

The complaint

Mr and Mrs S's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA'), (2) lending irresponsibly and (3) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr and Mrs S were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased several products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 9 May 2013 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 2,016 fractional points at a cost of £9,196 (the 'Purchase Agreement') after trading in their existing timeshare.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs S more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs S paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £9,196 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). Mr and Mrs S paid off the loan, and the credit relationship ended, on 16 July 2013.

Mr and Mrs S – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 27 September 2021 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise several different concerns. Since then, the PR has raised some further matters it says are relevant to this outcome of the complaint. As both sides are familiar with the concerns raised, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr and Mrs S's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 8 February 2022, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint that the Lender hadn't properly considered a claim made under Section 75 of the CCA on its merits. The Investigator felt that the complaint that there was an unfair credit relationship under Section 140A hadn't been made in time as per the rules that this service must follow and that it couldn't be considered.

Mr and Mrs S disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I issued a provisional decision explaining I could only consider the complaint about the Lender's response to the Section 75 claims, since the remainder of the complaint had been made too late under the rules I must apply.

The Lender responded to say it accepted my provisional decision.

The PR responded to say it disagreed and provided some further comments and documents for me to consider.

I then issued a jurisdiction decision confirming I could only consider the complaint about the Section 75 claims.

I followed this up with an email explaining that I had also considered the matter of the commission arrangements between the Lender and Supplier in relation to the Credit Agreement (since this could be considered outside of a complaint about an unfair relationship under Section 140A of the CCA), but that I found no reason to uphold the complaint because of that either – which the PR accepted.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is no different to that shared in several hundred ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set it out here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Office of Fair Trading's Irresponsible Lending Guidance – 31 March 2010

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide greater clarity for businesses and consumer representatives as to the business practices that the Office of Fair Trading (the 'OFT') thought might have constituted irresponsible lending for the purposes of Section 25(2B) of the CCA. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 2.3
- Paragraph 5.5

The OFT's Guidance for Credit Brokers and Intermediaries - 24 November 2011

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide clarity for credit brokers and credit intermediaries as to the standards expected of them by the OFT when they dealt with actual or prospective borrowers. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 3.7
- Paragraph 4.8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, a copy of which is below, for broadly the same reasons. That is, I do not uphold this complaint.

START OF COPY OF PROVISIONAL FINDINGS

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

As a general rule, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the 'LA') as it wouldn't be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court. So, it is relevant to consider whether Mr and Mrs S's Section 75 claim for misrepresentation was time-barred under the LA before he put it to the Lender.

As I mentioned above, a claim under Section 75 is a "like" claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mr and Mrs S could make against the Supplier.

A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the LA).

But a claim, like the one in question here, under Section 75 is also 'an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment' under Section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued was the Time of Sale (9 May 2013). I say this because Mr and Mrs S entered into the purchase of their timeshare at that time based on the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which they say were relied upon. And as the loan from the Lender was used to help finance the purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they suffered a loss.

Mr and Mrs S first notified the Lender of his Section 75 claim on 27 September 2021. And as more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when that claim was first put to the Lender, I don't think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject Mr and Mrs S's concerns about the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

As noted above when looking at the claim there was an unfair credit relationship, Mr and Mrs S say that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to. On my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, meaning it could be viewed as potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement. It is not clear precisely when this was alleged to have happened, but if it happened within six years of the time the complaint was first made, such a claim would not have been made too late under the LA.

Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr and Mrs S states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like they made use of their fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr and Mrs S any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

Commission complaint

Mr and Mrs S say that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

The Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd*, *Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd* and *Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 (*‘Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft’*).

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

- The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair” (see paragraph 327);
- The failure to disclose the commission; and
- The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

- The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
- The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
- The characteristics of the consumer;

- The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
- Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP'). But I don't think *Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft* assists Mr and Mrs S in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr and Mrs S a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

I say that because I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr and Mrs S, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr and Mrs S into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mr and Mrs S entered wasn't high. At £919.60, it was only 10% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (5%) as a proportion of the charge for credit.

So, had Mr and Mrs S known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not persuaded that they either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mr and Mrs S wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of their own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit they needed for a timeshare they wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr and Mrs S but as the supplier of contractual rights that they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

In summary, the PR's further comments in response to the provisional decision which are relevant to the complaint about the Section 75 claims said that:

1. I had not properly applied the principles of the Limitation Act, since Section 32(1)(b) provides more time to make the claim where the Supplier has concealed the misrepresentation.
2. Rule CONC 7.3.4R in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook means that the Lender has a duty to treat customers fairly and consider evidence of fraud or misrepresentation – and this means the Lender should've investigated the claim rather than rejecting it.
3. I had failed to apply "*FOS technical guidance on linked lender liability, which requires that lender make reasonable enquiries rather than summarily dismissing such claims.*"

The PR's additional comments do not persuade me to depart from my provisional findings. It says that the Supplier concealed that "*the timeshare's alleged "asset-backed" nature was false*". But, as mentioned above, Mr and Mrs S's Fractional Club membership was asset-backed in that it was linked to the Allocated Property. That seems to have been made clear at the Time of Sale – both during the presentation Mr and Mrs S are likely to have been given, and in the documents provided to them at the time. So, I do not think this was "false", as the PR alleges. And I can't see that Section 32 of the Limitation Act provides more time for them to make the claim to the Lender.

As for the PR's second point, CONC 7.3.4R says:

"A firm must treat customers in or approaching arrears or in default with forbearance and due consideration."

I cannot see that this means what the PR says, nor that it is relevant to Mr and Mrs S's Section 75 claim. While there is a duty to treat customers fairly, I am not persuaded that the Lender unfairly rejected Mr and Mrs S's Section 75 claims.

Finally, the PR has not specified what technical guidance it is referring to. But I am satisfied I have followed our usual approach when deciding this complaint. As such, for the reasons given in my provisional findings above, I do not uphold this complaint.

My final decision

For the reasons I've explained, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr S and Mrs S to accept or reject my decision before 1 January 2026.

Phillip Lai-Fang
Ombudsman