

The complaint

Mrs T's and Mr T's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mrs T and Mr T were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') having purchased a product that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 18 August 2015 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier (the 'Purchase Agreement') to buy 1500 fractional points at a cost of £19,049.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs T and Mr T more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mrs T and Mr T for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £19,049 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mrs T and Mr T – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 8 February 2022 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mrs T's and Mr T's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter, rejecting it on very ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs T and Mr T disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'), the findings from which are set out below.

"I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords

consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs T and Mr T were:

1. *Told that they had purchased an investment that would “considerably appreciate in value”.*
2. *Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.*
3. *Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.*
4. *Made to believe that they would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round.*

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier’s sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn’t any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for points 3 and 4, while it’s possible that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don’t think it’s probable. They’re given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn’t any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for these reasons, I don’t think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mrs T and Mr T and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionable misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit

relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. *The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
2. *The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
3. *Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;*
4. *The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant*
5. *Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs T's and Mr T's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs T and Mr T. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs T and Mr T was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs T and Mr T.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs T and Mr T knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs T and Mr T suffering a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs T and Mr T in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs T's and Mr T's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons set out above and referred to in the Letter of Complaint. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of the prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's potential breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs T and Mr T's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs T and Mr T were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs T and Mr T the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs T and Mr T as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs T and Mr T, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs T and Mr T as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) as they

have alleged.

However, whether, or not, there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

The PR has provided a signed statement from Mrs T and Mr T dated 9 December 2016. Given this was just over a year from when they purchased Fractional Club membership I think it is likely to accurately reflect their recollection of what happened at the Time of Sale.

Mrs T and Mr T say the following about the circumstances behind their purchase of Fractional Club membership:

"We had one or two representatives with us thought (sic) out the day, the representatives created a scenario where our budget translated into 3 holidays (of the same or better standard of what we were shown and receiving at its resort in Spain) per year, and that after 17 years it would then sell the property and release our fractional ownership it, we would then receive a sum of money from the sale, the amount would be reliant on the value of the property at the time of sale.

We were with the sales team for an entire day, constantly being reassured/convinced that the option available to us was a good decision for our future family holidays, how our family would benefit from it over the next 17 years, that we would not be able to holiday to the same standard in the future if we did not purchase timeshare and that it was affordable for our family."

Mrs T and Mr T being told that they would receive a sum of money from the sale with the amount being determined by the value of the property at that time simply informed them of how Fractional Club membership worked. There is nothing in what they have said that suggests that the reason they purchased membership was because they expected to make some gain or profit on sale of the Allocated Property at the end of membership. To the contrary, when read as a whole, there is a clear impression in my view that the reason they went head was because of the holidays they could have.

My finding that the prospect of a gain or profit wasn't a motivating factor in Mrs T's and Mr T's decision to purchase membership doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs T and Mr T themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a

profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs T and Mr T's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether, or not, there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The Supplier's breach of Spanish Law and its implications on the Credit Agreement.

In its letter to the Lender of 8 February the PR argued that because Mrs T and Mr T obtained judgment against the Supplier in a Spanish Court which declared the Purchase Agreement a nullity they had the right to rescind the Credit Agreement and it should be treated as such. The PR – in keeping with the judgment of the UK's Supreme Court in Durkin v DSG Retail [2014] UKSC 21 ('Durkin').

However, as the Lender hasn't been party to any court proceedings in Spain, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement is valid under English law for the purposes of Durkin.

I also note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn't at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in Diamond Resorts Europe and Others (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that, because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR in its letter.

Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason."

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs T's and Mr T's Section 75 claims and was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs T and Mr T under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The Lender didn't respond to the PD. The PR did respond and explained why they didn't accept the PD, providing some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered, including a new allegation that the payment of commission by the Lender to the Supplier made the credit relationship unfair. I wrote to both parties explaining why I didn't think the credit relationship was unfair because of any commission arrangement between the Lender and Supplier. I gave the parties the opportunity to respond but neither party provided any further comment on this.

Having given the parties the opportunity of responding to my PD, I am now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. But I would add that the following rules/guidance are also relevant.

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs T and Mr T as an investment at the Time of Sale. They've also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship, as I said above.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn't make any further comments in relation to those in

their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven't said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

As I explained in my PD, Mrs T's and Mr T's evidence that they were told they would receive a sum of money with the amount being dependant on the value of the Allocated Property at time of sale simply informed them of how Fractional Club membership worked. And there was nothing in what they said that suggested they purchased membership because of some gain or profit they might make on sale of the property at the end of membership.

The PR suggests that Mrs T and Mr T saying they were told they would get a sum of money when the Allocated Property was sold that depended on the sale value falls squarely within the definition of 'investment', but I don't agree. As I said in my PD, by reference to the decided authorities and for the purposes of this decision, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. There is nothing in what Mrs T and Mr T said that in my view can reasonably be seen as suggesting that they purchased Fractional Club membership in the hope they might make some gain or profit on sale of the Allocated Property. And nothing that the PR has said in response to my PD persuades me this was a motivating reason for their purchase.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my PD, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I'm not persuaded Mrs T's and Mr T's decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mrs T and Mr T and the Lender was unfair to them for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

In response to the PD the PR has raised a new argument that wasn't raised before. The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. I wrote to both parties setting out what I thought about this issue and I repeat what I said below.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 ('Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench')*.

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest

assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471*, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair” (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’).

But I don’t think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs T and Mr T in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

Based on what I’ve seen, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs T and Mr T but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs T and Mr T, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs T and Mr T into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, no payment between the Lender and the Supplier, such as a commission, was payable when the Credit Agreement was arranged at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not persuaded that the commercial arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs T and Mr T.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs T's and Mr T's Section 75 claims and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs T and Mr T under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I can see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

I don't uphold this complaint for the reasons set out above.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs T and Mr T to accept or reject my decision before 28 January 2026.

Philip Gibbons
Ombudsman