rights he obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to him when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to X, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led X into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, no payment between the Lender and the Supplier, such as a commission, was payable when the Credit Agreement was arranged at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commercial arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to X.

I will also address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to X in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of his share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2032. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 17 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

*"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate."* (bold my emphasis).

It seems clear to me that the commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2032 as this is what is set out on X's owners' certificate (as opposed to the Information Statement which is simply a standard document). And in any event, it doesn't appear that X has relied on this when making his purchase.

So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between X and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to him. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that X credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to him for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to X complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling X (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed X a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to him. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think he would still have taken out the loan to fund his purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with X's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask X to accept or reject my decision before 29 December 2025.

Fiona Mallinson
Ombudsman