

The complaint

Mr and Mrs D's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr and Mrs D were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having previously purchased a product from it. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they upgraded on 31 March 2013 (the 'Time of Sale'). After trading in their existing membership, they paid £10,540 for 1,716 fractional points (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs D more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after the end of their membership term.

Mr and Mrs D paid for their Fractional Club upgrade by taking finance of £23,803 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). The amount borrowed exceeded the purchase price as Mr and Mrs D consolidated the finance taken to fund their initial purchase of Fractional Club membership into this loan.

Mr and Mrs D – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 11 October 2021 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr and Mrs D's concerns as a Section 75 claim and issued a response explaining why it was not prepared to accept this.

Mr and Mrs D's complaint was referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service on 6 January 2022. While the complaint was awaiting assessment by one of our Investigators, the Lender issued a final response letter, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr and Mrs D disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4 R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where

appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Office of Fair Trading's Irresponsible Lending Guidance – 31 March 2010

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide greater clarity for businesses and consumer representatives as to the business practices that the Office of Fair Trading (the 'OFT') thought might have constituted irresponsible lending for the purposes of Section 25(2B) of the CCA. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 2.3
- Paragraph 5.5

The OFT's Guidance for Credit Brokers and Intermediaries - 24 November 2011

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide clarity for credit brokers and credit intermediaries as to the standards expected of them by the OFT when they dealt with actual or prospective borrowers. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 3.7
- Paragraph 4.8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

This part of Mr and Mrs D's complaint was made for several reasons, which included that the Supplier misrepresented the Fractional Club upgrade at the Time of Sale as it told them they had purchased an investment which would considerably increase in value and that they would have access to the Allocated Property at any time.

Generally, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first made aware of after the claim has become time barred under the Limitation Act (the 'LA'), as it wouldn't be fair to expect them to look into such claims so long after the liability arose, and after a limitation defence would have been available in court. Therefore, it's relevant to consider

whether Mr and Mrs D's Section 75 claim was time barred under the LA before they put it to the Lender.

A claim under Section 75 is a "like claim against the creditor". It in effect mirrors the claim a consumer could make against the Supplier.

A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would typically be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the LA).

However, a claim under Section 75, like the one in question here, is also "an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment" under Section 9 of the LA. The limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued was the Time of Sale. That's when Mr and Mrs D entered into the purchase of their timeshare based on the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which they say they relied on. Further, as the loan from the Lender was used to help finance the purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they suffered a loss.

Mr and Mrs D first notified the Lender of their Section 75 claim on 11 October 2021. Given more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when they first put their claim to the Lender, in my view it was neither unfair nor unreasonable that the Lender rejected their concerns about the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I don't think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it rejected Mr and Mrs D's Section 75 claim in respect of the Supplier's alleged misrepresentations at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender along with all the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale in relation to the Fractional Club upgrade, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements;
4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender given their circumstances at the Time of Sale.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr and Mrs D's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr and Mrs D. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr and Mrs D was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for them.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr and Mrs D knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for the Fractional Club upgrade. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr and Mrs D experiencing a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs D in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs D may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase the Fractional Club upgrade when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling-off period and have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. Moreover, they went on to further upgrade their membership, which I find difficult to understand if the reason they went ahead with the purchase in question was because they were pressured into it. And with all that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs D made the decision to purchase the Fractional Club upgrade because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr and Mrs D's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of a prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr and Mrs D the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more

than what they first put into it. But it's important to note at this stage that the fact that the Fractional Club upgrade included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs D as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold the upgrade to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that the Fractional Club upgrade offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it's clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an "investment" or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs D, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of their allocated property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to it.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned the Fractional Club upgrade as an investment. So, I accept that it's also possible that the Fractional Club upgrade was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs D as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs D have been rendered unfair to them had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from the

Fractional Club upgrade was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase.

The PR has provided a statement from Mr and Mrs D containing their recollections of their various interactions with the Supplier. This says the following in respect of the Time of Sale:

“We bought more fractions the second time we visited [the Supplier] in Spain and again we had to attend another presentation to show us the changes and new resorts and go through the same process as the previous one again taking the same length of time and told us that our fraction had increased in value and we traded it in.”

I have concerns about the credibility of Mr and Mrs D’s account as the Supplier’s pricing sheet from the Time of Sale shows that the value given for the trade-in of their initial membership was the same as the price they paid to purchase it around a year earlier.

But even if I was to take what Mr and Mrs D have said at face value, I would not be persuaded that the investment element of the Fractional Club upgrade was the motivation for their purchase at the Time of Sale. Although they say the sales representative(s) told them that their “fraction had increased in value”, they do not say their motivation for the purchase was increasing the size of their investment.

I acknowledge that elsewhere in their statement, Mr and Mrs D say the sales presentation at the Time of Sale followed “the same format” as when they initially purchased Fractional Club membership. While I accept there would be some similarities, I would be surprised if the sales process was the same for a first-time purchase and an upgrade, as the circumstances are materially different. But in any event, the contents of the sales presentation do not provide an insight into the motivation for Mr and Mrs D’s purchase.

Further, much of Mr and Mrs D’s dissatisfaction with Fractional Club membership stems from the exclusivity, availability and standard of holiday not being what they say they were led to believe.

Having carefully considered the available evidence in the round – and in the absence of compelling testimony from Mr and Mrs D that the investment element of the Fractional Club upgrade was the motivation behind their purchase at the Time of Sale – I’m not persuaded it was. The evidence instead points to a holiday-based motivation.

That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs D don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club upgrade as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs D’s decision to purchase this at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e. a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Section 140A: conclusion

Given all the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them

into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs D and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Spanish Law and its implications on the Credit Agreement

The PR argues that, on the basis the Purchase Agreement was unlawful under Spanish law in light of certain information failings by the Supplier, I should treat that Agreement and the Credit Agreement as rescinded by Mr and Mrs D and award them compensation accordingly – in keeping with the judgment of the UK's Supreme Court in *Durkin v DSG Retail* [2014] UKSC 21 ('*Durkin*').

However, as the Lender hasn't been party to any court proceedings in Spain, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement is valid under English law for the purposes of *Durkin*. The Spanish judgment the PR has provided does not relate to the purchase Mr and Mrs D made at the Time of Sale.

What's more, I note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn't at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in *Diamond Resorts Europe and Others* (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that, because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR.

Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason.

Overall conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs D's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

My final decision is to not uphold Mr and Mrs D's complaint about Shawbrook Bank Limited for the reasons provided.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr and Mrs D to accept or reject my decision before 10 March 2026.

Alex Salton
Ombudsman