

The complaint

Mr D and Miss N's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr D and Miss N were existing members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier'), having previously purchased a trial membership product. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – membership of which they bought from the Supplier on 13 December 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,590 fractional points at a cost of £22,499 (the 'Purchase Agreement'). However, after trading in their existing trial membership, they paid £18,504 for Fractional Club membership.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr D and Miss N more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr D and Miss N paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £21,791 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement') in their joint names. Whilst the amount borrowed was more than the cost of their Fractional Club membership (after the trade in), it included an amount sufficient to repay existing finance outstanding in relation to the trial membership they'd previously purchased.

Mr D and Miss N – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 17 February 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr D and Miss N's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 17 April 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr D and Miss N disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') in which I explained why I didn't think this complaint should be upheld. In that decision, I said:

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Furthermore, creditors can reasonably reject section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has been time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the ‘LA’). The reason being that it wouldn’t be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability first arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court.

Having considered everything, I think Mr D and Miss N’s claim for misrepresentation is likely to have been made too late under the relevant provisions of the LA, which means it would have been fair for the Lender to have turned down their section 75 claim for this reason

A claim under section 75 is a “like” claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mr D and Miss N could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see section 2 of the LA.

But a claim under section 75, like this one, is also “*an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment*” under section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued here was the Time of Sale. I say this because Mr D and Miss N entered into the purchase of the Fractional Club membership at that time based upon the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which Mr D and Miss N says they relied upon. And as the Credit Agreement with the Lender provided funding to help finance that purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they allegedly suffered the loss.

Mr D and Miss N first notified the Lender of their concerns in February 2023. Since this was more than six years after the Time of Sale, I don’t think it was ultimately unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject their concerns about the Supplier’s alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

There are also other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr D, Miss N and the Lender along with all the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr D, Miss N and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr D and Miss N's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr D and Miss N. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr D and Miss N was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr D and Miss N.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr D and Miss N knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr D and Miss N incurring financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

In a witness statement produced much later on, Mr D and Miss N said "*We felt very pressured to agree to a new timeshare as it had more benefits than previous one...*". I acknowledge that Mr D and Miss N may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period, but they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel the membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr D and Miss N made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract term in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr

D and Miss N in practice, nor that any such terms led him to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr D and Miss N's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of the prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr D and Miss N's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr D and Miss N were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr D and Miss N the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr D and Miss N as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr D and Miss N, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr D and Miss N as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr D and Miss N and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr D, Miss N and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr D and Miss N decided to go ahead with their purchase. It appears neither the PR nor Mr D and Miss N provided any evidence to support this particular allegation at the time of making the complaint. In fact, the Lender refers to the lack of testimonial evidence in its final response, having previously requested that it be provided. It appears the PR did subsequently provide a witness statement to this service some 20 months after the complaint was first made and six months after the Lender's final response. Albeit that statement is unsigned and undated.

I think it's difficult to attach much weight to a statement which was first produced almost eight years after the event complained about. In particular, when compared to a statement written nearer to the time when memories may have been fresher and free from the potential influence of after events.

That said, I've considered Mr D and Miss N's recollections carefully and with that in mind. In many ways their statement appears to be very detailed. However, at times I found their recollections of what they were told confusing and unclear. On the one hand they suggest there was a focus upon the limitations of their existing timeshare (presumably in reference to their trial membership) - it being part of an older development and less secure whilst having limited facilities. This despite trial membership not ordinarily being tied to one particular resort. The suggestion being that Fractional Club membership offered them a higher standard of accommodation and facilities. But there's also reference to them being told that they could use their (Fractional Club) points to make money by renting them out to be used by family and friends, albeit I've seen no evidence to suggest Mr D and Miss N made any attempt, or had any intention of doing that.

Mr D and Miss N also allege they were told they "*...would receive money back plus profit from the sale*". However, this appears to be in reference to a suggestion that they were told "*they [the Supplier] were ready to sale whole site / resort to a private company who they was in talks with, we were to get our money back as they had us to agree the purchase plus more as the market was very good*" (sic). This particular recollection appears to contradict the very nature and function of Fractional Club membership. Whilst I acknowledge this is Mr D and Miss N's recollection, in the absence of any supporting evidence, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier's representative would have presented it in the manner described.

Having considered everything that's been said and provided, I don't think there is sufficient for me to be able to conclude that Mr D and Miss N was materially motivated by the prospect of a profit or financial gain when deciding to purchase Fractional Club membership. Their statement doesn't say that. There is a real lack of reliable detail or colour to their testimony, which to me suggests Mr D and Miss N may not have particularly strong recollections of what happened or what was said on the subject at the Time of Sale. Of course, that's not their fault, but it's not a reasonable basis for me to arrive at any conclusions about their motivations at the Time of Sale in December 2016.

That doesn't mean Mr D and Miss N weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as they don't suggest or persuade me that their purchase was primarily motivated by the share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mr D and Miss N ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr D and Miss N's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with the purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr D, Miss N and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Insolvency of the Supplier and its implications under the Credit Agreement

The PR argues that, because the Supplier, together with various associated businesses, entered into a liquidation procedure in December 2020, Mr D and Miss N

are not able to recover any amount that is expected to be awarded by the Spanish court.

However, as the Lender hasn't been party to any court proceedings in Spain, and as I can't see that the Supplier (i.e., the company that entered into the Purchase Agreement) is itself the subject of a Spanish court judgment in Mr D and Miss N's favour, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement remains valid under English law for the purposes of the ruling set out in *Durkin v DSG Retail* [2014] UKSC 21.

I also note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn't at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in *Diamond Resorts Europe and Others* (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that, because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract was governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR.

Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr D and Miss N's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

[The Consumer Credit Sourcebook \('CONC'\) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's \(the 'FCA'\) Handbook of Rules and Guidance](#)

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr D and Miss N and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr D and Miss N as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mr D and Miss N was unfair. I

agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mr D and Miss N to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mr D and Miss N as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mr D and Miss N in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr D and Miss N to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mr D and Miss N to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mr D and Miss N in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted their testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*¹ and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mr D and Miss N to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, Mr D and Miss N's recollections appeared to contradict the very nature of the Fractional Club membership they purchased and weren't evidentially supported. Further, their statement lacked the necessary and credible detail and colour to support the PR's assertion that they were motivated by the prospect of a financial gain or profit.

I was also mindful that Mr D and Miss N's witness statement wasn't produced at the time of the claim, despite the Lender's assertion that it had requested one. The PR argues there was no requirement for a witness statement to accompany such a claim. As I previously said above - *there remains an onus on Mr D and Miss N to provide some evidence for the claim they are making* - under the various provisions of the CCA. In Mr D and Miss N's case, their claim appears to rely upon their personal recollections, due to the lack of supporting documentary evidence available. So, I think the provision of their personal recollections is

¹ R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

fundamental to the claim's consideration – whether it was a 'requirement' or not. In Mr D and Miss N's case, it appears the witness statement wasn't provided until later on.

The PR says it has no record of the Lender requesting a witness statement from Mr D and Miss N although asserts it was provided on 19 December 2023 – 10 months after the claim was submitted but prior to the date on which the Lender issued its final response. I've seen no evidence to support that assertion. Indeed, the first reference to the provision of Mr D and Miss N's witness statement was in the PR's written response following the Lender's final response - "*which we also attach...*" (the witness statement).

Having considered the witness statement again, I continue to have concerns about the plausibility of some of those recollections. Particularly as some of the allegations around what Mr D and Miss N say they were told by the Supplier varies significantly from what the limited documentation suggests and what this service knows about the Fractional Cub membership they purchased.

The reality is that it doesn't appear that Mr D and Miss N's witness statement was produced any time before December 2023. So, I think it is very difficult to place emphasis and weight upon recollections provided so long after the event complained about. I'm also mindful that the witness statement was only provided after the judgement in the case of *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, a case which highlighted the potential significance of breaches of Regulation 14(3). And given there is no evidence to suggest that the statement was produced before that judgement, I can't discount the possibility that it may have been influenced by the outcome in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*. As a result, I think this all limits the weight I can reasonably apply to the evidence presented in this statement. And as a consequence, I'm not persuaded to vary from my provisional findings.

So, for the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mr D and Miss N's decision to purchase the Fractional Club membership.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33* ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471*, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr D and Miss N in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr D and Miss N. Nor have I seen anything that persuades me that there was a commission arrangement between them that gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr D and Miss N into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr D and Miss N.

Based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting

as an agent of Mr D and Miss N but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, the Lender didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not persuaded that there were commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender that were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr D and Miss N.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr D and Miss N and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mr D and Miss N's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints aside from Mr D and Miss N's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr D and Miss N (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr D and Miss N a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. Not least, because it appears no commission was paid. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I see no reason why they would not have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr D and Miss N's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr D and Miss N to accept or reject my decision before 18 February 2026.

Dave Morgan
Ombudsman