

The complaint

Mrs H and Mr H's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mrs H and Mr H were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having previously purchased a trial timeshare product from it. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 20 July 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,010 fractional points at a cost of £17,847 (after trading in their existing trial timeshare product) - the 'Purchase Agreement'.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave them more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mrs H and Mr H paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £21,777 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). The Credit Agreement included an amount sufficient to repay an existing loan with the Lender relating to the purchase of their previous trial timeshare product.

Mrs H and Mr H – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 15 November 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

In the absence of a response from the Lender, the complaint was referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs H and Mr H disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') in which I explained why I didn't think this complaint should be upheld. In that decision, I said:

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Furthermore, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has been time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the 'LA'). The reason being that it wouldn't be fair to expect creditors to look into such claims so long after the liability first arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court.

Having considered everything relating to the Purchase Agreement, I think Mrs H and Mr H's claim for misrepresentation under it is likely to have been made too late under the relevant provisions of the LA, which means it would seem fair for the Lender to have turned down their section 75 claim for this reason

A claim under section 75 is a "like" claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mrs H and Mr H could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see section 2 of the LA).

But a claim under section 75, like this one, is also "*an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment*" under section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued here was the Time of Sale. I say this because Mrs H and Mr H entered into the purchase of the Fractional Club membership at that time based upon the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which Mrs H and Mr H say they relied upon. And as the Credit Agreement with the Lender provided funding to help finance that purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they allegedly suffered the loss.

Mrs H and Mr H first notified the Lender of their concerns in November 2023. Since this was more than six years after the Time of Sale, I don't think it would ultimately be unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to reject their concerns about the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers, like Mrs H and Mr H, a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

The PR says that Mrs H and Mr H have been unable to access the holidays that they were led to believe Fractional Club membership would entitle them to. The Letter of Complaint seems to frame this as an alleged misrepresentation. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Like any holiday accommodation or booking service, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times - like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork signed by Mrs H and Mr H states that the booking of holidays was/is subject to availability and demand.

I accept that Mrs H and Mr H may not have been able to take certain holidays, but I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. Based upon the evidence available, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mrs H and Mr H compensation for an alleged breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in responding to this aspect of the complaint in the way it did.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonable in not accepting Mrs H and Mr H's claims under Section 75. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender.

The alleged misrepresentations

In determining if the relationship is unfair under Section 140A, I think the alleged misrepresentations are relevant here. So, even though I think it likely they couldn't be considered under Section 75 due to the effects of the LA, I think they could still be considered under s.140A CCA¹. So, in trying to establish whether I think a court would likely find that an unfair relationship existed, I've considered those alleged misrepresentations further in addition to the various other points raised in this complaint.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs H and Mr H were:

1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would "appreciate in value" when that was not true.
2. Told that they would own a share in a property that would increase in value during the membership term when that was not true.
3. Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't enough evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for point 3, while it's *possible* that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for that reason, I don't think it's *probable*. The complaint gives little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made a false statement of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for that reason, I don't think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mrs H, Mr H and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim for misrepresentation, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I can't reasonably conclude that the alleged misrepresentations resulted in an unfair credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs H and Mr H under Section 140A.

¹ See Scotland & Reast v. British Credit Trust Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 790

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs H and Mr H's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs H and Mr H. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs H and Mr H was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs H and Mr H.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs H and Mr H knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs H and Mr H suffering financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

In a witness statement provided by the PR, Mrs H and Mr H said, *"I feel that there was quite a lot of pressure to sign before we left the presentation to the point that they even gave us an IPAD to sweeten the deal"*.

I acknowledge that Mrs H and Mr H may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs H and Mr H made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs H and Mr H's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs H and Mr H's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs H and Mr H were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs H and Mr H the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs H and Mr H as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs H and Mr H, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club

membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs H and Mr H as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase. It appears neither the PR nor Mrs H and Mr H provided any evidence to support this particular allegation at the time of making the complaint.

The PR provided a witness statement which appears to have been prepared by Mrs H and Mr H albeit, the statement is unsigned and undated and the Lender has not confirmed whether it was provided at the time Mrs H and Mr H's complaint was first submitted.

I've considered Mrs H and Mr H's recollections carefully. They began by recalling the circumstances that first led them to meet with the Supplier, resulting in their decision to purchase a trial timeshare membership. They explained how they subsequently agreed to upgrade that trial membership by purchasing Fractional Club membership in 2016.

In relation to the 2016 purchase, Mrs H and Mr H recalled:

"We went through a scenario of holidays that we would like to take, and they showed us all these amazing resorts we could go to if we took out full membership in connection with [a timeshare exchange provider]. They therefore, knew the level of holidays we liked and places we said we would love to go to so would have thought this would have been taken into account when allocating points to us".

“The suggestion was that we would own a percentage of a property in the [Supplier’s] resort and after the remainder of the 15 years of the agreement the property would be valued and we would get a percentage of the sale value equivalent to our percentage share, suggesting that basically we would get our investment back. We finally agreed to go with full membership thinking we would be able to take the holidays we wanted to the countries we wanted to visit and thinking the points we had would allow us to achieve this.”

Importantly, Mrs H and Mr H’s witness statement includes no suggestion that Fractional Club membership had been represented as an investment by the Supplier. This appears somewhat removed from the allegations included within the Letter of Complaint. I accept that Mrs H and Mr H did refer to their “investment”, but this appears to be their own way of describing the purchase they had made. At no point did they suggest in their witness statement that they had purchased Fraction Club membership as an investment, or that they did so in the hope of a profit or financial gain.

I don’t think this is sufficient for me to be able to conclude that Mrs H and Mr H were materially motivated by the prospect of a profit or financial gain when deciding to purchase Fractional Club membership. Their statement doesn’t say that. There is a real lack of detail or colour to their testimony, which to me suggests Mrs H and Mr H may not have particularly strong recollections of what happened or what was said on the subject at the Time of Sale. Of course, that’s not their fault, but it’s not a reasonable basis for me to arrive at any conclusions about their motivations at the Time of Sale in July 2016.

From what they did say, it seems more likely that their decision to purchase Fractional Club membership in July 2016 was motivated by their desire to take holidays at various destinations, as discussed at the Time of Sale with the Supplier.

That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs H and Mr H themselves don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by the share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs H and Mr H ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs H and Mr H’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mrs H and Mr H were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I’ve already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does

not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mrs H and Mr H sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mrs H and Mr H nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs H and Mr H in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

Insolvency of the Supplier and its implications under the Credit Agreement

The PR argues that because the Supplier, together with various associated businesses, entered into a liquidation procedure in December 2020, Mrs H and Mr H are not able to recover any remedy from the Supplier.

However, as the Lender hasn't been party to any court proceedings in Spain, and as I can't see that the Supplier (i.e., the company that entered into the Purchase Agreement) is itself the subject of a Spanish court judgment in Mrs H and Mr H's favour, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement remains valid under English law for the purposes of the ruling set out in *Durkin v DSG Retail* [2014] UKSC 21.

I also note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn't at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in *Diamond Resorts Europe and Others* (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that, because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract was governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR.

Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason.

At the time of my provisional decision, I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties

setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint. I said:

The PR says that a payment of commission from The Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission – the aforementioned *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* judgment.

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors* and *Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between The Lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by The Lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was “*so high*” and “*a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair*” (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and The Lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as
5. Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
6. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–

credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs H and Mr H in arguing that their credit relationship with The Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that The Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs H and Mr H, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that there was a commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs H and Mr H into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that The Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said above, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if The Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs H and Mr H.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the Lender has confirmed that no commission was paid to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs H and Mr H entered into.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs H and Mr H but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not currently persuaded that there were commission arrangements between the Supplier and The Lender that were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs H and Mr H.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mrs H and Mr H's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs H and Mr H's complaint about an unfair

credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether The Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from The Lender without telling Mrs H and Mr H (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to The Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs H and Mr H a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them given it appears no commission was actually paid. And because of that, I can't see that any alleged failure by the Lender to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, has any relevance to Mrs J and Mr H's complaint.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs H and Mr H's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Neither the PR nor the Lender responded to my subsequent letter relating the matter of commission disclosure.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

[The Consumer Credit Sourcebook \('CONC'\) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's \(the 'FCA'\) Handbook of Rules and Guidance](#)

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]

- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs H and Mr H as an investment at the Time of Sale.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in its response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mrs H and Mr H was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mrs H and Mr H to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind

both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mrs H and Mr H as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mrs H and Mr H in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mrs H and Mr H to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mrs H and Mr H to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mrs H and Mr H in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted Mrs H and Mr H's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*² and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mrs H and Mr H to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, I didn't believe Mrs H and Mr H were motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. Rather, I thought they appeared highly motivated by the holiday options offered by the Supplier – which was a factor in my overall conclusion in light of all the available evidence that they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase of the Fractional Club membership even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

The PR argues that Mrs H and Mr H clearly stated, "*what they were led to believe, would happen at the end of the term of the agreement and they are specific in their understanding of the what return (sic) they could expect on their investment...*". However, I think Mrs H and Mr H were simply describing the basic mechanics of Fractional Club membership as they understood them. Not least because Mrs H and Mr H then went on to say, "*We finally agreed to go with full membership thinking we would be able to take the holidays we wanted to the countries we wanted to visit and thinking the points would allow us to achieve this*".

On balance, I believe Mrs H and Mr H's purchase decision was motivated by the holiday experiences they thought would be available to them under Fractional Club membership. And whilst they may describe the mechanics of Fractional Club membership, I'm not

² R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

persuaded that this sufficiently demonstrates that they were motivated by, or even saw their purchase as an investment.

For the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mrs H and Mr H's decision to purchase the Fractional Club membership.

I will also address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mrs H and Mr H in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2032. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which Mrs H and Mr H would have initialled and signed as being read. This date indicates that the membership has a term of a little over 16 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

“The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate.” (my emphasis)

It seems clear to me that the contractual commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2032. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above. The Information Statement is, in my view, reflective of the fact that most fractional memberships were set up to run for nineteen years. But not all memberships attached to a given Allocated Property were sold at exactly the same time, so often the time left before the sale date was less than nineteen years at the actual time of sale. I accept that this could be confusing, however I do not think Mrs H and Mr H were misled by this at the Time of Sale. So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

I think it's also relevant to consider what appears to have motivated Mrs H and Mr H to initiate their claim here. Towards the end of their witness statement, they said:

“Around 12 months after we took out the agreement (Mrs H) was made redundant and we approached (the Supplier) to see if we would be able to sell back our Fractional ownership...only to be told that they do not re-sell fractional ownership...The payments were becoming a real worry and on top of this I lost (a parent)”.

I think Mrs H and Mr H's desire to seek out a way to exit their Fractional Club membership early was ultimately driven by the unfortunate change in their circumstances, rather than any fundamental dissatisfaction or regulatory breaches.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs H and Mr H and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs H and Mr H's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs H and Mr H to accept or reject my decision before 18 March 2026.

Dave Morgan
Ombudsman