

## The complaint

Mr S and the estate of Mrs S' complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with Mr S and the late Mrs S under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

## What happened

Mr S and the late Mrs S were the members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased at least one product from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 22 April 2014 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 6,470 fractional points at a cost of £10,750 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr S and the late Mrs S more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr S and the late Mrs S paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £5,400<sup>1</sup> from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). Mr S and the late Mrs S repaid this finance in full in May 2016.

Mr S and the late Mrs S – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 26 October 2021 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

In January 2023 the PR referred Mr S and the late Mrs S' complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service.

Mr S and the late Mrs S' complaint was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected it on its merits.

Mr S and the late Mrs S disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

In January 2024 Mrs S sadly passed away.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') on 15 October 2025. In that decision, I said:

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<sup>1</sup> £10,750 less a deposit paid of £5,350

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done that, I don't currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it's to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that doesn't mean I've not considered it.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale**

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr S and the late Mrs S were:

1. told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that wasn't true.
2. told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that wasn't true.

However, telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties wasn't untrue. After all, a share in an allocated property was, by its very nature, an investment. And while, as I understand it, the sale of the Allocated Property could be postponed in certain circumstances according to the Fractional Club Rules, Mr S and the estate of Mrs S say little to nothing to persuade me that Mr S and the late Mrs S were given a guarantee by the Supplier that the Allocated Property would be sold on a specific date when such a promise would have been impossible to stand by given the inevitable uncertainty of selling property some way into the future. And as there's nothing else on file to support the PR's allegation, I'm not persuaded that there was a representation by the Supplier on the issue in question that constituted a false statement of fact.

So, while I recognise that Mr S and the estate of Mrs S and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly in this respect.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract**

I've already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it isn't necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

Mr S and the late Mrs S say that they couldn't holiday where and when they wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that the Supplier wasn't living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

But, like any holiday accommodation, availability wasn't unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr S and the late Mrs S states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I've not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

The PR also says on Mr S and the estate of Mrs S' behalf that the Supplier breached the Purchase Agreement because it went into liquidation. And if certain parts of the Supplier's business were put into administration, I can understand why the PR is alleging that there was a breach of the Purchase Agreement as a result. However, neither Mr S and the estate of Mrs S nor the PR have said, suggested or provided evidence to demonstrate that Mr S is no longer:

1. a member of the Fractional Club;
2. able to use his Fractional Club membership to holiday in the same way he could initially; and
3. entitled to a share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property when his Fractional Club membership ends.

So, from the evidence I've seen, I don't think the Lender is liable to pay Mr S and the estate of Mrs S any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I don't think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this respect either.

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I've looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I've then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender.

### **The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale**

Mr S and the estate of Mrs S' complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance that:

1. the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr S and the late Mrs S;  
and
2. Mr S and the late Mrs S were pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale.

However, as things currently stand, neither of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr S and the late Mrs S was actually unaffordable, before also concluding that they lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I'm not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr S and the late Mrs S.

I acknowledge that Mr S and the late Mrs S may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But Mr S and the estate of Mrs S say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentation that made Mr S and the late Mrs S feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply didn't want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and Mr S and the estate of Mrs S haven't provided a credible explanation for why Mr S and the late Mrs S didn't cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr S and the late Mrs S made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr S and the late Mrs S' credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to Mr S and the late Mrs S. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

## **The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations**

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr S and the late Mrs S the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it's important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element didn't, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations didn't ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr S and the late Mrs S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I've to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it's clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr S and the late Mrs S, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr S and the late Mrs S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier isn't ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

## **Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?**

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches don't automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I'm to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership wasn't an important and motivating factor when Mr S and the late Mrs S decided to go ahead with their purchase. I say that having read and considered testimony from Mr S.

This testimony was compiled by the PR and dated 23 March 2020.

This testimony sets out Mr S' recollections of his and the late Mrs S' entire relationship with the Supplier. As regards the purchase of the Fractional Club at the Time of Sale Mr S says:

*"In 2014 we were again...on holiday. We had decided that we required confirmation of when we would be able to exit our timeshare. The reps again invited us to a meeting which turned into a long sales presentation where we were offered the opportunity to purchase more fractions. We were advised that on this occasion we would sell our investment properties in 19 years when we would have our fraction of the market value and any profit."*

Now I accept that in the above Mr S says that the Supplier advised him and the late Mrs S that they would be able to "sell [their] investment properties in 19 years when [they] would have [their] fraction of the market value and any profit". But in my view this is nothing more than a description of how the Fractional Club membership worked. Furthermore, Mr S doesn't say that the potential of a profit was actually the motivating factor in his and the late Mrs S' purchasing decision. And in my view had it have been I might have expected him to say so specifically and in some detail.

This doesn't mean that Mr S and the late Mrs S weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of their complaint. But as I've said, I don't think this was a motivation for them.

Furthermore I think that more likely than not the motivating factor for Mr S and the late Mrs S to enter into the membership was a guaranteed exit date and the type, quality and exclusivity of holidays that they understood membership would allow them to take given that in Mr S' testimony he goes on to say:

*"We would also then have a guaranteed exit from our timeshare contract..."*

...

*"We have not always had the excellent availability promised and have to offer 2 years advanced notice of any booking.*

*The standards are acceptable but not the high standard promised. The exception to this is [xxxx] which uses up all our points for just 2 weeks holiday.*

...

*Our membership is not exclusive, and we know that non members can access the same holiday on online holiday sites."*

So as Mr S and the estate of Mrs S don't persuade me that Mr S and the late Mrs S' purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I'm not persuaded that Mr S and the late Mrs S' decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I don't think the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

### **The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale**

The PR says that Mr S and the late Mrs S weren't given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier in order to make an informed choice.

It isn't clear what information the PR thinks the Supplier failed to provide at the Time of Sale. But as I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it doesn't automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

So, while I acknowledge that it's also possible that the Supplier didn't give Mr S and the late Mrs S sufficient information, in good time, in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'), even if that was the case, neither Mr S and the estate of Mrs S nor the PR have persuaded me that Mr S and the late Mrs S were deprived of information that would have led them to make a different purchasing decision at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why they led to a financial loss.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I didn't think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr S and the late Mrs S' Section 75 claims, and I wasn't persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

Following my provisional decision, I also communicated how I wasn't persuaded that Mr S and the late Mrs S' credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier.

The Lender responded to the PD to say it accepted it.

The PR responded to the PD to say that it didn't accept it, providing further evidence and comments in support, but it didn't respond to my further communication (detailing how I wasn't persuaded that Mr S and the late Mrs S' credit relationship with the lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier).

Having received responses, I'm now finalising my decision.

## **The legal and regulatory context**

In considering what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I'm required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

## **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following responses from the PR, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender was unfair.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But although the PR reiterated some of these points in response to my PD, it didn't provide anything new in relation to them. And since I haven't been provided with anything new in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

#### **The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations**

Included in the PR's response to my PD was an oral hearing request along with the offer for Mr S to provide a sworn affidavit. Oral hearings are something that I can direct happen under DISP 3.5.5. However, the Financial Ombudsman Service is set up to decide complaints informally and it's for me as the decision maker to determine what evidence I think I need to determine what's a fair and reasonable outcome to a complaint. Having considered everything, I don't think I need to hold an oral hearing to fairly determine this complaint.

This is because both Mr S and the Lender have already provided lengthy submissions. In this case, I've a statement from Mr S, other evidence, including the documents from the sale, and full submissions from the PR and the Lender to decide what I think was most likely to have happened.

I'm satisfied I'm able to weigh up what Mr S said against the available evidence and arguments to determine what I think happened on the balance of probabilities without the need for an oral hearing. And as it's in everyone's interest to resolve this complaint as soon as possible, to grant a hearing at such a late stage would inevitably prolong the resolution of this case.

I understand that the PR also offers to have Mr S provide a sworn affidavit. But I must remind the PR that we don't have strict evidential requirements. We aren't expected to decide complaints only after receiving sworn evidence. And our jurisdiction is investigative rather than adversarial. I remain of the view that the information we have on file is enough to cover all the issues I need to consider to reach a fair decision. And as I've considered everything on file, including the specific points raised by the PR as part of its request, I'm of the view that a hearing request and/or a sworn affidavit aren't required.

As I explained in my PD, although I found there was a possibility that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) at the Time of Sale, I wasn't persuaded that the evidence suggested that Mr S and the late Mrs S purchased Fractional Club membership in whole or in part down to any breach of Regulation 14(3). And having considered everything afresh I can confirm that I remain of the same view and for the same reasons.

In considering everything afresh I would like to assure the PR I've considered the client assessment form which prompted a third party to refer Mr S and the late Mrs S to the it in 2019.

However, I'm unable to obtain any real insight into Mr S and the late Mrs S' recollections from the form provided – its format doesn't assist me in gaining insight to their thoughts and motivations in the Sale. For example, they've answered "yes" to every single question where a yes/no answer would be appropriate and no additional comments (to add context to those yes answers) is included. So with this in mind I'm not persuaded I can attach much weight, if any, on this form.

The PR has stated that I've been inconsistent with my approach compared to previous decisions issued by the service, and has provided examples it feels demonstrates this. But my decision is based on consideration of Mr S and the late Mrs S' specific circumstances. Each complaint turns on its own facts; an ombudsman's decision on how one timeshare sale occurred doesn't determine his, or any other ombudsman's, decisions about the facts of other sales at different times to different purchases.

The PR has also reiterated that the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS* asserted that the relevant question in this circumstance is whether the breach of regulation 14(3) was a material factor in the decision to purchase, not whether it was the only factor or principal one. It feels that the testimony Mr S has provided demonstrates that this was the case. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, I'm not persuaded from the testimony that Mr S has adequately demonstrated that the promise of profit was a motivating factor to his and the late Mrs S' decision to move ahead with the purchase – principal or otherwise.

So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mr S and the late Mrs S' purchasing decision.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I'm not persuaded Mr S and the late Mrs S' decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mr S and the late Mrs S and the Lender was unfair to them for this reason.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I don't think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr S and the late Mrs S' Section 75 claims, and I'm not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them (including in respect the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender) for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr S and the estate of Mrs S.

## **My final decision**

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr S and the estate of Mrs S to accept or reject my decision before 10 March 2026.

Peter Cook  
**Ombudsman**