

The complaint

Mr K and Mr R's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mr K and Mr R were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a product from it previously. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Signature Collection' – which they bought on 8 August 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,800 fractional points at a cost of £21,439 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Signature Collection membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr K and Mr R more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

To pay for their Signature Collection membership, Mr K and Mr R traded in their existing membership with the Supplier and took out a loan of £25,106 by from Shawbrook (the 'Credit Agreement'). Some of the loan funds were used to repay an existing loan Mr K and Mr R had taken with a different lender to fund the purchase of their previous membership.

Mr K and Mr R – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to Shawbrook on 14 November 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

As Shawbrook didn't respond to the concerns within the requisite 8-week period, Mr K and Mr R referred the complaint to us. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr K and Mr R disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision, which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'). In that decision, I said:

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

As both sides may already know, a claim against Shawbrook under Section 75 essentially mirrors the claim Mr K and Mr R could make against the Supplier. Certain conditions must be met if this protection is engaged – which are set out in the CCA. Shawbrook does not dispute that the relevant conditions are met in this complaint, and I'm satisfied that they are.

There are, though, certain time limits that apply – and I think these mean Mr K and Mr R's claim would've been time-barred.

The Limitation Act 1980 sets out limitation periods, or time limits, for bringing various types of legal claim. For a claim based on contract, it's not generally possible to start court action more than six years after the cause of action arose. If a claim is brought too late, the respondent is likely to have a complete defence to the claim on that basis.

For claims relating to misrepresentation, the time limit would typically be six years from the date the claimant suffers damage as a result of the misrepresentation. For example, entering into a contract – and incurring liabilities – when they would otherwise not have done.

Mr K and Mr R's claim under Section 75 is that but for the Supplier's various alleged misrepresentations, they wouldn't have entered into the Purchase Agreement (and, therefore, the Credit Agreement). So it is the date on which they entered into those agreements that their cause of action arose, meaning they had six years from that date within which to bring this claim.

Mr K and Mr R entered into the Purchase Agreement and Credit Agreement on 8 August 2016. They raised their claim under Section 75 within the Letter of Complaint dated 14 November 2023 – more than six years later.

That being the case, I don't think Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably in declining the claim. However, I have considered whether these alleged misrepresentations could have been something that caused an unfair credit relationship.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, Shawbrook is also liable.

I've gone on to consider whether there would be any additional time within which Mr K and Mr R could raise a claim under Section 75 for breach of contract, given that their cause of action may have accrued in a different way and therefore at a different point in time.

While not explicitly referenced as such in the Letter of Complaint, some of Mr K and Mr R's points could reasonably be interpreted as an allegation of a breach of contract by the Supplier. Most notably, that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that they consider that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, and had breached the Purchase

Agreement. Their cause of action would therefore accrue when any such breach occurred, i.e. when they were unable to holiday either when or where they wanted.

Mr K and Mr R haven't provided us with the dates of their attempts to book holidays that ended up falling short of their expectations. So it is hard for me to ascertain when their cause of action arose. But even accepting that this claim was made in time, I don't think it would've been unreasonable for Shawbrook to decline it.

I say this because the evidence I've seen so far doesn't persuade me that the Supplier breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. In addition to the vague nature of the allegations as I've described above, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork signed by Mr K and Mr R states that the availability of holidays was subject to demand. Even if I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays, I don't think this necessarily amounts to a breach of the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think Shawbrook is liable to pay Mr K and Mr R any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

Section 140A of the CCA: did Shawbrook participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Signature Collection membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr K and Mr R's complaint about Shawbrook being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

I have firstly considered whether the misrepresentations they allege were made by the Supplier in the context of their Section 75 claim could have caused any unfairness for the purposes of Section 140A.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Signature Collection membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr K and Mr R were:

1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would “appreciate in value”.
2. Told that they would have a share in a property that would increase in value.
3. Made to believe that they would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier’s sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than an honestly held opinion as there isn’t any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for point 3, while it’s *possible* that Signature Collection membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for that reason, I don’t think it’s *probable*. Mr K and Mr R *did* acquire a preferential right to use the Allocated Property through their membership. The Purchase Agreement clearly set this out – and that such right existed only for a specific week on a bi-annual basis. I find it highly unlikely that the Supplier would have led Mr K and Mr R to believe something so starkly different from this, and the suggestion that it did is given none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that any such false statement was made.

So, while I recognise that Mr K and Mr R, and the PR, have concerns about the way in which Signature Collection membership was sold by the Supplier, I do not think this caused any unfairness in Mr K and Mr R’s credit relationship with Shawbrook such that it warrants a remedy.

Turning to the points specifically raised in relation to the potential unfairness of the relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook, the PR said in the Letter of Complaint that the right checks weren’t carried out before Shawbrook lent to Mr K and Mr R. I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that Shawbrook failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr K and Mr R was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr K and Mr R.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that Shawbrook wasn’t permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr K and Mr R knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to

pay for Signature Collection membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr K and Mr R suffering a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell Shawbrook to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that Mr K and Mr R were rushed into signing the contractual paperwork at the end of a long sales meeting, without having sufficient time to properly consider the implications of the agreement into which he was entering. Mr K and Mr R make no such allegation within the statement given in their own words. All the same, I can acknowledge and appreciate that Mr K and Mr R may well have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time with a lot of paperwork to read through. But there is no detail as to what was said and/or done by the Supplier that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Signature Collection membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel the membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr K and Mr R made the decision to purchase Signature Collection membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr K and Mr R's credit relationship with Shawbrook was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

Shawbrook does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr K and Mr R's Signature Collection membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Signature Collection membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr K and Mr R were told by the Supplier that Signature Collection membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr K and Mr R the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that

was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Signature Collection membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Signature Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Signature Collection membership was marketed or sold to Mr K and Mr R as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Signature Collection membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Signature Collection membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Signature Collection as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr K and Mr R, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to Mr K and Mr R as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between Shawbrook and Mr K and Mr R rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

To help me decide this point, I've carefully considered what Mr K and Mr R have said in the course of their complaint about how the membership was sold to them and their motivation for purchasing it.

I would note first of all that the evidence in this respect is limited. Within the Letter of Complaint, it is said that Mr K and Mr R were told that they had purchased an investment that would increase in value. There was no further detail underpinning these statements within the Letter of Complaint, which are rather generic in nature. In fact, such assertions are made in an identical fashion by the PR in a number of other complaints.

When referring the complaint to us, the PR included a statement in Mr K and Mr R's own words. They highlight that within that statement, Mr K and Mr R said:

"It was described as a valuable asset. They said as we had signed up for the 19-year plan after this time the apartment would be sold and we would easily get our money back we had invested. Basically we looked at it as an investment and sort of mortgage payment which would obviously mature over the years."

The PR says this demonstrates that the investment element of the Signature Collection membership was promoted to Mr K and Mr R at the Time of Sale. But it is clear to me that Mr K and Mr R, when making these comments, were referring to the purchase of their previous membership – a "Fractional Club" membership that they bought from the Supplier a year earlier. That previous membership, funded by a loan from a different provider, is not something that is relevant to my assessment of the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook.

In fact, the majority of their statement talks about that 2015 purchase with very little mention of the Signature Collection purchase in 2016 at all. On that, all they said was:

"We did upgrade [to the Signature Collection]. We actually went back to [the Supplier] to complain about the number of points we were receiving and stating that they didn't cover one holiday per year let alone several worldwide. They stated that the only way we could get more points was to upgrade, which unfortunately we did."

My reading of this is that Mr K and Mr R purchased the Signature Collection in order to improve their access to holidays – which they did through the additional points they acquired (which they increased from the 1,300 held under their existing Fractional Club membership to 1,800 under the Signature Collection membership). Mr K and Mr R make no mention of the investment element playing a part in their decision-making.

Mr K and Mr R's motivation being the improved holiday options is further supported by the Supplier's notes of the sale, made at the time, which recorded that:

"[Mr K and Mr R] said they are buying the SSC (Signature Collection) mainly for more points and usage but may use the week occasionally ..."

So on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Signature Collection membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr K and Mr R decided to go ahead with their purchase. That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr K and Mr R themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their

share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Signature Collection membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr K and Mr R's decision to purchase Signature Collection membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr K and Mr R were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Signature Collection membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr K and Mr R sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Signature Collection members in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr K and Mr R nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Signature Collection's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr K and Mr R in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Signature Collection membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

At the time of my provisional decision, I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint. I said:

Mr K and Mr R's professional representative ('PR') says that a payment of commission from Shawbrook to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr K and Mr R in arguing that their credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that Shawbrook and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr K and Mr R, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr K and Mr R into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr K and Mr R.

Based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr K and Mr R but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, Shawbrook didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and Shawbrook were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr K and Mr R.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mr K and Mr R's credit relationship with Shawbrook wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mr K and Mr R's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether Shawbrook is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from Shawbrook without telling Mr K and Mr R (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to Shawbrook's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr K and Mr R a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that Shawbrook failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on Shawbrook's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think Mr K and Mr R would still have taken out the loan

to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr K and Mr R's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that Shawbrook was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct Shawbrook to compensate them.

Shawbrook responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr K and Mr R as an investment at the Time of Sale.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did Shawbrook participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on Shawbrook to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mr K and Mr R was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that Shawbrook – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mr K and Mr R to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with Shawbrook, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Signature Collection membership to Mr K and Mr R as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mr K and Mr R in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr K and Mr R to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mr K and Mr R to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mr K and Mr R in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted Mr K and Mr R's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*¹ and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mr K and Mr R to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, Mr K and Mr R were highly motivated by the improved holiday options that their upgrade to Signature Collection membership offered them – which was a factor in my overall conclusion in light of all the available evidence that they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase of the Signature Collection membership even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

I've taken into account everything the PR has said, including its assertion that Mr K and Mr R's testimony predominantly related to the 2016 purchase in light of my provisional finding that it referred mostly to a prior one. I'm still not persuaded that I can take the comments in question to relate to the sale at issue given the structure of the testimony. At best Mr K and Mr R may have conflated the two sales to some extent – which would be understandable in view of their proximity to one another and the time between them and their provision of the statement. In any event, Mr K and Mr R's statement does quite clearly say – to my mind – that they upgraded in order to get more points to access more holidays through their membership. And weighing everything up, I think this would always have motivated them to proceed with the purchase – whether or not the Supplier marketed Signature Collection membership to them as an investment opportunity.

So for the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mr K and Mr R's decision to purchase the Signature Collection membership.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR also says highlights an apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mr K and Mr R in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2034. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mr K and Mr R. This date indicates that the membership has a term of a little over 18 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate." (my emphasis)

¹ R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

It seems clear to me that the contractual commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2034. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above. The Information Statement is, in my view, reflective of the fact that most fractional memberships were set up to run for nineteen years. But not all memberships attached to a given Allocated Property were sold at exactly the same time, so often the time left before the sale date was less than nineteen years at the actual time of sale. I accept that this could be confusing, however I do not think Mr K and Mr R were misled by this at the Time of Sale. So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

Section 140A: conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr K and Mr R and Shawbrook under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr K and Mr R's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that Shawbrook was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct Shawbrook to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr K and Mr R to accept or reject my decision before 23 February 2026.

Ben Jennings
Ombudsman