

The complaint

Mrs C and Mr C's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mrs C and Mr C were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having previously purchased a trial timeshare membership from it. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 10 October 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,420 fractional points at a cost of £24,214 (the 'Purchase Agreement'). However, after trading in their trial membership, they paid £20,219 for Fractional Club membership.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs C and Mr C more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mrs C and Mr C paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £20,219 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mrs C and Mr C – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 27 March 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mrs C and Mr C's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 26 April 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs C and Mr C disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') in which I explained why I didn't think this complaint should be upheld. In that decision, I said:

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Furthermore, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has been time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the ‘LA’). The reason being that it wouldn’t be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability first arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court.

Having considered everything, I think Mrs C and Mr C’s claim for misrepresentation is likely to have been made too late under the relevant provisions of the LA, which means it would have been fair for the Lender to have turned down their section 75 claim for this reason

A claim under section 75 is a “like” claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mrs C and Mr C could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see section 2 of the LA).

But a claim under section 75, like this one, is also “*an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment*” under section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued here was the Time of Sale. I say this because Mrs C and Mr C entered into the purchase of the Fractional Club membership at that time based upon the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which Mrs C and Mr C say they relied upon. And as the Credit Agreement with the Lender provided funding to help finance that purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they allegedly suffered the loss.

Mrs C and Mr C first notified the Lender of their concerns in March 2023. Since this was more than six years after the Time of Sale, I don’t think it was ultimately unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject their concerns about the Supplier’s alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I’ve already explained why I don’t think it was ultimately unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject Mrs C and Mr C’s concerns about the Supplier’s alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs C and Mr C's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs C and Mr C. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs C and Mr C was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for the Mrs C and Mr C.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs C and Mr C knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs C and Mr C suffering financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

Although not included within the Letter of Complaint, in response to the Lender's final response, a witness statement from Mrs C and Mr C was produced which included the suggestion that they were pressured into signing "*loads of paperwork*" – a point which the Lender addressed in its response.

I acknowledge that Mrs C and Mr C may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They

were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs C and Mr C made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs C and Mr C's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs C and Mr C's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs C and Mr C were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs C and Mr C the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs C and Mr C as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs C and Mr C, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs C and Mr C as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, the question of whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

In the Letter of Complaint, the PR asserts that the Fractional Club membership was sold to Mrs C and Mr C as an investment. But this assertion is somewhat generic and one that has been made by the PR in an identical or similar fashion in a number of other complaints.

The Lender's response to Mrs C and Mr C's complaint highlights that despite requesting their recollections of the sale, no witness testimony was received. That said, in reply to the Lender's complaint response, the PR did subsequently provide a brief witness statement – albeit it is unsigned and undated. In that statement, Mrs C and Mr C recall the Supplier:

“...showing us pictures of holidays, we could have a great opportunity. We could have this and make a good profit sale at any time and get your money back. Have great holidays and make money. Top flights airport lounge best

apartments (we could never book when we wanted, and the resort were only in Spain or Mallorca miles from transport.)”

On 9 December 2024 the PR provided this service with a subsequent, more detailed witness statement signed and dated 4 December 2024 by Mrs C and Mr C.

I have some concerns about this subsequent statement. Firstly, I've noted it was provided in response to the investigator's assessment which didn't uphold their complaint. Also, it was dated more than 20 months after the original complaint was submitted and more than eight years after the Time of Sale. Notably, it was provided after the judgement in the case of *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*¹, a case which highlighted the potential significance of breaches of Regulation 14(3).

The subsequent statement appears to expand upon the circumstances leading up to Mrs C and Mr C's meeting with the Supplier in October 2016 and repeats much of what was included in the first witness statement. However, it adds:

“The fractional timeshare was presented as investment, and we hoped we would make some money out of it.”

“We thought we were buying a financial and holiday product which would suit our needs and we could pass it to our children.”

“...we thought we would make the money back with the profit, and would have bought it otherwise”.

Having considered these statements, I find some of the content contradictory. On the one hand, Mrs C and Mr C say they saw their purchase as something that could be passed on to their children. On the other, they refer to making some money back. I think all of this limits the extent to which I can reasonably rely upon Mrs C and Mr C's subsequent statement.

On balance, I don't think there is sufficient for me to be able to conclude that Mrs C and Mr C were materially motivated by the prospect of a profit or financial gain when deciding to purchase Fractional Club membership. The first statement says very little about the investment allegation and even less about Mrs C and Mr C's motivations to purchase.

There is a real lack of reliable detail or colour to their testimony, which to me suggests Mrs C and Mr C may not have particularly strong recollections of what happened or what was said on the subject at the Time of Sale. Of course, that's not their fault, but it's not a reasonable basis for me to arrive at any conclusions about their motivations at the Time of Sale in October 2016.

That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs C and Mr C themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs C and Mr C ultimately made.

¹ *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin)

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs C and Mr C's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was primarily motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Insolvency of the Supplier and its implications under the Credit Agreement

The PR argues that, because the Supplier, together with various associated businesses, entered into a liquidation procedure in December 2020, Mrs C and Mr C are not able to recover any amount that is expected to be awarded by the Spanish court.

However, as the Lender hasn't been party to any court proceedings in Spain, and as I can't see that the Supplier (i.e., the company that entered into the Purchase Agreement) is itself the subject of a Spanish court judgment in Mrs C and Mr C's favour, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement remains valid under English law for the purposes of the ruling set out in *Durkin v DSG Retail* [2014] UKSC 21.

I also note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn't at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in *Diamond Resorts Europe and Others* (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that, because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract was governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR.

Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs C and Mr C's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs C and

Mr C as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mrs C and Mr C was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mrs C and Mr C to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mrs C and Mr C as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mrs C and Mr C in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mrs C and Mr C to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mrs C and Mr C to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimonies given by Mrs C and Mr C in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted their testimonies differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*² and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mrs C and Mr C to have been "primarily or mainly

² R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

motivated” by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, I found Mrs C and Mr C’s recollections somewhat contradictory in so far as they said that they thought they were buying a financial and holiday product that they could pass on to their children, despite earlier saying they believed they could “*make a good profit sale at any time and get your money back*”. Furthermore, given the timing of both of Mrs C and Mr C’s witness statements, I had concerns about the extent that I could rely upon those recollections.

In summary, I wasn’t persuaded that Mrs C and Mr C were highly motivated by the possibility of a financial gain and/or profit when purchasing Fractional Club membership. And in light of all the available evidence I thought they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

The PR has reiterated its argument that Mrs C and Mr C’s witness statements clearly (in its view) stated “*the benefits that obviously convinced them to purchase, which include the potential gains from selling the apartment at the end*”.

To recap, Mrs C and Mr C purchased Fractional Club membership in October 2016. The first time they raised any concerns with the Lender was in March 2023 when the claim was submitted – almost six and a half years later. Despite the alleged concerns, Mrs C and Mr C did not provide a witness statement to the Lender.

The PR argues there was no requirement for a witness statement to accompany such a claim – despite the Lender having requested one. As I’ve already said - *there remains an onus on Mr S and Mr S to provide some evidence for the claim they are making* - under the various provisions of the CCA. In Mrs S and Mr S’s case, their claim appears reliant upon their personal recollections, due to the lack of supporting documentary evidence available. So, I think the provision of their personal recollections in the form of a witness statement was quite important to the claim’s consideration – whether it was a ‘requirement’ or not. In Mrs C and Mr C’s case, a witness statement wasn’t provided until after the Lender’s final response – more than eight years after the event complained about.

That first statement, was relatively brief and didn’t really expand upon what it was the Supplier was alleged to have said and/or shown them which persuaded them to purchase Fractional Club membership as an investment or even led Mrs C and Mr C to see it that way. The second statement was dated 4 December 2024 – almost nine years after the event complained about. It was more detailed in its content and was provided direct to this service in response to the investigator’s findings.

However, and as I touched upon in my PD, I’m mindful that both witness statements were only first provided after the judgement in the case of *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, a case which highlighted the potential significance of breaches of Regulation 14(3). There is no evidence to suggest that any statement was produced before that judgement was issued. So, I can’t discount the possibility that those recollections may have been influenced by the outcome in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*. As a result, I think this limits the weight I can reasonably apply to the evidence presented in these statements. And consequently, I’m not persuaded to vary from my provisional findings.

So, for the reasons given in my PD and above, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mrs C and Mr C’s decision to purchase the Fractional Club membership.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the

Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33* ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471*, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs C and Mr C in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs C and Mr C. Nor

have I seen anything that persuades me that there was a commission arrangement between them which gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate leading Mrs C and Mr C into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs C and Mr C.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, the Lender didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs C and Mr C but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not persuaded that there were any commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender that were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs C and Mr C.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs C and Mr C and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mrs C and Mr C's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to their complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs C and Mr C (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs C and Mr C a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be

available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. Not least because it appears no commission was paid. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing any commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think that is relevant in the circumstances of Mrs C and Mr C's case.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs C and Mr C's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs C and Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 24 February 2026.

Dave Morgan
Ombudsman