

The complaint

Mr C complains that Revolut Ltd (Revolut) is refusing to refund him the amount he lost as the result of a scam.

Mr C is being represented by a third party. To keep things simple, I will refer to Mr C throughout my decision.

What happened

The background of this complaint is well known to all parties, so I won't repeat what happened in detail.

In summary, Mr C tells us he saw an advertisement for an investment company I will call X on social media which led him to be contacted by X where an investment opportunity was discussed.

Mr C initially invested a small amount which appeared to make a profit. Mr C was then convinced to invest more on the promise that he would be able to double his funds. But when it came to making a withdrawal, the funds were blocked, and Mr C was required to make further payments before his funds could be released.

Mr C made further payments but was still unable to make a withdrawal. Mr C was asked to make yet another payment and realised he had fallen victim to a scam.

What I can and can't look into in relation to this complaint

Our service can't consider all complaints that are referred to us. The rules under which we operate are set out in the Financial Conduct Authority's Handbook and are collectively known as the DISP rules. We can only consider complaints that fall within our jurisdiction, in line with these rules.

Particularly relevant to Mr C's complaint is DISP 2.2 which states:

"DISP 2.2: Which complaints can be dealt with under the Financial Ombudsman Service?

2.2.1 The scope of the Financial Ombudsman Service's two jurisdictions depends on:

(1) the type of activity to which the complaint relates..."

Those activities are then listed in DISP 2.3 (although I will not list all of them here). We can only consider complaints that relate to an act or omission by a financial business in carrying out one or more of the activities listed in DISP 2.3.

Cryptocurrency isn't electronic money or fiat currency according to the Financial Conduct Authority. Instead, it classifies cryptocurrency, and similar cryptocurrency-assets, as 'exchange tokens'. The operation of cryptocurrency services isn't currently regulated by the financial regulator in the UK.

There are no activities listed in DISP 2.3 which would cover the activity this part of Mr C's complaint relates to – namely, withdrawing the cryptocurrency and sending it on to the scammer. And so, I don't think his complaint in relation to the cryptocurrency payment relates to an activity covered by us.

I am mindful that Mr C deposited fiat currency to his Revolut account and then exchanged this into the cryptocurrency which was withdrawn and ultimately lost to the scam. But the sending of the cryptocurrency was provided separately from the provision of Mr C's main e-money account. In the circumstances, I don't consider Revolut's provision of sending cryptocurrency services to be sufficiently closely linked to its provision of payment services to Mr C (through the provision of his e-money account) that it should be deemed ancillary to this. So, I'm satisfied that this service is unable to investigate the withdrawal of cryptocurrency here.

What I can look at, is whether Revolut should have intervened when the deposits into Mr C's account were made, and the payments made directly to a cryptocurrency exchange.

Mr C has disputed the following payments made in relation to the scam from his Revolut account:

Payment	Date	Payee	Payment Method	Amount
1	1 October 2024	Attila Seres	Transfer	€4,410
2	7 October 2024	Binance	Debit Card	€1,000
3	7 October 2024	Binance	Debit Card	€1,570
4	8 October 2024	-	Crypto Withdrawal	1.00ETH
5	8 October 2024	MoonPay	Debit Card	€500

Our Investigator considered Mr C's complaint and didn't think it should be upheld. Mr C didn't agree, so this complaint has been passed to me to decide.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Recovering the payments Mr C made

Mr C made payments in relation to the scam via Transfer, Debit card and a Cryptocurrency withdrawal. As I've explained above the cryptocurrency withdrawal is outside of the scope of our service, so I am unable to consider it here.

When payments are made by transfer Revolut has limited options available to it to seek recovery. I can see that Revolut did contact the operator of the receiving account but did not get a response.

The payments Mr C made by debit card were made to a legitimate cryptocurrency exchange, likely in exchange for cryptocurrency that was provided to him. As it took further steps for those funds to end up in the hands of the scammer any attempt to recover those payments would have no prospects of success.

Should Revolut have reasonably prevented the payments Mr C made?

It has been accepted that Mr C authorised the payments that were made from his account with Revolut, albeit on X's instruction. So, the starting point here is that Mr C is responsible.

However, banks and other Payment Services Providers (PSPs) do have a duty to protect against the risk of financial loss due to fraud and/or to undertake due diligence on large transactions to guard against money laundering.

The question here is whether Revolut should have been aware of the scam and intervened when Mr C made the payments. And if it had intervened, would it have been able to prevent the scam taking place.

Deposits

In general, I wouldn't expect Revolut to have concerns about deposits being made into a customer's account and interventions to take place Unless they had money-laundering concerns which it didn't have in on this occasion. So, I don't think it was unreasonable that Revolut didn't intervene when payments were made into Mr C's account.

The first payment Mr C made in relation to the scam did not carry an increased risk as it was not identifiably in relation to a higher risk payee such as a cryptocurrency exchange, and it was not of such a significant value. So, I don't think Revolut should have had concerns that Mr C may have been at risk of financial harm when this payment was made, or that it should have intervened.

The remaining payments were made directly to cryptocurrency exchanges. These types of payments do carry a higher risk; however, the payments were not so significant in value that I think Revolut should have had concern's that Mr C could have been at risk of financial harm.

In any event I can see that Revolut did intervene on several occasions.

When Mr C made payment 1 Revolut intervened, and Mr C was provided with several screens. Mr C was warned that the transaction was a potential scam, and it was important that he provided honest information.

Mr C then confirmed that:

- He was not being pressured to make the payment and was making it by himself
- He was not being told to ignore warnings
- He was making the payment to a family member or friend
- He had never paid the person before
- The payee details had been provided face to face

When Mr C made payment 2 using his debit card Revolut intervened again and Mr C was required to provide further information. Mr C confirmed he was making the payment to another account of his to invest.

Mr C was then provided with several warnings that were relevant to the answers he had provided, they stated:

- "This could be a crypto scam – STOP. Crypto scams promise high returns in short periods of time, and might even have professional-looking online platforms"
- "Beware of social media promotions – Fraudsters use social media to promote fake investment opportunities. Read online reviews to make sure it's legitimate"
- "Don't give anyone remote access"

In addition to the above Mr C has also told us that when Revolut intervened X guided him through how to answer the questions for the payments to be processed.

So even though I don't think Revolut needed to intervene when the payments were made it's clear that when it did Mr C was willing to provide dishonest information and ignore clear relevant warnings having been guided by the scammer.

Providing incorrect information made it very difficult for Revolut to uncover the scam that was taking place, so even if Revolut did intervene further than it did (which I don't think it needed to), I don't have enough to say that Mr C would have provided any more honest answers than he had done previously.

With the above in mind, I don't think Revolut missed an opportunity to prevent the scam and it is not responsible for Mr C's loss.

My final decision

I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 29 December 2025.

Terry Woodham
Ombudsman