

## **The complaint**

Mr S has complained that Revolut Ltd won't refund money he says he has lost to scam.

## **What happened**

The details of the complaint are well known to both parties, so I will not repeat them again here. Instead, I will focus on giving the reasons for my decision.

## **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I agree with the investigator's findings for broadly the same circumstances, I will explain why.

I'm very aware that I've summarised this complaint briefly, in less detail than has been provided, and in my own words. No discourtesy is intended by this. Instead, I've focused on what I think is the heart of the matter here. If there's something I've not mentioned, it isn't because I've ignored it. I haven't. I'm satisfied I don't need to comment on every individual point or argument to be able to reach what I think is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this. This simply reflects the informal nature of our service as a free alternative to the courts.

Banks have various and long-standing obligations to be alert to fraud and scams and to act in their customers' best interests. These are predicated on their having been a fraud or scam. So, a first consideration in determining Revolut's obligations here would normally be:

- was Mr S scammed as he alleged and to establish the loss he suffered.

And while I don't dispute Mr S' version of events, our service has asked Mr S' representative (when he was being represented) on several occasions to provide further evidence. I want to highlight at this stage I haven't overlooked Mr S' comments regarding the evidence or the difficult circumstances, or the challenges he may face obtaining certain evidence.

However, given the circumstances of this complaint and how the scam evolved, I don't think it is unreasonable to conclude that Mr S would be able to provide some evidence of the loss as a result of a scam, such as his crypto currency statements showing the funds being transferred to a third-party's accounts or evidence the funds were lost to the alleged scammer. Or scam conversations demonstrating the scammer provided Mr S with details of where to send the funds to, and discussions surrounding the alleged 'investment' scam. As such, I haven't seen anything to specifically show that the transactions in questions were carried out in relation to a scam. I've considered Mr S' testimony and while I can be satisfied that he made the transactions on his account, I can't be satisfied that the ultimate beneficiary of the funds was to the scammer.

In any event, in absence of the evidence requested I have considered the events which took place. It's not in dispute that Mr S authorised the disputed payments in question. Between 13

September and 19 September 2024 Mr S says he fell victim to an investment scam. He sent two payments from his Revolut account to a cryptocurrency account in his own name, (where the funds were subsequently transferred on to the scammer). The first payment Mr S made was £5,000 followed by a payment of £10,000 a few days later. Revolut would generally be expected to process payments a customer authorises it to make. While I accept that Mr S didn't intend for his money to go to the fraudsters, under the Payment Service Regulations 2017 (PSRs) he is presumed liable for the loss in the first instance as the payments were authorised by him. This is unless there is sufficient evidence that Revolut should fairly and reasonably have done more to protect Mr S.

It isn't in dispute that the payments ought to have triggered Revolut's fraud prevention systems, I say this because Revolut's did intervene on the payments in question. On 13 September 2024, Mr S transferred £5,000 to his cryptocurrency account. The FCA's Consumer Duty, which was in force at the time these payments were made, requires firms to act to deliver good outcomes for consumers including acting to avoid foreseeable harm. In practice this includes maintaining adequate systems to detect and prevent scams and to design, test, tailor and monitor the effectiveness of scam warning messages presented to customers. As such, firms, have developed warnings to recognise both the importance of identifying the specific scam risk in a payment journey and of ensuring that consumers interact with the warning.

In light of the above, by September 2024, when these payments took place, Revolut should have had systems in place to identify, as far as possible, the actual scam that might be taking place for example by asking a series of automated questions designed to narrow down the type of scam risk associated with the payment he was making – have provided a scam warning tailored to the likely scam Mr S was at risk from. I accept that any such system relies on the accuracy of any information provided by the customer and cannot reasonably cover off every circumstance.

Having reviewed the evidence provided, I am satisfied Revolut did ask Mr S what the payment was for and Mr S, selected transferring money to another account. Mr S was then asked further questions, (in line with what I have highlighted above) to narrow down the type of scam Mr S was falling victim to. Mr S was asked several questions, including how did he discovered the opportunity, where he was also provided with information stating the following:

*“Fraudsters use social media to advertise fake investments. Well-known celebrities and influencers may even promote them to make them seem real.”*

And while some of the information Revolut provided Mr S with would have been identical to the situation, he found himself in, Mr S proceeded. To be clear, I am satisfied this would have been a proportionate and reasonable intervention given the risk the transaction presented. As such I wouldn't have expected Revolut to do anything further in the circumstances.

On 17 September 2004, Mr S attempted to transfer a payment of £10,000. However, Revolut intervened, and due to how Mr S answered the questions, Revolut contacted Mr S by phone. Having listened to the phone call, I am satisfied Revolut asked open and probing questions to Mr S. Mr S, as part of his submission to our service, has said he was coerced by the scammer and was heavily guided by the scammer, such as to say when asked: *“I'd been investing for around 6 months and I've read all the online reviews.”*

However, having listened to the call between Revolut and Mr S, when asked if he is was being guided or pressurising him to make the payment, Mr S said:

*“No”*

The advisor clearly said he thought Mr S could be falling victim to an investment scam and explained in order to establish that he would need to ask further questions.

The advisor said:

*“Has anyone reached out to you after you reacting to an investment post being promoted by a celebrity?”*

Mr S answered *“No”*

The advisor also asked

*“Anyone ask you not to be truthful while asking security questions”*

Mr S said *“No”*.

Therefore, based on what Mr S told our service and how he answered the questions when asked by the advisor from Revolut, it is clear Mr S hasn't provided accurate information to Revolut or has provided conflicting testimony.

Revolut went on to asking more open and probing questions and based on how Mr S' answered declined the transaction after making it clear several times; Mr S was at risk of falling victim to an investment scam. I am satisfied; Revolut's intervention was not only proportionate but also robust. And despite Mr S not providing accurate information, stopped the transaction to allow Mr S further time to reflect and carry out research.

On 18 September 2024, Mr S attempted to make the payment twice, and Revolut declined the transaction. However, on 18 September 2024, Mr S attempted to make the transaction again, and it was successful. While it could be argued that Revolut ought to have prevented that transaction, in line with how it did above, it is evident from Mr S' testimony and future actions (with a third-party bank) Mr S was adamant he wanted to make the payment. Mr S has told our service that the scammer was pressurising him, telling him to lie to Revolut and advising him to 'be upset with Revolut' for not allowing him to make payments. As such, even if Revolut had intervened in the later payment, I am not persuaded it would have unveiled the scam and essentially prevented the loss. Mr S was clearly under the spell and influence of the scammer and trusted him more than he did Revolut and was determined to make the transaction.

As discussed above, without being able to establish the loss Mr S actually suffered (if any), I can't fairly or reasonably direct Revolut to refund Mr S the disputed transactions.

I've also looked at whether Revolut took the steps it should have once Mr S contacted it to dispute the payments. It's important to note that Mr S didn't ask Revolut to send the money directly to the alleged scammer but instead to a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange (to an account in his own name under his control). Revolut did as Mr S requested. So, it was always highly unlikely that Revolut would be able to facilitate the recovery of the payment after they were moved on from Mr S' wallet to the alleged scammers. So, it follows that I won't be asking b to do anything further.

### **My final decision**

My final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr S to accept or

reject my decision before 24 October 2025.

Jade Rowe  
**Ombudsman**