

The complaint

Mr R's complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK PLC, trading as Novuna Consumer Finance, (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr R purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 23 June 2014 (the 'Time of Sale'). Mr R, together with another individual that is not party to this complaint, entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,200 fractional points at a cost of £12,294 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr R more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after his membership term ends.

Mr R paid for his Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £12,294 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement') in his sole name.

Mr R – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 17 November 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. Since then the PR has raised some further matters it says are relevant to the outcome of this complaint. As both sides are familiar with the concerns raised, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr R's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 19 February 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint had, by that time, been referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by two Investigators who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint that the Lender hadn't properly considered a claim made under Section 75 of the CCA on its merits. The Investigators felt that the complaint that there was an unfair credit relationship under Section 140A hadn't been made in time as per the rules that this service must follow and that it couldn't be considered.

Mr R disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me. I've already issued a decision explaining what parts of the complaint this service can and can't consider. In summary, I didn't think the Financial Ombudsman Service had the jurisdiction to consider Mr R's complaint about the Lender's participation in and/or perpetuation of an unfair credit relationship under Section 140A of the CCA.

Insofar as Mr R's complaint about the Lender's decision to decline his Section 75 claim for misrepresentation, and the credit broker being unauthorised was concerned, I thought those parts of the complaint were in jurisdiction. I said I'd consider the merits of those aspects of the complaint, and set out my findings on them, in a separate decision. I've done so in this

final decision.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I conclude that the Lender didn't act unfairly or unreasonably by coming to the decision that it did to reject Mr R's concerns about the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations under Section 75 of the CCA and the credit broker not being authorised.

I'll explain my reasons for my conclusions below.

Mr R's complaint that the credit broker was not authorised

The PR has argued that that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr R knew, amongst other things, how much he was borrowing and repaying each month, who he was borrowing from and that he was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. So, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr R's financial loss.

And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate Mr R, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

Mr R's Section 75 Complaint

Section 75 of the CCA creates a financial liability that the creditor is bound to pay. Liability under Section 75 isn't based on anything the lender does wrong, but upon the misrepresentations and breaches of contract by the supplier, for which Section 75 imposes on the lender a "like claim" to that which the borrower enjoys against the supplier. If the lender is notified of a valid Section 75 claim, it should pay its liability. And if it fails or refuses to do so, that failure or refusal can give rise to a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service.

So, when a complaint is referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service on the back of an unsuccessful attempt to advance a Section 75 claim, the act or omission that engages the Service's jurisdiction is the creditor's refusal to accept and pay the debtor's claim – rather than anything that occurs before the claim was put to the creditor, such as the supplier's alleged misrepresentation(s) and/or breach(es) of contract.

As a general rule, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the 'LA') as it wouldn't be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court. So, it is relevant to consider whether Mr R's Section 75 claim for misrepresentation was time-barred under the LA before he put it to the Lender.

As I mentioned above, a claim under Section 75 is a "like" claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mr R could make against the Supplier.

A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim

expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the LA).

But a claim, like the one in question here, under Section 75 is also 'an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment' under Section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued was the Time of Sale. I say this because Mr R entered into the purchase of his timeshare at that time based on the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which he says were relied upon. And as the loan from the Lender was used to help finance the purchase, it was when he entered into the Credit Agreement that he suffered a loss.

Mr R first notified the Lender of his Section 75 claim on 17 November 2023. And as more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when that claim was first put to the Lender, I don't think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject Mr R's concerns about the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations.

The PR has argued that the limitation period can be extended, for example, in the case of concealment or fraud. There are provisions within the LA to extend limitation periods in such circumstances. However, I don't think the PR's arguments assist the claim in this regard, not least because the concealment of the product being an investment would be inconsistent with the allegation the PR's also made that the Supplier had promoted the product to Mr R as an investment.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold the complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr R to accept or reject my decision before 15 October 2025.

Nimish Patel
Ombudsman