

The complaint

Mr M complains that Revolut Ltd won't refund him all his money after he was the victim of a safe account scam.

What happened

Mr M says he was contacted by someone purporting to be from his bank and told that he had been the victim of a phishing scam. The caller referred to a transaction Mr M had made two days earlier and said he would receive a message from his bank shortly, which he did. The caller was able to convince Mr M he was genuinely calling from his bank.

Mr M says there were three calls in total, over a period of a few hours on 23 August 2024. The caller urged Mr M to move his money from another of his bank accounts to his Revolut account, which Mr M did. The caller then asked Mr M for details of his Revolut debit card and told him it would be necessary to move his money to a safe account. He was told the safe account would be named after a well-known company and that his money would be moved back to his bank account later that same day.

He says he didn't initiate the payments from Revolut to the well-known company, but he did authorise them on his Revolut app, in the belief they were being moved to a safe account.

Revolut blocked the transactions, saying it had detected unusual activity. The caller advised him to reactivate his account and follow his instructions, which Mr M did, reactivating his account and approving the payment of £3,435.98 to the well-known company.

The caller then urged him to make another payment, this time for £800. Mr M agreed but his card was declined. He says he became suspicious at this point and when he pressed the caller with some questions, the caller was unable to answer satisfactorily. Mr M says it was at this point that he contacted Revolut to report the scam.

Transaction	Date and time	Amount	Payment type	Result
1	23/08/2024 15:08:15	£3,445.93	Card payment	Declined
2	23/08/2024 15:15:55	£3,445.93	Card payment	Declined
3	23/08/2024 15:25:49	£3,435.98	Card payment	Declined
4	23/08/2024 15:27:15	£315.00	Card payment	Completed
5	23/08/2024 15:39:24	£800	Card payment	Declined
6	23/08/2024 15:39:25	£800	Card payment	Declined
7	23/08/2024 15:40:25	£800	Card payment	Declined
8	24/08/2024 09:00:06	£933.99	Card payment	Completed
9	24/08/2024 09:00:09	£1,249.00	Card payment	Completed
10	24/08/2024 09:00:14	£937.99	Card payment	Completed

Mr M says Revolut was adamant that it couldn't chargeback the transactions, even though he was coerced into authorising the payments. He says he found the in-app chat with Revolut was not satisfactory for dealing with an urgent fraud. He says he dealt with multiple people at Revolut and they couldn't explain why the payments couldn't be blocked or

reimbursed immediately. He says he should be compensated under the Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) Code, which states he should be reimbursed as he didn't authorise the payments, unless it can be shown he acted with gross negligence.

Revolut says all the payments were authorised by Mr M. It doesn't think Mr M exercised due diligence. It says Mr M should have disconnected the call and called his bank back to confirm the legitimacy of the call. Further, it says Mr M was grossly negligent because he sent money to an unknown beneficiary.

Our investigator substantially upheld the complaint. She thought that after Mr M had reported the scam to Revolut on 23 August 2024, it shouldn't have allowed further payments to be made on 24 August 2024. She thought Revolut should have intervened to prevent the three transactions on 24 August 2024 and if it had done so, Mr M's further losses would most likely have been prevented.

Revolut initially offered to refund 50% of Mr M's losses but Mr M didn't accept that offer and it has now been withdrawn. It said Mr M must have given his card details to the scammer. It was not realistic to send payments to a merchant in order to protect a bank account. It declined some of the transactions and froze others and it was ultimately Mr M who reactivated his card to allow the transactions to proceed.

Revolut also said the three payments made on 24 August 2024 were offline transactions, meaning the payments were requested by the merchant but the payments were not captured at the point of sale – the transactions were authorised on 23 August 2023, but fully processed with a delay. Essentially, Revolut says when the Mr M authorised the merchant to collect £3,435.98 on 23 August 2024, he authorised it to collect the payment at any time.

I issued a provisional decision on 21 August 2025 and explained why I considered Mr M's complaint shouldn't be upheld. I said:

"In broad terms, the starting position at law is that an Electronic Money Institution ("EMI") such as Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations (in this case the 2017 regulations) and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

While Mr M indicates that he didn't authorise the payments, I find that he did authorise them. He says he gave his card details to the scammer, the scammer set up the payments, but Mr M knew they had been set up to go to an account in the name of a well-known company and he approved the payments knowing the amount and payment destination. I accept that he was misled into believing the money would be returned to him, but under the Payment Services Regulations 2017 – which is the relevant legislation here – the payments would be considered authorised as he consented to them being made.

While Mr M also refers to the CRM Code, that code doesn't apply to payments made by debit card and Revolut was not a signatory to that code, so it doesn't apply here.

Having taken into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, Revolut ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances.

Revolut says the first three attempted card payments were declined automatically because the payments were processed without 3DS security. The fourth payment didn't flag as suspicious and was authenticated via the 3DS authentication system.

Payments five to seven did flag as suspicious and were declined by Revolut, but it doesn't appear to have given Mr M any warnings or asked the purpose of the payments. The payments were relatively small though. Revolut placed restrictions on his card and sent him a notification to log into the Revolut app and review the transactions and confirm they were genuine. Mr M contacted Revolut to report the fraud after this.

In terms of transactions 8 – 10, these were authorised on 23 August 2023. Revolut says Mr M authorised the merchant to debit his account by £3,435.98 on 23 August 2023 and while some of the payments weren't fully processed that day, Revolut says it had no way of stopping the payments once they had been authorised for collection by the merchant. So, I can understand why Mr M is upset that money debited his account after he had told Revolut about the scam, but once the transactions were authorised there was no way Revolut could have prevented that.

On balance, I consider Revolut's actions were proportionate to the risk. Many payments made by customers each day will be entirely legitimate, and it isn't reasonable to expect a business to stop and check every payment, a balance needs to be struck between protecting customers and not unnecessarily disrupting transactions. I don't consider Revolut was at fault for not intervening in the transaction for £3,435.98 that Mr M authorised on 23 August 2023. While the amount involved was larger than many of the transactions Mr M had made on his Revolut account in the past, occasional, larger, one-off payments are not particularly unusual and the amount involved was not so large that I consider it ought to have triggered intervention from Revolut. That's particularly the case for this type of account, which often involves larger transfers to a variety of different payees.

Because Mr M authorised the merchant to collect £3,435.98, Revolut said the chargeback claim could not succeed. Chargebacks are not a legal right, they are governed by rules set by the relevant card scheme. The relevant chargeback rules do not cover claims for fraud where the customer authorised the payments and so I don't consider there was a realistic prospect of Revolut being able to recover Mr M's money in those circumstances."

Revolut didn't respond to my provisional decision.

Mr M responded and said, in summary:

- Revolut's customer service was poor and this needed to be taken into account. He was unable to speak to anyone at Revolut and needed to use live chat. Revolut didn't seem to acknowledge or accept that he had been coerced and manipulated into making the payments, but Revolut ought to have been aware of this type of scam;
- Revolut's initial offer was a tacit admission of responsibility;
- New rules came into effect shortly after the fraud took place and might have provided better protections to him;
- The investigator reached a substantially different outcome; and
- My assessment seemed to accept that Revolut didn't act expeditiously or correctly.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I've reached the same overall conclusions as set out in my provisional decision and for broadly the same reasons, but I'll address the further points Mr M has raised.

I don't agree that Revolut didn't act promptly or correctly when Mr M reported the fraud and in its subsequent response. In general, it is for Revolut to decide how it wants to staff and operate its business and I can't see that using live chat, rather than a phone call, has caused Mr M any particular inconvenience. Looking at the chat history between Mr M and Revolut, it responded promptly to Mr M getting in contact, within a few minutes, and dealt with his enquiries promptly. He was transferred to other members of staff, for example in the chargeback team, or fraud team on the basis that they were best able to help him. On balance, I don't consider there was a problem with Revolut's customer service or that Mr M was caused any harm by it.

I understand that Mr M was the victim of a scam and that he was tricked and manipulated into approving these transactions. These scams are cruel and designed to instil a sense of panic and urgency in the victim. Revolut would have been aware of this type of scam and it didn't express any doubt about the circumstances Mr M had described. It appears to have accepted and understood that Mr M had been tricked and manipulated. But the fact that Mr M was the victim of a scam does not make Revolut responsible for his losses.

While the investigator reached a different outcome, for the reasons set out in my provisional decision, I don't consider the transactions were sufficiently suspicious that Revolut ought to have intervened to prevent them. I also explained why I don't think there was anything Revolut could realistically have done to recover Mr M's money. I remain of the view set out in my provisional decision.

While it is unfortunate that Revolut withdrew its offer, I don't consider the offer was a tacit admission that Revolut did anything wrong. There are a variety of reasons why businesses make offers, for example commercial reasons or goodwill gestures. And Revolut hasn't accepted responsibility for Mr M's loss at any point nor accepted it made any error.

Further rules were introduced shortly after the events Mr M complains about, but they were not in place at the time and wouldn't have applied to card payments in any event.

I'm sorry Mr M has been the victim of a scam and I appreciate it would have been distressing, on top of the financial loss he has suffered, but for the reasons set out above and in my provisional decision, I'm not persuaded Revolut is at fault for his loss.

My final decision

I don't uphold Mr M's complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr M to accept or reject my decision before 3 October 2025.

Greg Barham

Ombudsman