DRN-5941901

The complaint

Mr G's complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the Complaint

Mr G purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 12 September 2012 (the 'Time of Sale'). He entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,932 fractional points (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr G more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after his membership term ends.

Mr G paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £9,809 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement') and by trading in his existing points-based membership.

Mr G – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 29 November 2018 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr G's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 19 August 2020, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr G disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I issued my provisional findings to the parties on 27 October 2025.

In my provisional decision, I said:

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Mr G's claims under Section 75 CCA are "like" claims against the Lender which mirror the claims he could make against the Supplier. And so, it wouldn't be fair to expect the Lender to pay claims that arose after such a limitation defence would be available to the Supplier in court. As such, it's a relevant for me to consider whether Mr G's claims were time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (the 'LA') before he first raised them to the Lender.

A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, and the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Mr G's claim is subject to the limitation periods set out under Sections 2 and 9 of the LA, which are both six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued was at the Time of Sale. I say this because Mr G entered into the Purchase Agreement at that time based on alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier, which he says he relied upon when deciding whether or not to make the purchase. And the Credit Agreement was used to finance the purchase, so it was when Mr G entered into this that he suffered a loss.

Mr G first notified the Lender of his claims against it on 29 November 2018, which was more than six years after the Time of Sale. With that being the case, I don't think it was unfair or unreasonable of the Lender to decline to pay the claim Mr G made against it for the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

Mr G says that he could not holiday where and when he wanted to. That was framed, in the Letter of Complaint, as part of his complaint about the fairness or otherwise of his credit relationship with the Lender under Section 140A of the CCA. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Unlike a claim for misrepresentation, the point in which Mr G alleges he suffered a loss was not necessarily at the Time of Sale, instead, it was at the time he did not receive the holiday(s) he was promised under the Purchase Agreement. I don't think I need to make a finding on exactly when this first occurred, as I don't think the claim ought to have been paid by the Lender. Like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr G states that the availability of holidays was/is

subject to demand. I accept that he may not have been able to take certain holidays. And I appreciate he may have been frustrated when the Supplier could not provide him with the accommodation he desired in October 2014 so that he and his partner could holiday with friends. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr G any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

(1) *The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
(2) *The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
(3) *Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and*
(4) *The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender.

<u>The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale</u>

Mr G's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.

They include, for various reasons, the allegation that the Supplier misled Mr G and carried on unfair commercial practices under Regulations 5 and 6 of the CPUT Regulations. However, as Regulations 5 and 6 state, commercial practices only amount to misleading actions or omissions if, in addition to satisfying one or more of the specific matters set out in those provisions, they cause or are likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not have taken otherwise. And as I haven't seen enough evidence to persuade me that, if there were any such actions or omissions at the Time of Sale (which I make no formal finding on), they led Mr G to make the purchasing decision he did, I'm not persuaded that anything done or nor done by the Supplier amounted to an unfair commercial practice for the purposes of those provisions.

The PR also alleges that the Supplier acted unfairly under Regulation 7 Schedule 1 of the CPUT Regulations. But given the limited evidence in this complaint, I am not persuaded that the Supplier did.

In addition, the PR also says that:

(1) *the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr G.*
(2) *Mr G was pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale.*
(3) *there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement.*

I have also thought about whether any of the alleged misrepresentations may have led to an unfair debtor-creditor relationship between Mr G and the Lender.

However, as things currently stand, none of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr G was actually unaffordable before also concluding that he lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr G.

I acknowledge that Mr G may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But he says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentation that made him feel as if he had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when he simply did not want to. Mr G was also given a 14-day cooling off period and he has not provided a credible explanation for why he did not cancel the membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr G made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because his ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr G was:

(1) *told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true.*
(2) *told by the Supplier that he was buying an interest in a specific piece of "real property" when that was not true.*
(3) *told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that was not true.*

The words and/or phrases allegedly used by the Supplier to misrepresent Fractional Club for the reason given in point (1) were set out by the PR in the Letter of Complaint, and they were limited to: "That the Fractional Property Ownership Scheme had a guaranteed end date, specifically after 19 [years], after which the clients would have no further legal liability to [the Supplier] under or in respect of the Scheme.".

The PR says that such a representation was untrue because the "Sales Process" begins on the Sale Date as defined in the Fractional Club Rules, and under Rule 9, particularly Rules 9.2.9 and 9.2.12, there is no guarantee that any sale will result at all, leaving prospective members to pay their annual management charge for an indefinite and unspecified period.

However, I cannot see why the phrase above would have been untrue at the Time of Sale even if it was said. It seems to me to reflect the main thrust of the contract Mr G entered into. And while, under Rules 9.1 and 9.2.9 of the relevant Fractional Club Rules, the sale of the

Allocated Property could be postponed for up to two years by the 'Vendor'[1], longer than that if there were problems selling and the 'Owners'[2] agreed, or for an otherwise specified period provided there was unanimous agreement in writing from the Owners, that does not render the representation above untrue. So, I am not persuaded that the representation above constituted a false statement of fact even if it was made.

As for points (2) and (3), neither of these strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue – nor was it untrue to tell prospective members that they would receive some money when the allocated property is sold. After all, a share in an allocated property was clearly the purchase of a share of the net sale proceeds of a specific property in a specific resort. And while the PR might question the exact legal mechanism used to give prospective members that interest, it did not change the fact that they acquired such an interest.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr G's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to Mr G. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr G's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR and Mr G say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that he was told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr G the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what he first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract

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[1] Defined in the FPOC Rules as "CLC Resort Developments Limited".
[2] Defined in the FPOC Rules as "a purchaser who has entered into a Purchase Agreement and has been issued with a Fractional Rights Certificate (which shall include the Vendor for such period of time until the maximum number of Fractional Rights have been acquired)."

as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr G as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to him as an investment, i.e. told him or led him to believe that Fractional Club membership offered him the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr G, the financial value of his share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr G as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr G decided to go ahead with his purchase.

I note that the PR included a document in its submission to our service that lists the documents provided. These include documents titled "Clients hand written statement", "Hand written letter to timeshare accounts department" and "Signed witness statement dated

[21 February 2018]". Our investigator requested a copy of Mr G's written statement prior to issuing their findings, but none of the above documents were presented.

Instead, the PR provided a copy of what appears to be a draft copy of Mr G's witness statement, which is unsigned and undated. This says:

"We were told in the meeting that with fractional ownership our property would be sold off in 19 years and we would get our "share back of the property". The implication was that we were part owners of the property and the land that it sits on. We were told that this was the only way out of our [Supplier] membership."

Mr G also says:

"We felt we had no option that if we [wanted] out we would have to do this. We were told in the sales meeting that if we wanted to, we could just give our points back and walk away. However, we did want to get our money back so bought into the [Fractional Club].

We did decide to purchase because we felt we had no option to get something back for our money. [The Supplier] would not buy back the points and we could not sell them."

So, I think Mr G was motivated by the shorter membership term and the prospect of receiving something back at the end of that term, but as Mr G himself doesn't persuade me that his purchase was motivated by the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision he ultimately made.

In response to the Investigator's rejection of Mr G's complaint, the PR provided what it calls a "supplementary statement" signed by Mr G on 13 December 2023. He says:

6. The [Supplier] reps told us that Fractional Property Ownership involved buying a share (fraction) in a property, which would be sold after 19 years, and the proceeds of sale split between all the fractional owners. In addition, we would get holiday Points, which would enable us [to] have a holiday in our apartment, every year, or exchange it for holidays in other [Supplier] resorts.

7. We were shown a pie chart, showing how many owners there would be in each property, split into slices, and it was suggested that we buy two of the slices.

8. We were told that we would own a share in this property but didn't realise at the time that everyone who owned a share needed to agree to sell before we could receive any money back.

9. Thus, the Fractional Property Ownership scheme was sold to us an investment.

10. We asked if buying into this product would be an earlier way out of [the Supplier], and we were told time after time that it was. We were not told that we could exit our membership by simply giving notice to [the Supplier]."

Once again, Mr G says he would receive his share of the proceeds from the sale of the Allocated Property, which was true. Although he says the Fractional Club was sold to him as an investment, his own testimony does not persuade me that it was sold in that way as there is no suggestion that he might receive more money than he spent on the membership. And he does persuade me that he was motivated by the Supplier's confirmation that the membership offered him an "earlier way out" of his membership, which was true.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr G's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests he would have pressed ahead with his purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr G was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr G sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges he could have been subject to as a Fractional Club member in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr G nor the PR have persuaded me that he would not have pressed ahead with his purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr G in practice, nor that any such terms led him to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing the Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

In conclusion, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with the relevant Section 75 claims.

At the time of my provisional decision I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint.

Applying the principles and factors set out in the Supreme Court judgment[3] handed down on 1 August 2025, I found nothing to suggest to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr G. Nor did I see anything that persuaded me that the commission arrangements between him gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate which led Mr G into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

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[3] *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ("*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench"*)

Further, the flat rate and amount of commission paid was such that it gave me no reason to think that any failure to disclose it to Mr G had a material impact on his decision to enter into the Credit Agreement. At £1,005.42, it was only 10.25% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (5.6%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. That didn't strike me as disproportionate; nor were the surrounding circumstances otherwise capable of rendering unfair the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr G such that the Lender needed to take any action in redress.

I didn't find any of the other arguments put forward demonstrated that the credit agreement between Mr G and the Lender was unfair to him under section 140A of the CCA. As there was not any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr G, I said I did not propose to uphold the complaint.

Responses to my provisional decision

The Lender did not reply to my provisional decision. The PR did not accept the proposed outcome. It submitted further comments and evidence in support of Mr G's position.

Having received and reviewed these, I'm now proceeding with my final decision.

The legal and regulatory context

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint has been shared in several hundred published decisions on very similar complaints, as well as in previous correspondence with the parties. So there's no need for me to set this out again in detail here. I simply remind the parties that our rules[4] say that in considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I will take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

After considering the case afresh and having regard for what's been said in response to my provisional decision and in my subsequent correspondence, I find it offers no persuasive reason to depart from the conclusions I've previously set out. I'll explain why.

The PR originally raised various points of complaint, such as those giving rise to Mr G's section 75 claim, which I addressed in my provisional decision. In its response, it hasn't made any further comments in relation to most of its original points or provided me with anything that leads me to think it disagrees with my provisional conclusions in relation to those points. So I'll focus here on the points the PR *has* made in response.

The PR's response to my provisional decision relates mainly to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender was unfair *per* section 140A of the CCA. In particular, the PR has provided more comment in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr G as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also made further submissions in support of its position that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship between the Lender and Mr G.

[4] Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") Handbook – DISP 3.6.4R ("R" denotes a rule).

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The PR has questioned whether my provisional conclusions run contrary to precedent decisions issued by my ombudsman colleagues and the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*. I don't believe they do. However, for the avoidance of doubt, other decisions issued by other ombudsmen do not have a precedent effect like some court judgments might, and each ombudsman must determine each case on its own specific facts. Further, the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all products of the type that Mr G purchased were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting.

I remind the PR that in my provisional decision I accepted the possibility that Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold to Mr G as an investment, in breach of Regulation 14(3). I went on to explain that relevant case law[5] indicates that in considering the question of relief for any resultant unfairness in the credit relationship, I needed to take into account any material impact of such a breach on Mr G's decision whether to enter into the Purchase and Credit Agreements. It doesn't strike me that doing so flies in the face of either the handed down judgment or previous decisions the PR has mentioned.

While the PR has referred me to Mr G's recollections and the Supplier's training materials, I have already considered these and what was said. And I set out in my provisional decision the reasons why I didn't find that evidence sufficiently persuasive that Mr G's purchase decision would have been any different, given the other motivational factors he had described. Having re-examined Mr G's statement that remains my view, for the reasons previously given.

So as I said before, whether or not the Supplier marketed or sold Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I'm not persuaded Mr G's decision to make the purchase was materially impacted by the prospect of a financial gain. It follows that I find the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender was not rendered unfair to him for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR has asked for the documents the lender has provided to evidence [the commission arrangements. As the PR will be aware, under DISP 3.5.9R I may, where I consider it appropriate, accept information in confidence (so that only an edited version, summary or description is disclosed to the other party). I'm satisfied that agreements between the Lender and the Supplier are commercially sensitive and that the summary information on commission arrangements we've already shared with the PR is appropriate in this case. I've seen nothing in this case that leads me to think what the Lender has said about the commission arrangements is inaccurate. So there's no reason for me to reach a different finding over those commission arrangements.

As I've noted, the PR has disagreed with my provisional conclusions on whether the Lender should pay redress because of an unfair credit relationship arising in connection with commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier. The PR says, in summary, that when the overall circumstances of those arrangements are considered in the round, the credit relationship was plainly unfair. In support of this position the PR has expressed, among other things, that:

- The provisional decision doesn't properly apply the Supreme Court's judgment in

[5] *Carney* and *Kerrigan*

Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, which concluded a range of factors informed whether a credit relationship between a consumer and a lender was unfair
- A conflict of interest existed on the part of the Supplier, who provided neither independent nor competent explanation of the credit
- Failure to disclose payment of commission – irrespective of the size of any payment - was a regulatory breach that goes to the heart of fairness

I have read and considered the PR's submissions it provided on behalf of Mr G. But I don't find what it has said offers persuasive grounds for me to reach a different conclusion on this issue.

I've previously set out my thoughts on any impact the Supreme Court's conclusions in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* has on Mr G's arguments that his credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

The PR's response doesn't offer anything that leads me to think that, for the most part, any of the factors it has referenced were in fact at play in Mr G's case. It hasn't, for example, provided evidence to show the existence of commercial or contractual ties that were concealed from Mr G, any persuasive reasons to conclude that the Supplier's role was that of advisor to Mr G, or to show that any other conflict of interest arose from the roles the Supplier did perform. For such a claim to be successful would require more than the bare assertions that have been made in this case.

In its correspondence the PR has emphasised the regulatory breaches connected with a failure to disclose commission payment. I have already set out why in my view this doesn't automatically lead to an unfair credit relationship for which the Lender needs to offer redress. I remain of that view, the PR's submissions notwithstanding.

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I remain unpersuaded that the credit relationship between Mr G and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to him such that it warrants the Lender offering any redress.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

In my previous correspondence I mentioned that some of the grounds for complaint about the fairness or otherwise of the credit relationship could also constitute separate and freestanding complaints. I'll reiterate my findings here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr G (that is, secretly). The second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

For the reasons I set out previously, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr G a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to him. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold

this complaint. For the reasons I have also previously set out, I think Mr G would still have taken out the loan to fund his purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

After careful reconsideration of the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I adopt my provisional conclusions as part of my final decision. For the reasons I've given above and in my earlier correspondence I've mentioned, I don't think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr G's section 75 claims. And I'm not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mr G that was unfair to him for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA. Having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable for me to direct the Lender to compensate Mr G.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, my final decision is that I don't uphold Mr G's complaint against Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr G to accept or reject my decision before 12 January 2026.

Andrew Anderson
Ombudsman