DRN-5946315

The complaint

Mr and Mrs B's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the Complaint

Mr and Mrs B were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Signature Collection' – which they bought on 9 June 2015 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 2,090 fractional points at a cost of £11,091 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Signature Collection membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs B more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs B paid for their Signature Collection membership by taking finance of £25,992 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). Mr and Mrs B say this finance included an amount to pay off some outstanding finance with a different provider relating to their previous timeshare membership.

Mr and Mrs B – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 10 October 2022 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr and Mrs B's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 13 February 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr and Mrs B disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I issued a provisional decision ('PD') dated 31 October 2025, concluding the complaint should not be upheld. The findings from my PD are set out below.

> ***"The legal and regulatory context***
>
> *In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where*

appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context here.

What I've provisionally decided – and why

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under Section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the Supplier. In short, a claim against the Lender under Section 75 essentially mirrors the claim Mr and Mrs B could make against the Supplier.

The Lender rejected Mr and Mrs B's claim on multiple grounds. I've considered the Lender's response, but even if I were to find the Lender shouldn't have declined the claim for the reasons it did, I can't reasonably expect the Lender to meet that claim. That's because I need to take into account the Limitation Act 1980 (the "LA").

Mr and Mrs B purchased their membership on 9 June 2015. Although a court is only able to make a ruling under the LA, as it's relevant law, I've also considered any impact this may have on Mr and Mrs B's claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

As I've explained, a claim under Section 75 is a "like" claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim Mr and Mrs B could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the LA). But a claim under Section 75, like this one, is also "an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment" under Section 9 of the LA. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The date on which the cause of action accrued here was the Time of Sale. I say this because Mr and Mrs B entered into the purchase of the timeshare product at that time based upon the alleged misrepresentations of the Supplier – which Mr and Mrs B say they relied upon. And as the Credit Agreement with the Lender provided funding to help finance that purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they allegedly suffered the loss.

Mr and Mrs B first notified the Lender of their Section 75 complaint on 10 October 2022. As more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when they first put

their complaint to the Lender, I can't conclude that the Lender should accept responsibility for such a claim. However, I have considered whether these alleged misrepresentations could have been something that caused an unfair credit relationship.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

There are aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.
I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr and Mrs B's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

However, I've firstly considered whether the misrepresentations they allege were made by the Supplier in the context of their Section 75 claim could have caused any unfairness for the purposes of Section 140A.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Signature Collection membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr and Mrs B were:1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value".
2. Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.
3. Told that they could sell their Signature Collection membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.
4. Made to believe that they would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the

relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for point 3, while it's possible that Signature Collection membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for this reason, I don't think it's probable. They've given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrate that the Supplier made a false statement of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Signature Collection membership was misrepresented for this reason, I don't think it was.

Turning to point 4, like point 3 while it's possible that Signature Collection membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for this reason, I don't think it's probable. They've provided very little detail to demonstrate that the Supplier made a false statement of existing fact and/or opinion. It is also worth noting that Mr and Mrs B did have access to their Allocated property in a specific week every other year.

So, while I recognise that Mr and Mrs B - and the PR - have concerns about the way in which Signature Collection membership was sold by the Supplier, I do not think this caused any unfairness in Mr and Mrs B's credit relationship with the Lender such that it warrants a remedy.

Turning to the points specifically raised in relation to the potential unfairness of the relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender, the PR says they do not recall any credit checks being carried out before the Lender lent to them. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr and Mrs B was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr and Mrs B.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr and Mrs B knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Signature Collection membership, as Mr and Mrs B signed the Credit Agreement which included all of this information on the face of the agreement. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to financial loss for Mr and Mrs B – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs B in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Signature Collection membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs B may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase

Signature Collection membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs B made the decision to purchase Signature Collection membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr and Mrs B's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr and Mrs B's Signature Collection membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Signature Collection membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr and Mrs B were told by the Supplier that Signature Collection membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr and Mrs B the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Signature Collection membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Signature Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Signature Collection membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs B as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Signature Collection membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Signature Collection membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Signature Collection as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs B, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs B as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. To help me decide this point, I've carefully considered what Mr and Mrs B have said in the course of their complaint about how the membership was sold to them and their motivation for taking it out.

As I've stated above, it is said within the Letter of Complaint that Mr and Mrs B were told that they had purchased an investment that would increase in value and were promised a considerable return. There was no further detail underpinning these statements within the Letter of Complaint.

The PR provided a statement from Mr and Mrs B containing their recollections from the Time of Sale which was signed and dated on 8 August 2024 – which was some time after the Letter of Complaint. Mr and Mrs B have set out their experiences with the Supplier since becoming members, but the relevant part of their statement in relation to the membership in question, is as follows:

"In June 2015 we returned again to [the Supplier] and this time were informed that there were further changes to the fractional Ownership as what we had purchased had to be linked to an actual physical building. They apparently had their top of the range apartments for which we had the opportunity of being able to purchase some time in this

apartment in a specific week every other year. This had a cost of £11,091 however it had an end date of 2034 at which time the building would be sold and we were to receive the proceeds of the total amount divided by the fractional owners. This however would only happen if every fractional owner agreed to sell, but the salesman said who would not want to sell so there would be a definite return".

This is the only reference Mr and Mrs B make in relation to the potential return they may receive at the end of the membership term. To me, this seems to be a factual description of how the Signature Collection membership and the eventual sale of the Allocated Property worked. I say this because, as a result of this purchase, Mr and Mrs B had a share in the net sale proceeds of the property named on their Purchase Agreement, specifically 1.05%. Upon the sale of the property, Mr and Mrs B would receive their share in the net sale proceeds of their Allocated Property after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs B's testimony offers little clarity on why they may have entered into this agreement. Although they mentioned receiving a return after their membership term ends, they've not provided any detail about the actual return they were expecting to achieve. At no point did Mr and Mrs B say or suggest that the Supplier led them to believe that their Signature Collection membership would lead to a financial gain (i.e. a profit) – something that I would have expected them to make clear if that is what they were told at the Time of Sale. So, I'm simply not persuaded that it would be fair to conclude that Mr and Mrs B were materially motivated by the prospect of a profit or financial gain when deciding to upgrade to a Signature Club membership.

Mr and Mrs B also requested to surrender their membership in 2017. It's difficult in the context of this complaint to understand why, if Mr and Mrs B had made the purchase because they were motivated by a financial gain or profit, that they were prepared to relinquish their membership.

The Lender believes Mr and Mrs B's motivation for purchasing their Signature Collection membership was for holidays. The Lender received a 'dissatisfaction form' in relation to a complaint Mr and Mrs B were making in relation to the loan connected to this purchase. This form was completed in 2018, much closer to the Time of Sale. Within this form, Mr and Mrs B say 'The purchase of the timeshare was taken out to enable us to have holidays…"1. So, in Mr and Mrs B's own words, they were interested in the holidays they could book using their Signature Collection membership.

So, on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Signature Collection membership was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase.

That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs B themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mr and Mrs B ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Signature Collection membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs B's decision to purchase Signature Collection membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B

and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Insolvency of the Supplier and its implications on the Credit Agreement

The PR argues that, because the Supplier's Spanish based sales companies have closed, Mr and Mrs B will not recover any amounts that are expected to be awarded by the Spanish court. But this is of no impact on the complaint because (1) I can't see that the Supplier (i.e., company that entered into the Purchase Agreement) is itself the subject of a court judgment in Mr and Mrs B's favour nor can I see that the Lender has been party to any court proceedings and (2) even if he had a claim for something, there's no explanation as to why the Lender would be responsible to answer it.

Overall, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs B's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA.

And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them."

I gave both parties the opportunity of responding and providing any further information or argument before I made my final decision. The Lender responded and said it agreed with my PD.

The PR also responded on behalf of Mr and Mrs B but did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted to be taken into account. It also raised, for the first time, an allegation that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier caused an unfair credit relationship.

Having read everything, I sent the following email to both parties:

"Following my provisional decision, Mr and Mrs B raised concerns relating to the alleged payment of commission by the Lender to the Supplier for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreement. I'm outlining my thoughts on this issue in this letter so that both parties have the opportunity to respond before I finalise my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways. no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- *CONC 3.7.3 [R]*
- *CONC 4.5.3 [R]*
- *CONC 4.5.2 [G]*

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- *Principle 6*
- *Principle 7*
- *Principle 8*

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 ('Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. *The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair" (see paragraph 327);*
2. *The failure to disclose the commission; and*
3. *The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.*

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. *The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;*
2. *The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);*
3. *The characteristics of the consumer;*

4. *The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and*
5. *Compliance with the regulatory rules.*

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mr and Mrs B in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

Based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr and Mrs B but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr and Mrs B, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr and Mrs B into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, no payment between the Lender and the Supplier, such as a commission, was payable when the Credit Agreement was arranged at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commercial arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr and Mrs B.

So again, in conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I still do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs B's Section 75 claim. I am also not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit agreement with them that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensation them."

Neither party responded so I am now finalising my decision.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr and Mrs B as an investment at the Time of Sale.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mr and Mrs B was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mr and Mrs B to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mr and Mrs B as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mr and Mrs B in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr and Mrs B to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mr and Mrs B to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mr and Mrs B in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted Mr and Mrs B's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR referred to Mr and Mrs B's testimony and highlighted that they shared their experience of how they were sold their previous purchase as an investment and this understanding followed through at the Time of Sale. I considered Mr and Mrs B's testimony in full but their witness statement, in my opinion, offers little insight on why they may have entered into the agreement in question. As I've said, I accept that their Signature Collection membership may have been sold as an investment, but I also need to be persuaded that the potential breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the agreement.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*[1] and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mr and Mrs B to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I referred to a 'dissatisfaction form' that Mr and Mrs B sent the Lender in which Mr and Mrs B said '*The purchase of the timeshare was taken out to enable us to have Holidays."* Neither party asked to see a copy of this form in response to my PD. Based on this form, I felt Mr and Mrs B were interested in the holidays they could book using their Signature Collection membership – which was a factor in my overall conclusion in light of all the available evidence that they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase of the Signature Collection membership even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

In my PD, I also mentioned Mr and Mrs B tried to surrender their membership in 2017 but Mr and Mrs B said *"..which is why when I was struggling to pay the maintenance fees in 2017 that I was prepared to give up my membership"*. I accept Mr and Mrs B's financial circumstances meant that they requested to surrender their membership but from all of the information and evidence I've considered, I am still not persuaded Mr and Mrs B's decision to make the purchase was materially impacted by the prospect of a financial gain. So, for the reason given in my PD and above, I find the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender was not rendered unfair to them for this reason.

<u>The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale</u>

I will address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mr and Mrs B in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2034. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mr and Mrs B. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 18 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

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[1] R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

> "The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate." (my emphasis)

It seems clear to me that the contractual commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2034. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above. The Information Statement is, in my view, reflective of the fact that most fractional memberships were set up to run for nineteen years. But not all memberships attached to a given Allocated Property were sold at exactly the same time, so often the time left before the sale date was less than nineteen years at the actual time of sale. I accept that this could be confusing, however I do not think Mr and Mrs B were misled by this at the Time of Sale. So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs B's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr and Mrs B to accept or reject my decision before 26 February 2026.

Sameena Ali
Ombudsman