

The complaint

Mr C complains that Revolut Ltd did not reimburse the funds he lost to a scam.

What happened

Mr C fell victim to a scam after he met an individual who said they needed help recovering an inheritance. Following this, a recovery company reached out to him and told him the funds he lost in the inheritance scam had been located in a cryptocurrency wallet. He was told these had been frozen due to anti-money laundering regulations and the recovery company, which I will refer to as 'X', could help him get it back.

Mr C was instructed to open an account with Revolut to assist with recovering the cryptocurrency. Over the course of a few months, Mr C sent over £16,000 from his Revolut account to various cryptocurrency exchanges as X told him he needed to do so to provide proof of funds and collateral for the money he lost to the scam. Despite doing so, he was asked to send even more money and eventually, he realised he had fallen victim to a further scam.

Mr C raised a scam claim with Revolut who explained they felt they had provided relevant warnings on the payments, and did not agree they were liable to reimburse Mr C. The complaint was referred to our service and our Investigator looked into it. They issued a view explaining they did not think Revolut needed to provide a refund. This was because they did not agree the payments were so unusual as to warrant an intervention from Revolut. And they noted that Revolut did intervene in some of the payments, and they felt the level of intervention was proportionate.

Mr C's representative disagreed with the findings as they felt the pattern of the payments was unusual enough to warrant an intervention. They felt that if there had been a human intervention, it would have been clear Mr C was falling victim to a scam.

As an informal agreement could not be reached, the complaint has been passed to me for a final decision.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

In deciding what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of a complaint, I'm required to take into account relevant: law and regulations; regulators' rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice; and, where appropriate, what I consider to be good industry practice at the time.

Broadly speaking, the starting position in law is that an account provider is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the account. And a customer will then be responsible for the transactions that they have authorised.

It's not in dispute here that Mr C authorised the payments in question as he believed they were needed to recover his funds. So, while I recognise that he didn't intend the money to go to scammers, the starting position in law is that Revolut was obliged to follow Mr C's

instruction and process the payments. Because of this, he is not automatically entitled to a refund.

The regulatory landscape, along with good industry practice, also sets out a requirement for account providers to protect their customers from fraud and financial harm. And this includes monitoring accounts to look out for activity that might suggest a customer was at risk of financial harm, intervening in unusual or out of character transactions and trying to prevent customers falling victim to scams. So, I've also thought about whether Revolut did enough to try to keep Mr C's account safe.

Mr C made a number of different types of payments from his Revolut account. This included faster payments to individuals and card payments to cryptocurrency providers, as well as exchanges made to cryptocurrency directly via Revolut and subsequent withdrawals of the cryptocurrency. It has already been explained and accepted that our Service does not have jurisdiction to look at the withdrawals made in cryptocurrency. But we do have jurisdiction to look at the deposits made into the Revolut account and subsequent exchanges into cryptocurrency.

Having carefully reviewed the statements, on balance I do not think the overall value or frequency of the payments was unusual enough to warrant a human intervention from Revolut. It should be noted that this was a new account and there was therefore no genuine account activity for Revolut to compare the scam payments to. The payments themselves were spread out over a few weeks instead of all being made at once, and the amounts were generally less than £3,000, with the only larger payment being an exchange to cryptocurrency of £7,500. However, it should be noted that the exchange was being made to Mr C's own cryptocurrency wallet contained within Revolut, so I do think the risk level on this payment was generally lower than that of one going outside of Revolut.

In any event, Revolut did stop a number of payments for additional, automated checks. This included some of the card payments and faster payments. Mr C was asked a number of questions about the payments to which he replied that no-one had asked him to make the payments and he had not been told to download any software such as AnyDesk. He mostly selected that he was transferring the funds to another account in his name, but on one he selected 'paying family/friends'. For the majority of these payments, Revolut still held the payments for a further three hours before releasing them in case Mr C changed his mind.

On balance, I do think this level of intervention was proportionate to the risk level the payments posed. Mr C's representatives have said it should have been clear something was not right when Mr C selected 'paying family or friends' – however this was selected in relation to a faster payment to an individual – so I don't think it would have looked suspicious in the circumstances. The answers Mr C selected for the payments did not raise red flags, so I think it is reasonable that Revolut provided appropriate automated warnings explaining the risks and then released the payments.

I also have to consider that it appears Mr C was selecting options which he felt would ensure the payments were processed, and this included not being truthful about some aspects of the payments. For example, Mr C has confirmed to our service that he did download AnyDesk as part of this scam, however he selected that he had not downloaded this when answering Revolut's questions. I can see that in the chat with the scammer, Mr C said he had been warned by his current account provider that the recovery company was most likely a continuation of the same scam he had fallen victim to previously. At multiple points in the conversation Mr C expressed he felt this may be a scam and even said his own father had warned him he was falling victim to a scam. Despite this Mr C continued speaking with the scammer and attempted to make further payments to him. I therefore think it is unlikely a further intervention from Revolut would have reasonably broken the spell of the scam.

Having carefully reviewed everything available to me, I think the intervention carried out by Revolut was proportionate and I don't think they needed to do more in the circumstances. I

understand that this will be very disappointing for Mr C, and I recognise that he has been the victim of a cruel and manipulative scam. But I do not consider that it would be fair to hold Revolut responsible for his loss, so I won't be asking it to refund any of that loss to him.

My final decision

I do not uphold Mr C's complaint against Revolut Ltd.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 13 February 2026.

Rebecca Norris

Ombudsman