

The complaint

Mr and Mrs T's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mr and Mrs T purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 8 August 2013 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 16,500 fractional points at a cost (after trading in their existing non-fractional timeshare) of £10,235 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs T more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs T paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £10,235 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mr and Mrs T – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 12 November 2018 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender says it received that letter in January 2020. It dealt with Mr and Mrs T's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 13 February 2020, rejecting it on every ground.

By then, the complaint had been referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service in July 2019. After some correspondence about whether Mr and Mrs T's claims under the CCA were time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980, our investigator and the Lender accepted that they were not time-barred.

The complaint was assessed by the investigator who, having considered the information on file, upheld the complaint on its merits. He found that the Fractional Club had been mis-sold in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (the 'Timeshare Regulations').

The Lender disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I issued my provisional findings to the parties on 14 October 2025. In my provisional decision, I said the following:

My provisional findings

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr and Mrs T were told by the Supplier:

- (1) that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true;
- (2) that they were buying an interest in a specific piece of real property – "bricks and mortar" – when that was not true;
- (3) that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that was not true;
- (4) fractional points were an appreciating asset, when that was not true because the points were depreciating;
- (5) the product was exclusively for members only, when that was not true;
- (6) that when they died, their liability under their existing timeshare would be inherited by their children when that was not true, and that the only solution was to replace it with a fractional timeshare of limited duration.

The words and/or phrases allegedly used by the Supplier to misrepresent the Fractional Club for the reason given in point 1 were set out by the PR in the Letter of Complaint, and they were limited to: "*There will be a guaranteed exit date which is the 31st December 2028.*"

The PR says that such a representation was untrue because the Fractional Club membership has no definitive end date, because there is no guarantee that any sale will result at all. This leaves prospective members to pay their annual management charge for an indefinite and unspecified period.

However, I cannot see that the phrase “*guaranteed exit date*” was mentioned by Mr and Mrs T in their joint witness statement. Instead, they say that their Fractional Club membership was a guaranteed exit strategy, and I cannot see that that would have been untrue at the Time of Sale. It seems to me to reflect the main thrust of the contract Mr and Mrs T entered into. And 31 December 2028 is described on the Purchase Agreement as the “*Proposed Sale Date of Property*”, which is not the same thing as a guaranteed exit date. It obviously is not possible to know in advance the precise date on which a property will be sold. So I am not convinced that Mr and Mrs T were told that the property would definitely be sold on that exact date. Indeed, paragraph 6 of the Customer Compliance Statement says:

“We understand that the Property referenced on our Purchase Agreement will be sold as soon as possible on or after the Proposed Sale Date. However we realise that it may not be possible to source a buyer immediately, and that in the event that the sale is effected on or after the Proposed Sale Date, we will be required to pay our Dues each year until the Property is sold.”

This is based on the Trust Deed, which says that the Allocated Property will be sold on or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Proposed Sale Date.

I think that the fact that selling a property may take time that does not render the representation above untrue. So I am not persuaded that the representation above constituted a false statement of fact.

As for points 2 and 3, neither of them strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue – nor was it untrue to tell prospective members that they would receive some money when the allocated property is sold. After all, a share in an allocated property was clearly the purchase of a share of the net sale proceeds of a specific property in a specific resort. And while the PR might question the exact legal mechanism used to give prospective members that interest, it did not change the fact that they acquired such an interest.

Turning to point 4, I don’t agree that Fractional Points were a depreciating asset, because the Allocated Property was an appreciating asset, and the points represent the proportion of Mr and Mrs T’s share in the proceeds of the sale.

On point 5, I’ve not seen evidence (other than Mr and Mrs T’s witness statement) that Mr and Mrs T were told that the resorts were exclusive and were not open to the public. The Supplier says that its resorts are not exclusive to members and denies saying that they were, but points out that some of the benefits of club membership are exclusive to members. I am currently not persuaded that the evidence I have now is enough to find that the resorts were misrepresented as only being available to be booked by members.

Finally, Mr and Mrs T say that at the Time of Sale they were worried about being tied into their existing timeshare contract until 2054 (when they would be in their 80s and 90s), and they were sold Fractional Club membership as a way of getting out earlier than that, since the fractional membership duration was for a much shorter term. They allege that the Supplier falsely told them that their children would inherit their liability to pay annual maintenance charges for their existing timeshare after their deaths, as a way of encouraging them to buy a fractional timeshare to avoid that happening.

I don't think it's plausible that the salesman told them that their children would inherit their liability after their deaths, as there is no law that would force their children to become party to a contract against their will (whether a timeshare contract or any other kind of personal contract). And in June 2013, the Supplier issued a new internal policy document which set out what its salespeople were required to tell consumers about (among other things) what would happen if they died. There were different policies for fractional and non-fractional timeshares, but when it came to the death of a timeshare owner they were broadly the same. If the last surviving joint owner died, then the executor of their estate would be entitled to either sell the points or request that the points and membership be transferred to a beneficiary. The beneficiary can choose to accept or disclaim the points; disclaimer terminates the membership. So I think it's more likely that the salesman mentioned that Mr and Mrs T could leave their membership to their children, than that he told them that their children would be compelled to become members and to pay the annual fees.

As for the salesman telling them that buying Fractional Club membership was the only way to bring forward the end of their contract, that was not quite true, because there was also the possibility of selling their points to a third party. I think it's likely that that would have been explained to them at the previous sales, since that seems to be a good selling point and a way to reassure consumers about otherwise being tied into a contract for decades. But apart from selling their existing points, upgrading to fractional points was the only other way to get out of their existing timeshare at that time.

The Supplier says it has no record of Mr and Mrs T asking about ending their timeshare membership prior to the Time of Sale. I note that they had upgraded their membership only two years earlier, by buying another 3,000 points. Their reservation history shows that they had been taking regular holidays up to the Time of Sale, and that they continued to take them afterwards. That does not suggest that they were keen to sell their points. So I think that telling Mr and Mrs T that they could abbreviate their membership term by buying fractional points was not a misrepresentation, because they would have chosen to do that.

So, while I recognise that Mr and Mrs T – and the PR – have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular section 75 claim.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's breach of contract

I have already summarised how section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

Mr and Mrs T say that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to. That was framed, in the Letter of Complaint, as part of their complaint about misrepresentation. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher

demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr and Mrs T states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. It also looks like they made use of their fractional points to holiday on a number of occasions. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr and Mrs T any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Times of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and
4. The inherent probabilities of the sales given their circumstances.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr and Mrs T's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.

They include, for various reasons, the allegation that the Supplier misled Mr and Mrs T and carried on unfair commercial practices under regulations 5 and 6 of the CPUR regulations.¹ However, as regulations 5 and 6 state, commercial practices only amount to misleading actions or omissions if, in addition to satisfying one or more of the specific matters set out in those provisions, they cause or are likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not have taken otherwise. And as I haven't seen enough evidence to persuade me that, if there were any such actions or omissions at the Time of Sale (which I make no formal finding on), they led Mr and Mrs T to make the purchasing decision they did, I'm not

¹ The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

persuaded that anything done or not done by the Supplier amounted to an unfair commercial practice for the purposes of those provisions.

The PR also alleges that the Supplier acted unfairly under regulation 7 Schedule 1 of the CPUT regulations. But given the limited evidence in this complaint, I am not persuaded that the Supplier did.

In addition, the PR also says that:

1. the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr and Mrs T;
2. Mr and Mrs T were pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale;
3. there was one, or more, unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement.

However, as things currently stand, none of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr and Mrs T was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr and Mrs T.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs T may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling-off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs T made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr and Mrs T's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of a prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr and Mrs T's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday

product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.”

But the PR and Mr and Mrs T say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that they were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr and Mrs T the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs T as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs T, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. For example, paragraph 5 of the Compliance Statement said:

“We understand that the purchase of our Diamond Fractional Points is an investment in our future holidays, and that it should not be regarded as a property or financial investment. We recognize that the sale price achieved on the sale of the Property in the Owners Club (and to which our Diamond Fractional Points have been attributed) will depend on market conditions at that time, that property prices can go down as well as up and that there is no guarantee as to the eventual sale price of the Property.”

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. In paragraph 35 of their joint witness statement, Mr and Mrs T said:

“On the diagram there were arrows pointing up, implying that this was an increasing asset and that we would be able to sell and make a profit.”

So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs T as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, then an important consideration is whether the Supplier's breach of regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement – or if they would still have done that anyway.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr and Mrs T decided to go ahead with their purchase. I will explain why.

In paragraphs 33 to 37 of their joint witness statement, they said:

“[W]e explained the difficulties that we were having, and the sales representative acknowledged how problematic Diamond membership had become and offered us fractional ownership as the only way to end our contract... by converting our points to fractions, we were told that we would then be out of our commitment to points. It would also be a solution to not being able to get the holidays that we wanted. ...

It would be an "investment". The sales representative also implied that the value of a 1 bed apartment was increasing by '£30,000, per year'. The sales representative wanted to make sure that we understood that Fractional Ownership would be an appreciating asset... We enquired about exiting our timeshare and was [sic] assured that fractional was the only guaranteed way out. ...

We were told that if we purchased an additional 1500 points then our total of 16,500 points could be used to purchase 3 fractional weeks at a cost of 5500 points per week. So, we purchased the additional 1500 points.”

My overall impression of all this is that Mr and Mrs T were primarily motivated by wanting to improve their holiday experience, and obtain an earlier end date to their contract with the Supplier. Although they describe the product as being described

and marketed as an investment, they say little about being influenced by that aspect of it.

Then in paragraph 39 they said:

“On all occasions, but especially the first two or three, it was always stressed to us that membership in the organisation would be a long-term investment, saving us money in the long term ... and that over the years we would actually save a substantial amount of money.”

Since their previous purchases were not fractional timeshares but ordinary timeshares, the reference to the first two or three products being sold as investments cannot mean selling an allocated property and sharing out the proceeds. This paragraph seems to be about *saving* money rather than *making* it, which is not suggestive of a profit. I don't agree with the Lender's argument that this paragraph undermines Mr and Mrs T's credibility overall, but I also don't think it assists them either.

All of that doesn't mean Mr and Mrs T weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs T themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs T's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr and Mrs T were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms. And there was no adequate or transparent explanation of the interest rate, which the PR alleged was so high as to make the loan unsuitable for Mr and Mrs T.

As I've already indicated, the case law on section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr and Mrs T sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing

costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr and Mrs T nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its facts and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs T in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I have looked at the Credit Agreement, and it appears to comply with the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 2010. In particular, it clearly and concisely sets out the interest rate (14.7%) and the APR (15.9%). I think that that is satisfactory. I think the 14-day cooling-off period was long enough for Mr and Mrs T to decide whether the cost of the loan was too high, and they had the opportunity to change their minds and to cancel the loan.

[...]

Conclusion

In conclusion, as things currently stand, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with the relevant section 75 claim, and if I put the issue of commission to one side for the time being, I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mr and Mrs T under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA – nor do I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My addendum provisional decision

At the time of my provisional decision I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint.

Applying the principles and factors set out in the Supreme Court judgment² handed down on 1 August 2025, I found nothing to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr and Mrs T. Nor did I see anything that persuaded me that the commission arrangements between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate which led Mr and Mrs T into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

Further, the flat rate and amount of commission paid was such that it gave me no reason to think that any failure to disclose it to Mr and Mrs T had a material impact on their decision to enter into the Credit Agreement. At £818:80, it was only 8% of the amount borrowed and not much more than that (8.69%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. That didn't strike me as disproportionate; nor were the surrounding circumstances otherwise capable of rendering

² *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ("*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*").

unfair the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs T such that the Lender needed to take any action in redress.

I didn't find any of the other arguments put forward demonstrated that the credit agreement between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender was unfair to them under section 140A of the CCA. Absent any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs T, I said I didn't propose to uphold the complaint.

Responses to my provisional findings

The Lender accepted my provisional decision. The PR didn't accept the proposed outcome. It made further submissions in support of Mr and Mrs T's position. Having received and reviewed these, I'm now proceeding with my final decision.

In doing so, I'm conscious that the PR has made a series of assertions surrounding the provision of information relating to commission arrangements. These include, among other things, expressing doubt that the Lender has provided key information, requesting that the information we have received be shared with it in full, and asking that we do not proceed with a decision before this is done and it has had an opportunity to make further submissions.

The PR's requests have been addressed by us under separate correspondence. For reasons I will explain in the course of this decision, I've concluded that it's appropriate for me to proceed with my determination.

The legal and regulatory context

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint has been shared in several hundred published decisions on very similar complaints, as well as in previous correspondence with the parties. So there's no need for me to set this out again in detail here. I simply remind the parties that our rules³ say that in considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I will take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

After considering the case afresh and having regard for what's been said in response to my provisional decision and in my subsequent correspondence, I find it offers no persuasive reason to depart from the conclusions I've previously set out. I'll explain why.

The PR's response to my provisional decision relates mainly to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender was unfair *per* section 140A of the CCA. In particular, the PR has provided more comment in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr and Mrs T as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also made further submissions in support of its position that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship between the Lender and Mr and Mrs T. It reiterated what it had said about breaches of contract and misrepresentation. And it has repeated and elaborated on the allegations about failing to carry out affordability checks,

³ Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") Handbook – DISP 3.6.4R ("R" denotes a rule).

not giving Mr and Mrs T enough time to read the sales documentation, high interest, and high pressure sales tactics. In particular, the PR argued that the Supplier hadn't needed to sell Mr and Mrs T Fractional Club membership as a way of getting out of their existing timeshare, because the Supplier had a policy of allowing customers to get out of their indefinite timeshare on payment of a relinquishment fee. That fee was cheaper than what they paid for their fractional points.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The PR has questioned whether my provisional conclusions run contrary to precedent decisions issued by my ombudsman colleagues and the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*. I don't believe they do. However, for the avoidance of doubt, other decisions issued by other ombudsmen do not have a precedent effect like some court judgments might, and each ombudsman must determine each case on its own specific facts. Further, the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all products of the type Mr and Mrs T purchased were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting.

I remind the PR that in my provisional decision I accepted the possibility that Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold to Mr and Mrs T as an investment, in breach of regulation 14(3). I went on to explain that relevant case law⁴ indicates that in considering the question of relief for any resultant unfairness in the credit relationship, I needed to take into account any material impact of such a breach on Mr and Mrs T's decision whether to enter into the Purchase and Credit Agreements. It doesn't strike me that doing so flies in the face of either the handed down judgment or previous decisions the PR has mentioned.

While the PR has referred me to Mr and Mrs T's recollections and the Supplier's training materials, I have already considered these and what was said. And I set out in my provisional decision the reasons why I didn't find that evidence sufficiently persuasive that Mr and Mrs T's purchase decision would have been any different, given the other motivational factors they had described. Having re-examined Mr and Mrs T's statement that remains my view, for the reasons previously given.

So as I said before, whether or not the Supplier marketed or sold Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3), I'm not persuaded Mr and Mrs T's decision to make the purchase was materially impacted by the prospect of a financial gain. It follows that I find the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender was not rendered unfair to them for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR has asked for the documents the lender has provided to us to show the commission arrangements. While I appreciate the PR would like to have full disclosure of all of the documents and information the Lender has provided, our rules do not require me to provide this when dealing with a complaint.

As the PR has been informed, under DISP 3.5.9R I may, where I consider it appropriate, accept information in confidence (so that only an edited version, summary or description is disclosed to the other party). That is what I have done in my provisional decision. I'm satisfied that agreements between the Lender and the Supplier are commercially sensitive and that the summary information on commission arrangements we've already shared with the PR is appropriate in this case.

⁴ *Carney and Kerrigan*.

I see no reason to find that this prejudices any arguments the PR or Mr and Mrs T are able to make in support of Mr and Mrs T's position. The PR has demonstrated its ability to present Mr and Mrs T's case and has had sufficient time to consider and make any further arguments.

As I've noted, the PR has disagreed with my provisional conclusions on whether the Lender should pay redress because of an unfair credit relationship arising in connection with commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier. The PR says, in summary, that when the overall circumstances of those arrangements are considered in the round, the credit relationship was plainly unfair. In support of this position the PR has expressed, among other things, that:

- The provisional decision doesn't properly apply the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, which concluded a range of factors informed whether a credit relationship between a consumer and a lender was unfair;
- A conflict of interest existed on the part of the Supplier, who provided neither independent nor competent explanation of the credit;
- Failure to disclose payment of commission – irrespective of the size of any payment – was a regulatory breach that goes to the heart of fairness.

I appreciate the time the PR has taken to put together its submissions on behalf of Mr and Mrs T. But I don't find what it has said offers persuasive grounds for me to reach a different conclusion on this issue.

I've previously set out my thoughts on any impact the Supreme Court's conclusions in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* has on Mr and Mrs T's arguments that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

The PR's response doesn't offer anything that leads me to think that, for the most part, any of the factors it has referenced were in fact at play in Mr and Mrs T's case. It hasn't, for example, provided evidence to show the existence of commercial or contractual ties that were concealed from Mr and Mrs T, any persuasive reasons to conclude that the Supplier's role was that of advisor to Mr and Mrs T, or to show that any other conflict of interest arose from the roles the Supplier did perform.

For such a claim to be successful would require more than the bare assertions that have been made in this case. I'm not persuaded that it is sufficient, as the PR seems to contend, simply to suggest unsubstantiated allegations of fact and require that the Lender disprove them or else the credit relationship be deemed unfair. This issue was considered in the judgment in *Promontoria (Henrico) Ltd v. Gurcharn Samra* [2019] EWHC 2327 (Ch) ("*Samra*"), where HHJ David Cooke held (at paragraph 26):

"...the onus is on the claimant⁵ to show, to the normal civil standard, that the relationship is not unfair because of any of the reasons set out in s 140A(1)(a)-(c). Whether it is so unfair is a matter for the court's overall judgment having regard to all the relevant circumstances and matters, including matters relating (i.e. personal) to the creditor and debtor. This onus on the claimant does not however mean, in my judgement...that where Mr Samra⁶ makes allegations of

⁵ In this case the creditor answering a claim of an unfair credit relationship arising out of an overdraft facility.

⁶ In this case the borrower making an allegation that there was an unfair credit relationship.

fact on which he relies he does not have the burden of proving them to the normal civil standard. The onus placed on the creditor is as to the relationship between it and the debtor, and does not have the effect that factual allegations made by Mr Samra must be accepted unless they can be positively disproved by contrary evidence.”⁷

I'm satisfied the Lender has provided sufficient information in response to my enquiries to enable me to reach a conclusion about its commission arrangements with the Supplier. I've seen nothing in this case that leads me to think what the Lender has said about the commission arrangements is inaccurate. So there's no reason for me to reach a different finding over those commission arrangements.

In its correspondence the PR has emphasised the regulatory breaches connected with a failure to disclose commission payment. I have already set out why in my view this doesn't automatically lead to an unfair credit relationship for which the Lender needs to offer redress. While I've considered all that the PR has submitted, I remain of that view.

Other causes of unfairness

I still haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender, or that the loan was unaffordable.

I think that the interest rate, the APR, the total charge for credit, and the total amount repayable were clearly presented on page 1 of the loan agreement, so Mr and Mrs T was told about them when they signed it. Furthermore, the 14-day cooling-off period gave them plenty of time and opportunity to go over the terms of the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement, and to consider whether they were suitable for them, and to cancel them if they chose to. And I remain of the view that the 14-day cooling-off period cures any unfairness that might otherwise have resulted from any high pressure sales tactics.

I have considered the PR's argument about the possibility of Mr and Mrs T paying a relinquishment fee to exit their original, indefinite timeshare, instead of buying a fractional timeshare of a fixed duration. The fee was certainly cheaper than the points. But that argument ignores the fact that Mr and Mrs T were still interested in holidays. They didn't want to stop having a timeshare right away, they just wanted to be able to get out of a timeshare one day, and in the meantime they still wanted to go on holidays at the Supplier's resorts. So I'm not satisfied that they would have just paid the relinquishment fee and stopped having a timeshare if that option had been offered to them (assuming it wasn't offered, about which I make no finding one way or the other).

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I remain unpersuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs T and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them such that it warrants the Lender offering any redress.

⁷ I further note that in *Wilson v Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd t/a Barclays Partner Finance* [2021] (unreported), the court also took the view that the burden is on the debtor to prove on the balance of probabilities *the facts* that purportedly create the unfairness. It is then that the lender's burden of proof that requires it to prove *the relationship* was not unfair kicks in. While I do not suggest this offers legal precedent, the subject matter of that case was a fractional timeshare sale, and given the similarities seems to me an appropriate approach when considering the facts in this case.

Commission: The alternative grounds of complaint

In my previous correspondence I mentioned that some of the grounds for complaint about the fairness or otherwise of the credit relationship could also constitute separate and freestanding complaints. I'll reiterate my findings here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr and Mrs T (that is, secretly). The second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

For the reasons I set out previously, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr and Mrs T a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint. For the reasons I have also previously set out, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Section 75 of the CCA: misrepresentation and breach of contract

I haven't seen anything which changes my mind about my earlier findings regarding the allegations of misrepresentation and breach of contract. For the reasons I gave in my earlier decision, I do not think the Lender was obliged to uphold Mr and Mrs T's section 75 claim.

Conclusion

After careful reconsideration of the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I adopt my provisional conclusions as part of my final decision. For the reasons I've given above and in my earlier correspondence I've mentioned, I don't think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs T's section 75 claim. And I'm not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mr and Mrs T that was unfair to them for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA. Having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable for me to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs T.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, my final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr T and Mrs T to accept or reject my decision before 12 March 2026.

Richard Wood
Ombudsman