

The complaint

Mrs M's complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA'), and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mrs M and her husband Mr M purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 19 March 2018 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 910 fractional points at a cost of £14,164 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs M more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs M paid for their Fractional Club membership by Mrs M taking finance of £18,324 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). For ease of readability, and as the Credit Agreement is in Mrs M's sole name, I will refer only to her (as the eligible complainant) below, even though her husband was also present at the Time of Sale and is party to the Purchase Agreement.

Mrs M – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 28 October 2021 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mrs M's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 5 January 2022, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs M disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision. So the complaint was passed to an Ombudsman to decide.

An Ombudsman considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') dated 1 August 2025. In that decision they said:

"I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld."

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs M was:

- told that she had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value".
- promised a considerable return on her investment because she was told that she would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.
- told that she could sell the Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.
- made to believe that she would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than an opinion as there isn't any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for points 3 and 4, while it's possible that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don't think it's probable. They're given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for these reasons, I don't think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mrs M's PR has concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

- the standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
- the provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and*
- the inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs M's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs M. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs M was actually unaffordable before also concluding that she lost out as a result – and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs M.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs M knew, amongst other things, how much she was borrowing and repaying each month, who she was borrowing from and that she was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. So, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs M's financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on her as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate her, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs M in practice, nor that any such terms led her to behave in a certain way to her detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mrs M may have felt weary after a sales process that she described as "pressure selling". In her testimony she mentions some uncomfortable behaviour of one of the sales representatives, however this relates to an earlier sale before the one concerning this complaint. Otherwise, she said little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made her feel as if she had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when she simply did not want to. She was also given a 14-day cooling off period and she has not provided a credible explanation for why she did not cancel the membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs M made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because her ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs M's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to her under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs M's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – alleging, in summary, that Mrs M was told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs M the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what she first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs M, the financial value of her share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs M as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs M rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that it is an important consideration whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when she decided to go ahead with the purchase. In her testimony, Mrs M said the following:

"I felt the whole situation was based on selling and pushing the idea we could go to any [Supplier] luxury resorts, the possible cruises and UK breaks so that was our main objective [...], knowing the standard of accommodation was consistent standard and luxury, it seemed ideal."

This quite clearly shows that her main motivation to enter the agreement were the holiday rights, the accommodation standards and the options for different types of trips. She does mention that she was informed the scheme was "a valuable asset" and "could be sold on to make a profit [...]", but this is not given the same weight as the above comments about luxury accommodation and choice of holidays, and she says the "main objective" were those holiday options.

That doesn't mean she wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs M doesn't persuade me that her purchase was motivated by her share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs M ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs M's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have gone ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender was unfair to her, even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Mrs M's Commission Complaint

*I note that one of Mrs M's other concerns relates to alleged payments of commission by the Lender to the Supplier for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreements. The Court of Appeal's recent judgment in *Johnson and Wrench -v- FirstRand Bank*, and *Hopcroft -v- Close Brothers* [2024] EWCA Civ 1282 ('*Johnson, Wrench and Hopcroft*') sought to clarify the law on secret and partially disclosed commission – albeit in the context of car dealers acting as credit brokers. In my view, the Court of Appeal's judgment sets out principles which appear capable of applying to credit brokers other than car dealer credit brokers. But as it was recently appealed to the Supreme Court, whose judgment is still pending, I don't intend on finalising my thoughts on this complaint until it is handed down and its implications on this complaint, if there are any, considered."*

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, the Ombudsman did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs M's Section 75 claim, and they were not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs M under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, they could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs M. But, as the Supreme Court's judgment on Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft was still pending at the time and may have proven to be important to this complaint, they said it was necessary to wait and consider the possible implications of that judgment before finalising their thoughts on the merits of this complaint.

The Ombudsman gave both parties the opportunity to respond to their PD. The PR responded stating it did not accept the PD, and it provided some further comments and evidence it wished to be considered. The Lender did not provide a substantive response to the PD.

The complaint was then passed to me to make a final decision on as the Ombudsman who issued the PD left the Service. Following the judgment in *Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft* being handed down, I issued a Side Letter explaining that I had reviewed the entire complaint, along with the previous Ombudsman's PD, and I agreed with their provisional conclusions, and for the same reasons. I went on to set out my thoughts about Mrs M's commission complaint, which were as follows:

“The legal and regulatory context

In considering what's fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I'm required under DISP 3.6.4 R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- *CONC 3.7.3 [R]*
- *CONC 4.5.3 [R]*
- *CONC 4.5.2 [G]*

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- *Principle 6*

- Principle 7
- Principle 8

The Provision of Information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench.

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

- 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair” (see paragraph 327);*
- 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and*
- 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.*

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

- 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;*
- 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);*
- 3. The characteristics of the consumer;*
- 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and*
- 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.*

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I'm required to consider under DISP 3.6.4 R.

But I don't think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs M in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs M. Nor have I seen anything that persuades me the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs M into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it's for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs M.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs M entered into wasn't high. At £732.96, it was only 4% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (3.71%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had she known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not currently persuaded that she either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs M wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for a timeshare she wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs M but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to her when arranging the Credit Agreement, and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs M.

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mrs M's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs M complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs M (i.e. secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs M a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to her. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between itself and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint. That's because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time."

In conclusion, I maintained the previous Ombudsman's provisional conclusions about how the Lender dealt with Mrs M's Section 75 claim, and I explained I wasn't persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I had seen no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

I gave both parties the opportunity to respond to the Side Letter. The Lender accepted what I said and confirmed it had no further comments to add. The PR did not respond.

As the parties have now had the opportunity to respond to the PD and the Side Letter, and having received the responses I mentioned above, I'm now finalising my decision on this complaint.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as the previous Ombudsman outlined in the PD, and which I added to in the Side Letter, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it. Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs M as an investment at the Time of Sale, and uncertainty in the sales documentation around the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property.

As outlined in the PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which were addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to all of those points in its response to the PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of the provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. The same can also be said in relation to Mrs M's commission complaint, which I set out my thoughts on in my Side Letter, and which the PR did not respond to. Since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points or Mrs M's commission complaint by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in the PD and the Side Letter. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in its response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

As the previous Ombudsman explained in the PD, Mrs M did recall that the Supplier told her Fractional Club membership was "*a valuable asset,*" and "*could be sold on to make a profit.*" But Mrs M did not give this recollection sufficient weight to persuade the Ombudsman that she purchased Fractional Club membership in whole or in part down to any breach of Regulation 14(3). Rather, it appeared from what Mrs M said that she was persuaded to purchase Fractional Club membership by the holiday rights it provided to her, such that whether the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) or not, she would still have gone ahead with her purchase.

The PR argues Mrs M clearly stated the benefits that "*obviously convinced [her] to purchase*" Fractional Club membership, which included the potential for making a financial gain from the sale of the Allocated Property. It says this means the prospect of a financial gain was an important and motivating factor behind her decision to purchase membership.

However, the fact Mrs M recalled she was told by the Supplier's sales representative(s) that Fractional Club membership included the prospect of a financial gain, does not necessarily mean that was an important and motivating factor behind her decision to purchase membership. That recollection has to be considered alongside her other recollections of the Time of Sale and all the other evidence provided to us, and the wider circumstances of her purchase. And I don't find the PR's argument here addresses the point made in the PD, that Mrs M's recollection of what the Supplier told her about the prospect of a financial gain lacked the weight necessary to conclude that played an important role in her decision to purchase membership.

So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those already explained in the PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs M's purchasing decision.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as explained in the PD, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, as explained in the PD, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no formal finding on here), I'm not persuaded Mrs M's decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender was unfair to her for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

I will also address here the PR's point about the apparent uncertainty around the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mrs M in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of her share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the Fractional Rights Certificate, is 31 December 2035. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mrs M. This date indicates that the membership has a term of around 18 years. The uncertainty identified by the PR is that the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation says the following:

*"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate."* (bold my emphasis).

It seems clear to me that the commencement date of the sale process is 31 December 2035. This specific date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above. So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship was unfair to Mrs M.

S140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs M and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. So, I don't think it's fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

Given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs M's Section 75 claim, and I'm not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs M to accept or reject my decision before 6 January 2026.

Asa Burnett
Ombudsman