

The complaint

Mrs F complains that Nationwide Building Society ('Nationwide') declined to reimburse her when she says she fell victim to an investment scam.

What happened

The circumstances of this complaint are well known to both parties, so I will not go into every detail of what happened here. But in summary, Mrs F went on a course and met someone who she spoke with about investments. He told her that he had invested in a company, which I will call 'B', and that his experience had been 'amazing'. She got in touch with B, and went out for lunch and met the directors twice. She researched B online, spoke to another investor, and finding nothing of concern, she decided to invest.

Mrs F sent a payment of £10,000 from her Nationwide account in November 2017 and received annual accounts and updates. In 2020, she decided to further invest and sent a series of six payments over around one month from her Nationwide account to B, which totalled £50,000. In 2021, she tried to send further funds, but the payments were returned as the beneficiary account had been closed.

Sometime later, Mrs F decided she wanted to withdraw money to buy property. She could not get through to one of the directors, and the other was unable to explain what was going wrong. Mrs F then realised she had fallen victim to a scam, and so she complained to Nationwide.

Nationwide reviewed Mrs F's claim but declined to reimburse her. Mrs F was unhappy with Nationwide's response, so she escalated her concerns to our service. One of our investigators looked into what had happened and recommended that Mrs F's complaint should be upheld in part. They said that they were satisfied this amounted to a scam, and under the provisions of the Lending Standard Board's Contingent Reimbursement Model ('CRM') Code, Nationwide were liable to reimburse her in full for the 2020 payments, along with 8% simple interest, calculated from the date of Nationwide's initial decision not to reimburse her, to the date of settlement. The 2017 payment pre-dated the CRM Code, and they did not think that proportionate intervention by Nationwide could have identified the scam at the time, and therefore prevented the loss. So they did not recommend that the 2017 payment should be reimbursed.

Nationwide did not accept our investigator's recommendations. It said that it did not think that B was a scam, and that what happened to Mrs F amounted to a private civil dispute.

As no agreement could be reached, the case has been passed to me to decide.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

When considering what is fair and reasonable, I am required to take into account: relevant

law and regulations; regulatory rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice; and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

In broad terms, the starting position in law is that a payment service provider is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (PSRs) and the terms and conditions of the customer's accounts. However, where the customer made the payment as a consequence of the actions of a fraudster, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the provider to reimburse the customer even though they authorised the payment.

The CRM Code is of particular relevance to this case. It is a voluntary code which requires firms to reimburse customers who have been the victims of Authorised Push Payment (APP) scams like this in all but a limited number of circumstances. Nationwide was a signatory to the Code at the time the payment in dispute was made.

In order for me to conclude whether the CRM Code applies in this case, I must first consider whether the payments in question, on the balance of probabilities, meet the Code's definition of a scam. An 'APP scam' is defined within the Code at DS1(2)(a) as:

“Authorised Push Payment scam, that is, a transfer of funds executed across Faster Payments, CHAPS or an internal book transfer, authorised by a Customer in accordance with regulation 67 of the PSRs where:

- (i) The Customer intended to transfer funds to another person but was instead deceived into transferring the funds to a different person; or*
- (ii) The Customer transferred funds to another person for what they believed were legitimate purposes but which were in fact fraudulent”*

The CRM Code is also clear at DS2(2)(b) that it does not apply to *“private civil disputes, such as where a Customer has paid a legitimate supplier for goods, services or digital content but has not received them, they are defective in some way, or the Customer is otherwise dissatisfied with the supplier”*

If I conclude that the payment here meets the required definition of a scam then Mrs F would be entitled to reimbursement, unless Nationwide has shown that any of the exceptions set out in R2(1) of the Code apply.

The LSB has said that the CRM Code does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt that a scam has taken place before a reimbursement decision can be reached. Nor does it require a firm to prove the intent of the third party before a decision can be reached. So, in order to determine Mrs F's complaint, I have to ask myself whether I can be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the available evidence indicates that it is more likely than not that she was the victim of a scam rather than this being a failed or bad investment.

Has Mrs F been the victim of a scam, as defined in the CRM Code?

The Code does not apply to private civil disputes, such as where a customer has paid a legitimate supplier for goods or services but has not received them, they are defective in some way, or the customer is otherwise dissatisfied with the supplier. So, it would not apply to a genuine investment that subsequently failed. And the CRM Code only applies if the definition of an APP scam is met, as set out above.

I do not consider the first part of the definition quoted above (DS(2)(a)(i)) is met in this case. This is not in dispute. But what is in dispute is whether Mrs F's payments meet DS1(2)(a)(ii). So I have gone on to consider if her intended purpose for the payments was legitimate, whether the intended purposes she and B had were broadly aligned and, if not, whether this

was the result of dishonest deception on the part of D.

From what I have seen and what Mrs F has told us, I am satisfied that she made the payments with the intention of investing. I have not seen anything to suggest that she did not think this was a legitimate venture – and as Nationwide argues this is a civil matter, it too seems to accept this.

I've then considered whether there is convincing evidence to demonstrate that the true purpose of the investment scheme was significantly different to this, and so whether this was a scam or a genuine investment.

The evidence I hold suggest that B was operating as a genuine forex trading investment opportunity at one point – it invested nearly £5,000,000 of investors' funds with a legitimate forex trading platform authorised and regulated in another jurisdiction, and for a number of years investors received returns which were often substantial.

I also understand that the police investigation, at last update, was continuing to investigate B, but no charges have been brought that I am aware of, against those individuals responsible for B.

However, by the time Mrs F made the payments to B, I am not satisfied that it was operating a legitimate enterprise. There is compelling evidence which establishes that investors were dishonestly deceived about the purpose of the payments they were sending to B. And so it follows that I am persuaded that Mrs F's payments to B meet the definition of an APP scam under the CRM Code, rather than a mere civil dispute. I will explain why.

B was not authorised by the FCA. It would have needed to be regulated by the FCA to take part in the activity it was alleging to be engaged in. Private investment funds do not solicit investments from the general public or retail investors, which is what B were doing here. So I am persuaded that B misled investors over regulatory requirements for the activities it was said to be undertaking, and I have seen this in writing in its managed account agreements.

Reviewing the evidence our service has received, it appears that B received approximately £28,000,000 from individual or business investors. But only £4,700,000 looks to have been used for the intended purpose of forex trading – less than 17% of the investment capital received. They made returns of roughly £4,100,000 – indicating that there was a trading loss of £600,000. Regardless of the fact that less than 17% of investment capital was traded, which resulted in a loss, roughly £19,000,000 was paid out to investors. This amounted to almost 68% of the investment capital received. The leftover funds were not traded – but instead appear to have been withdrawn to accounts linked to B or its associates.

B offered either loan agreements or managed account agreements – with returns of capital and 15-40% interest promised for the former, and a return of at least 48% for the latter. There is no available evidence to suggest that B could substantiate the rate of returns their investors were expecting. Nor is there evidence that B were trading forex or otherwise investing successfully and generating the profits they claimed to be generating.

So, I am of the opinion that B were not using investor funds for the purpose in which they were understood or intended by Mrs F, and this shows that it is more likely than not that they were not a 'legitimate supplier' of the investment services they claimed to be. I do think that the evidence suggests that their conduct went beyond misleading investors about a legitimate investment opportunity, and that the real purpose of the payments received was different to what Mrs F and other investors were led to believe – and this was done through deception.

Whilst Mrs F did not receive any returns, other investors did. But it appears that any returns that these other investors received were likely sent to encourage further investment. This further investment would either be from existing or new investors who were recommended the opportunity from others who had already invested – as Mrs F's acquaintance had recommended B to her after he had received returns. So, even if any of Mrs F's money was used to trade forex, or otherwise invest or trade, it was likely with the intention of encouraging more investment as part of an overall scam.

So, having considered everything, I am persuaded that B was more likely than not, operating a sophisticated APP scam. I am satisfied that Mrs F's payments to B meets the definition contained within the CRM Code. And so it follows that Nationwide cannot fairly refuse to consider refunding Mrs F under the provisions of the CRM Code on the basis that it amounted to a private civil dispute. So, I have gone on to consider whether Mrs F should be reimbursed under the CRM Code, for those payments which took place after it was implemented.

Is Mrs F entitled to a refund under the CRM Code?

Under the Code, the starting principle is that a firm should reimburse a customer who is the victim of an APP scam, like Mrs F. The circumstances where a firm may choose not to reimburse are limited and it is for the firm to establish those exceptions apply. R2(1) of the Code outlines those exceptions.

One such circumstance might be when a customer has ignored an effective warning. A second circumstance in which a bank might decline to reimburse, is if it can be demonstrated that the customer made the payments without having a reasonable basis for belief in a specific set of things.

Nationwide have provided a copy of the warning Mrs F would have seen when she made the first payment.

“STOP AND THINK

If an opportunity seems too good to be true, it probably is.

Signs it's a scam

You're being pressured to do this or you're just not sure about it.

Before you commit

Think it over and complete an online search for known investment scams. Use the FCA warning list.

If you're not sure it's real, stop now.”

I have considered whether the written warning would amount to an 'effective warning'. Under the provisions of the CRM Code, as a minimum any 'effective warning' needs to be understandable, clear, timely, impactful and specific. It must also provide information that gives customers a better chance to protect themselves against being defrauded and should include appropriate actions for customers to take to protect themselves from APP scams. In short – the warning needs to be capable of countering the typical features of the generic scam type identified during the payment journey.

It is my opinion that this warning did not meet the definition of an effective warning. It lacked

specificity to the scam Mrs F was falling victim to – she was not pressured into this investment – it was recommended by a trusted acquaintance. It therefore would have lacked impact, as Mrs F would understandably click past this due to the lack of specificity. It did not provide any information about how to protect herself from being defrauded, bar saying to look online or on the FCA warning list. Neither of these actions could have helped her uncover the scam. It did not bring to life the characteristics of the scam she was falling victim to. So, as this was not an effective warning, it follows that they cannot fairly decline reimbursement on the basis that Mrs F ignored an effective warning.

I also do not think that it would be fair or reasonable for Nationwide to rely on the exemption to reimbursement that Mrs F sent the funds without a reasonable basis for believing that she was sending funds to a legitimate investment. Given that Nationwide are still arguing that B was potentially a legitimate investment gone wrong, it would be hard to argue that Mrs F did not have a reasonable basis for believing that B was a legitimate company. And I think that there are other elements of what Mrs F knew at the time she made the payments that would have given her a reasonable basis for belief that B was legitimate. This includes that she had made the initial payment some years earlier, and had been provided updates on this showing purported returns on that investment. She had met the director in person, and had liaised with another investor. She had undertaken some research online and found nothing of concern. She received professional correspondence and documentation from B. Considering all of this – I think there was nothing that ought to have led Mrs F to believe she was dealing with an illegitimate company.

With this in mind, I do not think that Nationwide have established that any of the exceptions to the presumption of a full refund under the CRM Code apply here. And so, it follows that Nationwide should reimburse Mrs F in full under the provisions of the CRM Code.

Should Nationwide have done more to prevent Mrs F's losses in relation to the first payment of £10,000?

The CRM Code came into effect in May 2019, so as I outlined above, it did not apply to the first payment Mrs F made to B as this was sent in 2017. But based on the other relevant rules relating to authorised push payment scams, I think Nationwide should fairly and reasonably:

- Have been monitoring accounts and any payments made or received to counter various risks, including anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and preventing fraud and scams.
- Have had systems in place to look out for unusual and out of character transactions or other signs that might indicate that its customers were at risk of fraud (amongst other things). This is particularly so given the increase in sophisticated fraud and scams in recent years, which banks are generally more familiar with than the average customer.
- In some circumstances, irrespective of the payment channel used, have taken additional steps, or made additional checks, before processing a payment, or in some cases declined to make a payment altogether, to help protect customers from the possibility of financial harm from fraud.

So, I consider that as a matter of good practice, Nationwide should have been on the lookout for unusual and out of character transactions and where necessary, taken proportionate interventions. I do think that the payment of £10,000 was sufficiently substantial that it ought to have appeared unusual and out of character for Mrs F's account. But this is not, in and of itself, enough to say that it would be fair to ask Nationwide to reimburse this loss. To ask Nationwide to reimburse this loss, I would have to conclude that a suitable intervention could have prevented the loss. I am sorry to disappoint Mrs F, but I do not think this is the case

here. I'll explain why.

If Nationwide had intervened and asked proportionate, probing questions, I do not think this scam would have come to light. In 2017, there was no negative information about B readily available, and it appeared to be operating as an investment company. Nationwide would not have had access to information that Mrs F did not about how B was operating, and I think that Mrs F could have confidently answered their questions about the investment. And so it follows that I do not think it would be fair or reasonable to ask Nationwide to reimburse Mrs F for the initial £10,000 payment.

Putting things right

In order to put things right, I require Nationwide to:

- Reimburse £50,000 of Mrs F's losses;
- Pay 8% simple interest from the date her claim was declined until the date of settlement.

As B is going through insolvency proceedings, it is possible Mrs F could recover some further funds in the future. In order to avoid the risk of double recovery, Nationwide is entitled to take, if it wishes, an assignment of rights to all future distributions under this process before paying the award.

My final decision

I uphold this complaint and require Nationwide Building Society to pay Mrs F £50,000, plus 8% simple interest from the date it declined to reimburse him under the CRM Code to the date of reimbursement.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs F to accept or reject my decision before 8 January 2026.

Katherine Jones
Ombudsman