

The complaint

Mrs H's complaint is that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA'), and (2) deciding against paying her claims under section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mrs H and her husband ('Mr H') purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – purchasing the following number of fractional points on the dates below:

- 1,380 fractional points on 12 June 2014 for £19,849, after trading in their trial membership ('Purchase Agreement 1');
- 1,700 fractional points on 27 May 2015 for £5,346 – having traded in the first lot of 1,380 fractional points ('Purchase Agreement 2');

(which, when appropriate, I'll simply refer to as the 'Purchase Agreements').

Those dates are referred to as the 'Times of Sale' for the purposes of my decision.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs H more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the relevant purchase agreement (which I'll refer to as the 'Allocated Property 1 and 2' or, when appropriate, the 'Allocated Properties') after their membership term ends.

Mrs H paid for their fractional points by taking the following amounts of finance from the Lender:

- £21,067 on 12 June 2014 ('Credit Agreement 1');
- £26,862 on 27 May 2015 ('Credit Agreement 2');

(which, when appropriate, I'll simply refer to as the 'Credit Agreements').

Credit Agreement 1 consolidated an earlier loan from a different lender (which had financed Mr and Mrs H's purchase of their trial membership). This loan was in turn consolidated by Credit Agreement 2.¹

Mrs H – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 13 February 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

¹ Because Mr H was not a party to the Credit Agreements, he is not an eligible complainant under our rules.

The Lender dealt with Mrs H's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 15 September 2023, rejecting it on every ground.

Meanwhile, the complaint had been referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was later assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, decided that much of Mrs H's complaint had been brought too late. He rejected the rest of her complaint on its merits.

Mrs H disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me. I wrote a provisional decision which read as follows.

What I've provisionally decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Time limits

I will begin with my jurisdiction to consider this complaint.

Our jurisdiction is set out in rules made by the Financial Conduct Authority. These rules include time limits on bringing a complaint to our Service. These say we can normally only consider a complaint if it was made within six years of the event complained of, or (if later) within three years from the date on which the complainant became aware "*or ought reasonably to have become aware*" that he had cause for complaint. We can still consider a late complaint if it was late as a result of exceptional circumstances.

For the purposes of a claim under section 140A of the CCA, the time under the six-year time limit begins to run when the credit relationship between the debtor and the creditor ends. Credit Agreement 2 was settled in November 2020, which means that Mrs H complained about it in good time. But Credit Agreement 1 was settled in May 2015, more than six years before she complained in February 2023, so Mrs H's complaint about that has been brought too late. I also think that she ought to have realised she had cause to complain more than three years before she complained. So I'm satisfied that that part of her complaint is out of my jurisdiction. However, I can still take into account evidence about what happened at the Time of Sale in 2014 for the purposes of considering Mrs H's complaint about Credit Agreement 2, for reasons I will come to later.

The position as to jurisdiction is different when it comes to claims under section 75. For the purposes of my jurisdiction, time runs not from when the Credit Agreements were entered into or from the alleged misrepresentations, but from when the Lender rejected Mrs H's claims under that section, which was not until 2023. So I'm satisfied that I do have jurisdiction to consider her complaint about that.

However, time under the Limitation Act 1980 generally runs from the Time of Sale. Under section 32 of that Act, time can be treated as beginning to run later if material facts have been deliberately concealed from Mrs H, but for reasons I will come to later, I do not think that is the case here. So I agree with the Lender that Mrs H's section 75 claims were brought

out of time, and that this gives the Lender a complete defence to her claims under that section. I therefore do not uphold her complaint about the Lender's response to her section 75 claims.

I can however still consider the alleged misrepresentations (but not the alleged breaches of contract) as potential grounds for finding unfairness under section 140A. So I turn to that next.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationships between Mrs H and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Times of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Times of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Times of Sale; and
4. The inherent probabilities of the sales given their circumstances.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender.

The effect of sections 140A(1) and 140C(4)(a) and (7) is that any unfairness in the credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender under Credit Agreement 1 can be taken into account when assessing the fairness of the subsequent credit relationship arising under Credit Agreement 2, because the second loan consolidated the first loan and the Lender was the creditor under both loans. So I can still take into account evidence of what happened at the 2014 Time of Sale.²

The Supplier's alleged misrepresentations at the Times of Sale

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Times of Sale because Mr³ and Mrs H were told by the Supplier:

- (1) that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true;
- (2) that they were buying an interest in a specific piece of "real property" when that was not true;
- (3) that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that was not true.

The words and/or phrases allegedly used by the Supplier to misrepresent the Fractional Club for the reason given in point 1 were set out by the PR in the Letter of Complaint, and they were limited to: "*the Fractional Property Ownership Scheme had a guaranteed end*

² However, this does not apply to the sale of the trial membership, because that purchase was financed by a different lender (see section 140C(7)).

³ A credit relationship can be unfair under section 140A because of things done or said to a party to the related purchase agreement, which includes Mr H. (See sections 19 and 140C(4)(b).)

date, specifically after 19 years, after which the clients would have no further legal liability to [the Supplier] under or in respect of the Scheme.”

The PR says that such a representation was untrue because the Sales Process begins on the Sale Date as defined in the Fractional Club Rules, and under Rule 9, particularly Rules 9.2.9 and 9.2.12, there is no guarantee that any sale will result at all, leaving prospective members to pay their annual management charge for an indefinite and unspecified period.

However, I cannot see why the phrase above would have been untrue at the Time of Sale even if it was said. It seems to me to reflect the main thrust of the contracts Mr and Mrs H entered into. And while, under Rules 9.1 and 9.2.9 of the relevant Fractional Club Rules, the sale of the Allocated Properties could be postponed for up to two years by the ‘Vendor’,⁴ longer than that if there were problems selling and the ‘Owners’⁵ agreed, or for an otherwise specified period provided there was unanimous agreement in writing from the Owners, that does not render the representation above untrue. So, I am not persuaded that the representation above constituted a false statement of fact even if it was made.

As for points 2 and 3, neither of them strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue – nor was it untrue to tell prospective members that they would receive some money when the allocated property is sold. After all, a share in an allocated property was clearly the purchase of a share of the net sale proceeds of a specific property in a specific resort. And while the PR might question the exact legal mechanism used to give prospective members that interest, it did not change the fact that they acquired such an interest.

So, while I recognise that Mrs H – and the PR – have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular section 75 claim.

The Supplier’s sales and marketing practices at the Times of Sale

Mrs H’s complaint about the Lender being party to unfair credit relationships was and is made for several reasons.

They include, for various reasons, the allegation that the Supplier misled Mr and Mrs H and carried on unfair commercial practices under regulations 5 and 6 of the CPUT Regulations.⁶ However, as regulations 5 and 6 state, commercial practices only amount to misleading actions or omissions if, in addition to satisfying one or more of the specific matters set out in those provisions, they cause or are likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not have taken otherwise. And as I haven’t seen enough evidence to persuade me that, if there were any such actions or omissions at the Times of Sale (which I make no formal finding on), they led Mr and Mrs H to make the purchasing decisions they did, I’m not persuaded that anything done or not done by the Supplier amounted to an unfair commercial practice for the purposes of those provisions.

⁴ Defined in the FPOC Rules as “CLC Resort Developments Limited”.

⁵ Defined in the FPOC Rules as “a purchaser who has entered into a Purchase Agreement and has been issued with a Fractional Rights Certificate (which shall include the Vendor for such period of time until the maximum number of Fractional Rights have been acquired).”

⁶ The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.

The PR also alleges that the Supplier acted unfairly under regulation 7 Schedule 1 of the CPUT Regulations. But given the limited evidence in this complaint, I am not persuaded that the Supplier did.

In addition, the PR also says that:

1. the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs H;
2. Mr and Mrs H were pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Times of Sale;
3. there was one, or more, unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreements.

However, as things currently stand, none of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs H was actually unaffordable before also concluding that she lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs H. Her gross income was £90,000 a year, and her highest loan repayments were £331:39 a month, or 4.4% of her income.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs H may have felt weary after sales processes that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentations that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. Moreover, they did go on to upgrade their first purchase – which I find difficult to understand if the reason they went ahead with the purchase in question was because they were pressured into it. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs H made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreements, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs H in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs H's credit relationships with the Lender were rendered unfair to her under section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason why the PR now says the credit relationships with the Lender were unfair to her. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her and her husband as an investment in breach of a prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs H's Fractional Club memberships met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Times of Sale:

“A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.”

But the PR and Mr and Mrs H say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Times of Sale – saying, in summary, that they were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Properties clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs H the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs H as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Times of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs H, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Properties along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs H as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs H rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Times of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationships between Mrs H and the Lender under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements, as the case law on section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, then an important consideration is whether the Supplier's breach of regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreements and the Credit Agreements.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr and Mrs H decided to go ahead with their purchases. In connection with their 2014 purchase, they said they were told that Allocated Property 1:

"...would be sold, after 19 years, and the proceeds of sale split between the owners. [We] were told that it was an investment, whereby [we] would get money back, at the end, and possibly make a profit, because property prices always tend to go up."

They went on to say:

"As an incentive to purchase, and take out finance, [we] were offered a free week's holiday in Tenerife, as well as a "Travel Savings Bonus" of £144.00 per month, for 10 months.

[We] did not accept the first deal put in front of [us], at which point the salesman went away and returned with his Manager, who presented [us] with a "special deal", but which had to be taken that day."

I think that first paragraph has to be read not on its own but in the context of the whole description overall. And taken together, these paragraphs suggest a reluctance to purchase which was only overcome by further deals and discounts, rather than an enthusiasm for the prospect of a financial return 19 years later.

That doesn't mean Mr and Mrs H weren't interested in a share in Allocated Property 1. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the products at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs H themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

As for their 2015 purchase, they don't mention the prospect of a financial return at all.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs H's decisions to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Times of Sale were motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchases in 2014 and 2015 whether or not there had been a breach of regulation 14(3). And for that

reason, I do not think the second credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender was unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Times of Sale

The PR says that Mr and Mrs H were not given sufficient information at the Times of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr and Mrs H sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr and Mrs H nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchases had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its facts and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreements, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs H in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

[...]

Conclusion

In conclusion, as things currently stand, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with the relevant section 75 claims, and if I put the issue of commission to one side for the time being, I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs H under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA – nor do I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

My addendum provisional decision

At the time of my provisional decision I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint.

Applying the principles and factors set out in the Supreme Court judgment⁷ handed down on 1 August 2025, I found nothing to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs H. Nor

⁷ *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ("*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*").

did I see anything that persuaded me that the commission arrangements between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate which led Mrs H into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

Further, the flat rate and amount of commission paid were such that they gave me no reason to think that any failure to disclose it to Mrs H had a material impact on her decision to enter into the Credit Agreement. At £2,106:70, it was only 10% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (5.46%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. That didn't strike me as disproportionate; nor were the surrounding circumstances otherwise capable of rendering unfair the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs H such that the Lender needed to take any action in redress.

I didn't find any of the other arguments put forward demonstrated that the credit agreement between Mrs H and the Lender was unfair to her under section 140A of the CCA. Absent any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs H, I said I didn't propose to uphold the complaint.

Responses to my provisional findings

The Lender accepted my provisional decision. The PR didn't accept the proposed outcome. It made further submissions in support of Mrs H's position. Having received and reviewed these, I'm now proceeding with my final decision.

In doing so, I'm conscious that the PR has made a series of assertions surrounding the provision of information relating to commission arrangements. These include, among other things, expressing doubt that the Lender has provided key information, requesting that the information we have received be shared with it in full, and asking that we do not proceed with a decision before this is done and it has had an opportunity to make further submissions.

For reasons I will explain in the course of this decision, I've concluded that it's appropriate for me to proceed with my determination, the PR's submissions notwithstanding.

The legal and regulatory context

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint has been shared in several hundred published decisions on very similar complaints, as well as in previous correspondence with the parties. So there's no need for me to set this out again in detail here. I simply remind the parties that our rules⁸ say that in considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I will take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

What I've decided – and why

I've reconsidered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

After considering the case afresh and having regard for what's been said in response to my provisional decision and in my subsequent correspondence, I find it offers no persuasive reason to depart from the conclusions I've previously set out. I'll explain why.

⁸ Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") Handbook – DISP 3.6.4R ("R" denotes a rule).

The PR originally raised various points of complaint, such as those giving rise to Mrs H's section 75 claim, which I addressed in my provisional decision. In its response, it hasn't made any further comments in relation to most of its original points, or said anything that leads me to think it disagrees with my provisional conclusions in relation to those points. So I'll focus here on the points the PR *has* made in response.

The PR's response to my provisional decision relates mainly to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender was unfair *per* section 140A of the CCA. In particular, the PR has provided more comment in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs H as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also made further submissions in support of its position that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs H. And it has repeated and elaborated on the allegations about failing to carry out affordability checks, about not giving Mrs H enough time to properly consider the loan documentation, and about high pressure sales tactics. It also argued that the complaint about the First Credit Agreement was not out of time and should be considered.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The PR has questioned whether my provisional conclusions run contrary to precedent decisions issued by my ombudsman colleagues and the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*. I don't believe they do. However, for the avoidance of doubt, other decisions issued by other ombudsmen do not have a precedent effect like some court judgments might, and each ombudsman must determine each case on its own specific facts. Further, the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all products of the type Mrs H purchased were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting.

I remind the PR that in my provisional decision I accepted the possibility that Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold to Mrs H as an investment, in breach of regulation 14(3). I went on to explain that relevant case law⁹ indicates that in considering the question of relief for any resultant unfairness in the credit relationship, I needed to take into account any material impact of such a breach on Mrs H's decision whether to enter into the Purchase and Credit Agreements. It doesn't strike me that doing so flies in the face of either *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*¹⁰ or previous decisions the PR has mentioned.

While the PR has referred me to Mrs H's recollections and the Supplier's training materials, I have already considered these and what was said. And I set out in my provisional decision the reasons why I didn't find that evidence sufficiently persuasive that Mrs H's purchase decision would have been any different, given the other motivational factors she had described. Having re-examined Mrs H's statement that remains my view, for the reasons previously given.

The PR has also said that Mrs H's investment "*has not materialised.*" However, given that she is only about half-way through her membership's 19-year term, I'm not sure what the PR was expecting to materialise, given that nothing happens until the Allocated Property is sold.

So as I said before, whether or not the Supplier marketed or sold Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3), I'm not persuaded Mrs H's decision to make the purchase was materially impacted by the prospect of a financial gain. It follows that I find the credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender was not rendered

⁹ *Carney and Kerrigan*.

¹⁰ Indeed, paragraph 185 of *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS* appears to endorse this approach.

unfair to her for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR has asked for the documents the lender has provided to show the commission arrangements. As the PR will be aware, under DISP 3.5.9R I may, where I consider it appropriate, accept information in confidence (so that only an edited version, summary or description is disclosed to the other party). I'm satisfied that agreements between the Lender and the Supplier are commercially sensitive and that the summary information on commission arrangements we've already shared with the PR is appropriate in this case.

While I appreciate that the PR would like to have full disclosure of all of the documents and information the Lender has provided, our rules do not require me to provide this when dealing with a complaint.

As I've noted, the PR has disagreed with my provisional conclusions on whether the Lender should pay redress because of an unfair credit relationship arising in connection with commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier. The PR says, in summary, that when the overall circumstances of those arrangements are considered in the round, the credit relationship was plainly unfair. In support of this position the PR has expressed, among other things, that:

- The provisional decision doesn't properly apply the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, which concluded a range of factors informed whether a credit relationship between a consumer and a lender was unfair
- A conflict of interest existed on the part of the Supplier, who provided neither independent nor competent explanation of the credit
- Failure to disclose payment of commission – irrespective of the size of any payment - was a regulatory breach that goes to the heart of fairness.

I appreciate the time the PR has taken to put together its submissions on behalf of Mrs H. But I don't find what it has said offers persuasive grounds for me to reach a different conclusion on this issue.

I've previously set out my thoughts on any impact the Supreme Court's conclusions in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* have on Mrs H's arguments that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

The PR's response doesn't offer anything that leads me to think that, for the most part, any of the factors it has referenced were in fact at play in Mrs H's case. It hasn't, for example, provided evidence to show the existence of commercial or contractual ties that were concealed from Mrs H, any persuasive reasons to conclude that the Supplier's role was that of advisor to Mrs H, or to show that any other conflict of interest arose from the roles the Supplier did perform.

For such a claim to be successful would require more than the bare assertions that have been made in this case.¹¹ I'm not persuaded that it is sufficient, as the PR seems to contend,

¹¹ In *Wilson v Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd t/a Barclays Partner Finance* [2021] (unreported), the court took the view that the burden is on the debtor to prove on the balance of probabilities *the facts* that purportedly create the unfairness. It is then that the lender's burden of proof that requires it to prove *the relationship was not unfair* kicks in. While not amounting to legal precedent, the similarity of

simply to suggest unsubstantiated allegations of fact and require that the Lender disprove them else the credit relationship be deemed unfair.

I'm satisfied the Lender has provided sufficient information in response to my enquiries to enable me to reach a conclusion about its commission arrangements with the Supplier. I've seen nothing in this case that leads me to think what the Lender has said about the commission arrangements is inaccurate. So there's no reason for me to reach a different finding over those commission arrangements.

In its correspondence the PR has emphasised the regulatory breaches connected with a failure to disclose commission payment. I have already set out why in my view this doesn't automatically lead to an unfair credit relationship for which the Lender needs to offer redress. While I've considered all that the PR has submitted, I remain of that view.

Other causes of unfairness

I still haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender, or that the loan was unaffordable. However, I have seen the loan application forms for both loans, which include information about Mrs H's income, employer and mortgage, so I think that she must have been asked questions about her finances at the Time of Sale.

Finally, I remain of the view that the 14-day cooling-off period cures any unfairness that might otherwise result from any high pressure sales tactics, as well as giving Mrs H enough time to read and think about the loan documentation.

Time limits

I have not changed my opinion that Mrs H's section 140A claim about Credit Agreement 1 was technically brought too late. But I also don't think that makes any difference anyway, because – as I said in my provisional decision – I was still able to take Credit Agreement 1 into account while considering Credit Agreement 2 which consolidated it, because of section 140C(7). And I specifically took Mrs H's evidence about it into account, and I quoted it at length. So she has not actually been disadvantaged by the FCA's jurisdiction rules.

Section 140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I remain unpersuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs H and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her such that it warrants the Lender offering any redress.

Commission: the alternative grounds of complaint

In my previous correspondence I mentioned that some of the grounds for complaint about the fairness or otherwise of the credit relationship could also constitute separate and freestanding complaints. I'll reiterate my findings here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs H (that is, secretly). The second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

the subject matter of that case suggests to me that it is reasonable to take the same approach when considering the facts in this case.

For the reasons I set out previously, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs H a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to her. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint. For the reasons I have also previously set out, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

After careful reconsideration of the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I adopt my provisional conclusions as part of my final decision. For the reasons I've given above and in my earlier correspondence I've mentioned, I don't think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs H's section 75 claims. And I'm not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs H that was unfair to her for the purposes of section 140A of the CCA. Having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable for me to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs H.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, my final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs H to accept or reject my decision before 10 February 2026.

Richard Wood
Ombudsman