

The complaint

Mr K complains that Revolut Ltd (“Revolut”) won’t refund him the money he lost after he fell victim to an Authorised Push Payment (‘APP’) scam.

In bringing his complaint to this service Mr K is represented, however for ease of reading I will, in the main, refer to Mr K within this decision.

What happened

The background to this complaint is well known to both parties and has been laid out in detail by our Investigator in their view, so I won’t repeat it all in detail here. But in summary, I understand it to be as follows.

In or around June 2025, Mr K received an unexpected message from somebody claiming to be a recruiter, about a job opportunity. He was told the job entailed reviewing hotels online, for which he would receive a salary/commission. Believing everything to be genuine, Mr K proceeded, but unknown to him at the time, he had been contacted by fraudsters. The fraudsters then persuaded Mr K to pay his own money in order to proceed with the work.

To facilitate the payments Mr K moved money between his own bank accounts to a Revolut account, which the fraudsters had directed him to set up. The funds were subsequently transferred into a cryptocurrency account, which again the fraudsters guided Mr K to set up, before then being moved onto accounts the fraudsters controlled. This complaint relates to payments Mr K made between 17 and 25 June 2025. He made a number of transactions through his newly opened Revolut account in relation to the fraud, resulting in a loss of over £13,000 (a breakdown of these payments was provided by our Investigator in his view, so I won’t repeat that again here).

Mr K initially received some small returns, but he realised he’d been scammed when he was unable to withdraw funds but was asked to continue making payments.

Mr K raised the matter with Revolut, but it didn’t uphold his complaint. In summary, it said that all correct procedures had been followed and that due to the lack of evidence that had been provided to it, it was unable to take any further action. It added that it thought it had issued appropriate warnings, but that Mr K had provided untruthful information which had misled it.

Unhappy with Revolut’s response, Mr K brought his complaint to this service. One of our Investigators looked into things but didn’t think the complaint should be upheld. In summary, our Investigator considered that Revolut’s intervention was proportionate to the risk it identified, but that Mr K had given different reasons (for the payments) that hindered Revolut’s ability to protect him.

Mr K didn’t agree with our Investigator’s view. In summary,

- Mr K said Revolut’s intervention was insufficient and not proportionate to the risk posed.

- The warnings Revolut gave were generic and ineffective.
- Revolut failed to act on red flags (such as on 12 June 2025, when Mr K was attempting to make a cryptocurrency transaction, he indicated that it was related to a job opportunity), which should have triggered heightened security.
- At one stage Mr K was unresponsive during a live chat and cancelled a payment, saying that it was too complicated. He considers this should have been seen as highly concerning.

As agreement couldn't be reached, the complaint has been passed to me for a final decision.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

I'm very aware that I've summarised this complaint briefly, in less detail than has been provided, and in my own words. No discourtesy is intended by this. Instead, I've focussed on what I think is the heart of the matter here. If there's something I've not mentioned, it isn't because I've ignored it. I haven't. I'm satisfied I don't need to comment on every individual point or argument to be able to reach what I think is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this. This simply reflects the informal nature of our service as a free alternative to the courts.

I'm aware in their submissions Mr K's representative have referred to other decisions issued by our service. But I would point out that, while on the surface complaints may seem quite similar, each complaint is determined by its own individual circumstances. Here, as I'm required to do, I've looked at the individual circumstances of Mr K's complaint against Revolut.

Having thought about everything carefully, I agree with our Investigator, and I don't think Revolut is responsible for refunding the money Mr K sadly lost. I'm sorry to hear that Mr K has been the victim of a cruel scam. I know he feels strongly about this complaint, and this will come as a disappointment to him, so I'll explain why.

I'm satisfied Mr K 'authorised' the payments for the purposes of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 ('the Regulations'), in force at the time. So, although he didn't intend the money to go to scammers, under the Regulations, and under the terms and conditions of his account, Mr K is presumed liable for the loss in the first instance.

However, that isn't the end of the story. Good industry practice required that Revolut be on the lookout for payments that were out of character or unusual to the extent that they might have indicated a fraud risk. On spotting such a payment, I'd expect it to intervene in a manner proportionate to the risk identified.

In this case, I need to decide whether Revolut acted fairly and reasonably in its dealings with Mr K when it processed the payments, or whether it should have done more than it did. Firms, such as Revolut, process a high volume of transfers and transactions each day. And a balance has to be struck as to when it should possibly intervene on a payment(s) against not holding up or delaying its customer's requests.

I can see that, by way of a static risk warning, Revolut did intervene on a crypto withdrawal Mr K attempted to make on 12 June 2025. During this Mr K responded by saying that he wasn't investing and that the reason for the payment was that it was related to a job opportunity. Mr K's representatives have argued that this was a clear red flag. I agree, I think a customer telling their bank that they are making a cryptocurrency related payment for the

purposes of a job opportunity is a red flag and I acknowledge the point that is being made here. However, in and of itself and in the individual circumstances of this case, I'm not persuaded it is sufficient for me to reasonably say this, on its own, would mean that Revolut is liable for refunding Mr K's loss.

I say that as, importantly, Mr K cancelled this transaction soon after he had indicated that it was related to a job opportunity, indicating that this was because the process was too complicated. It was a few days later before Mr K attempted another transaction, whereas typically, in the case of a fraud, there is some urgency in making payments.

More notably, in the circumstances of this case, these type of 'job scams' often involve victims being coached by the fraudsters. Mr K has argued that he wasn't coached by the fraudsters as to what to say to the bank. However, his submissions on this point have not been consistent – on the one hand, he's said he wasn't being coached, but on the other hand he's said that the fraudsters provided him with reasons for the payments.

Mr K has been unable to provide evidence of all of the messages and conversations that he had with the fraudsters. So of course, I can't be sure of what happened. Where there is conflicting information given, or where crucial evidence is missing, as there is here, it is difficult to know precisely how events unfolded. So, in such situations, I am required to reach my decision based on the balance of probabilities – in other words what I consider most likely given the available evidence.

Based on the evidence I've seen and with my experience of how these scams play out. I'm persuaded that Mr K was more likely than not being coached by the fraudsters. I'll explain why.

While Mr K indicated that an initial payment was related to a job opportunity, he cancelled that payment and then didn't give this for the purpose on any of the future payments that Revolut intervened on, despite having the opportunity to do so. As well as this Mr K indicated to Revolut that he hadn't been asked to install software that would allow others to help him, when this wasn't the case. Revolut explained to Mr K that remote access applications are commonly used by fraudsters, so I don't agree with Mr K's argument that Revolut were not clear on this particular point.

Revolut also asked Mr K whether anybody had suggested specific ways that he should answer questions or advised him to describe a transaction in a particular way. Mr K told Revolut they hadn't, however through Mr K's own submissions it is apparent that the fraudsters had provided him with reasons for the payments.

Mr K also told Revolut that nobody had guided him in choosing the beneficiary account (to which he was making the payments), nor that anybody had recommended a Revolut account to him. However, evidence from the chats that *have* been provided, of conversations Mr K had with the fraudsters, shows that the fraudsters had recommended these to him.

Revolut also asked Mr K what the purpose of the cryptocurrency account was and Mr K confirmed that the purpose of the account was for crypto investments. Importantly, Revolut also asked Mr K whether the funds would stay in his cryptocurrency account and he confirmed they would. Revolut provided context, in explaining that a common pattern is that scams occur when funds are then sent to a third-party wallet where Mr K loses control. But while Mr K was going to send this money on - he confirmed to Revolut that he wouldn't be and that he would retain full control of the funds – which sadly wasn't the case.

Overall, from what I've seen the weight of available evidence compellingly supports the notion that it's more likely than not that Mr K had been subject to social engineering and was

being coached by the fraudsters. I'm persuaded that this coaching included how he should answer questions posed about the payments he was making, which I think is evident with the answers Mr K gave Revolut.

So, even if Revolut's intervention had gone further and it had presented more online warnings, or indeed if it had phrased its questions in a different way, I think it's more likely than not Mr K would've reverted to the fraudster, on how to answer any questions. I think this would more likely than not have been done in such a way so as to avoid alerting Revolut to what was really happening. I think it's also more likely than not that Mr K would have moved passed any warnings that I think Revolut could proportionately have given.

So, in summary, while it's arguable that Revolut could have done more here, I'm not persuaded that, on the balance of probabilities that any further intervention would have made a difference.

Finally, I've also considered if Revolut could have done more to help Mr K recover the funds when he reported the scam. But as the funds were subsequently moved on from accounts in Mr K's own name to the fraudsters, by way of cryptocurrency, they didn't remain in the account they were sent to directly, meaning Revolut unfortunately couldn't have recovered the loss.

I don't intend any comments or findings I've made in this decision to downplay or diminish the impact this scam has had on Mr K. I have a great deal of sympathy for Mr K being the victim of what was clearly a cruel scam. But I can only compel Revolut to refund Mr K if it is responsible for the loss incurred. For the reasons explained, having carefully considered the circumstances of this complaint, I can see no basis on which I can fairly say that Revolut should be held liable for the loss Mr K has sadly suffered.

My final decision

My final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr K to accept or reject my decision before 20 May 2026.

Stephen Wise
Ombudsman