

The complaint

Mrs C complains Shawbrook Bank Limited (the “Lender”) has failed to honour a claim under Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (the “CCA”) and has participated in an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the CCA.

Mrs C is represented in her complaint by a professional representative (“PR”).

What happened

I issued a provisional decision on Mrs C’s complaint on 1 October 2025, in which I set out the background to the matter and my provisional findings on it. A copy of that provisional decision is attached to, and forms part of, this final decision.¹ For that reason, it’s not necessary to go over all the details again, but to summarise very briefly:

- Mrs C bought a type of asset-backed timeshare (the “Purchase Agreement”) from a timeshare provider (the “Supplier”) on 11 July 2018 (the “Time of Sale”). The purchase was financed by a loan (the “Credit Agreement”) from the Lender.
- Mrs C later complained to the Lender via PR, in March 2022, that the timeshare and associated loan had been mis-sold, seeking to hold the Lender responsible under Section 75 and 140A of the CCA.

In my provisional decision, I didn’t think the complaint should be upheld, and reached the following general conclusions (the more detailed reasoning can be found in the appended document):

- There was insufficient evidence the timeshare had been misrepresented as Mrs C had alleged. Some of the alleged misrepresentations seemed to be no more than statements of honestly held opinion, while the rest of the allegations were vague and lacked colour and context.
- The credit relationship between Mrs C and the Lender had not been rendered unfair to her by any of the matters she had mentioned. These included allegedly deficient creditworthiness checks, the Supplier having pressured her into the purchase, and the Supplier having improperly marketed and sold the timeshare as an investment.
 - Regarding the matter of the Supplier’s alleged improper selling of the product as an investment, I had concluded that a witness statement Mrs C had supplied much later, after certain events which could have influenced her recollections had occurred, was not evidence I could attach sufficient weight to when forming an opinion as to the Supplier’s actions or of Mrs C’s motivations at the Time of Sale.

I asked the parties to the complaint to comment before I made my decision final. The Lender

¹ There was a formatting error in the original provisional decision which has been corrected here. However, the content remains the same.

didn't respond. PR responded to say Mrs C disagreed with the provisional decision. I could summarise its points as follows:

- Mrs C's witness statement could not have been influenced by the events I'd referred to. These events had been our Investigator sending an unfavourable assessment of the complaint, and the court cases of *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd* and *R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin)* ("*Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*"). PR said this was because Mrs C had never seen the Investigator's assessment and had been unaware of the court cases. The witness statement was therefore a credible and genuine set of recollections.
- Mrs C had recalled the Supplier selling the timeshare as an investment and that this had played an important part in her purchasing decision. An unfair credit relationship was the result.
- The Lender had paid the Supplier a commission for arranging the Credit Agreement, which had not been properly disclosed to Mrs C, which was an additional source of unfairness.
- There were ambiguities in the Purchase Agreement and the certificate Mrs C received to show ownership of her timeshare, as to the date on which the membership would end and the underlying asset sold. This was another source of unfairness.

The case has now been returned to me to decide.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ("CONC") – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the "FCA") Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3R
- CONC 4.5.3R
- CONC 4.5.2G

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the

Principles for Businesses (“PRIN”). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I’ve decided – and why

I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I’ve considered the case afresh and having done so, I’ve reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn’t to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it.

Rather, I’ve focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

PR’s further comments in response to the provisional decision relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs C and the Lender was unfair. In particular, PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs C as an investment at the Time of Sale. PR has also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my provisional decision, PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn’t make any further comments in relation to those in their response to that decision. Indeed, it hasn’t said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven’t been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my provisional decision. So, I’ll focus here on PR’s points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

PR explained in its response to my provisional decision that it hadn’t shared the Investigator’s assessment on this complaint with Mrs C, saying this was done in order not to influence her recollections.

PR also said Mrs C hadn’t heard about the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*². PR said this means Mrs C’s recollections have not been influenced by either the Investigator’s assessment or the judgment.

Part of my assessment of the testimony was to consider *when* it was written, and whether it

² *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (*‘Shawbrook & BPF v FOS’*).

may have been affected by external factors such as the widespread publication of the outcome of *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*.

I have thought about what PR has said, but on balance, I don't find it a credible explanation of the contents of Mrs C's evidence. Here, PR responded to our Investigator's assessment to say that Mrs C alleged that the timeshare had been sold to her as an investment and it provided evidence from Mrs C to that effect. I fail to understand how Mrs C disagreed with the assessment on the basis that the timeshare was sold as an investment if she didn't know our Investigator's conclusions. It follows that I conclude Mrs C did know about our Investigator's view before the evidence was provided.

So, I maintain that there is a risk that Mrs C's testimony was coloured by the Investigator's assessment and/or the outcome in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*. And, on balance, the way in which the evidence has been provided makes me conclude that I can place little weight on it. So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my provisional decision, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs C's purchasing decision.

PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the timeshare Mrs C purchased. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I'm not persuaded Mrs C's decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mrs C and the Lender was unfair to her for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

I have considered PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the underlying fractional timeshare asset (the "Allocated Property"). PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mrs C in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of her share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2035. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mrs C. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 17 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

*"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate."* (bold my emphasis).

It seems clear to me that the commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2025. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above.

So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

The Matter of Commission

PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ("DISP").

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs C in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs C, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs C into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs C.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs C entered into wasn't high. At £854.76, it was only 4% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (3.7%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had she known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not currently persuaded that she either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs C had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for the timeshare doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs C but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of "loyalty" to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs C.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs C and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mrs C's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs C's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs C (i.e. secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs C a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to her. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

My final decision

For the reasons explained above, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs C to accept or reject my decision before 17 December 2025.

Will Culley
Ombudsman

COPY OF PROVISIONAL DECISION

I've considered the relevant information about this complaint.

Having done so, I've arrived at broadly the same conclusions as our Investigator, but I've explained some of my findings in more detail, so I've decided to issue this provisional decision to give the parties to the complaint an opportunity to provide further submissions.

The deadline for both parties to provide any further comments or evidence for me to consider is **15 October 2025**. Unless the information changes my mind, my final decision is likely to be along the following lines.

If I don't hear from Mrs C, or if they tell me they accept my provisional decision, I may arrange for the complaint to be closed as resolved without a final decision.

The complaint

Mrs C complains Shawbrook Bank Limited (the "Lender") has failed to honour a claim under Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (the "CCA") and has participated in an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the CCA.

Mrs C is represented in her complaint by a professional representative ("PR").

What happened

This complaint relates to a timeshare purchase made by Mrs C from a timeshare provider (the "Supplier") on 11 July 2018. She had previously purchased a "Trial" membership from the Supplier in December 2017. I've outlined the basic details below:

- The purchase made on 11 July 2018 (the "Time of Sale") was of a membership in the Supplier's "Fractional Club". Mrs C bought 1,590 points in the Fractional Club, which could be used to book holiday accommodation annually. This type of timeshare was also asset-backed, meaning it included a share in the future sale proceeds of a specific timeshare apartment named on Mrs C's purchase paperwork. The purchase agreement stated the price was £17,530, which appears to have been after the trade-in of the Trial membership
- The Supplier arranged a loan (the "Credit Agreement") with the Lender for £21,369. This appears to have covered both the balance of the purchase price, and the consolidation of existing debt (most likely relating to the Trial membership). This was repayable over 180 months at £246.82 per month.
- In March 2022, through PR, Mrs C complained to the Lender, seeking to find it responsible for the Supplier having mis-sold the timeshare and associated loan. The individual mis-selling concerns raised by PR can be found in the table below, but broadly-speaking they included misrepresentations for which Mrs C sought to hold the Lender liable under Section 75 of the CCA, and matters which were alleged to have rendered the credit relationship between her and the Lender unfair under Section 140A of the CCA.

The Lender rejected the complaint, which was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs C disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context here.

What I've provisionally decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

I think it's also important at this stage to outline very briefly the general grounds on which Mrs C seeks redress from the Lender in relation to what are, at least in part, the *Supplier's* alleged wrongdoings as opposed to the Lender's. The grounds are that Mrs C has a claim under Section 75 of the CCA, and Section 140A of the CCA.

Section 75 of the CCA gives a person who has purchased goods or services with certain kinds of credit, a right to claim against their lender in respect of any breach of contract or misrepresentation on the part of the supplier of those goods or services. This is subject to certain technical conditions being met, which I am satisfied have been met in this case.

Section 140A of the CCA operates in a more complex manner. Insofar as is relevant to Mrs C's case, it means that the credit relationship between her and the Lender can be found unfair because of anything done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the Lender.

An unfair credit relationship can also be based on the terms of a related agreement (such as the agreement to buy the timeshare) and, when combined with Section 56 of the CCA, on anything done or not done by the Supplier on the Lender's behalf before the making of the timeshare or loan agreements. The Supplier's acts or omissions during the process of negotiations leading up to the purchase are deemed to be the Lender's responsibility.

In the interests of efficiency and ease of reading, I have set out my findings in a table format. Where a particular finding requires further explanation or analysis, I have indicated this and provided the further explanation below the table.

Table of Summarised Findings

Section 75 - Misrepresentations	Reason why this complaint doesn't succeed
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It was falsely represented that the product was an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value".	There's insufficient evidence this was said. If it was said, it would not be untrue to describe the product as an investment as it contained investment features. Any statements regarding future value are likely to have been statements of honest opinion in the absence of evidence to show otherwise.
It was falsely represented that there would be a considerable return on investment because the purchase involved a share in a property that would increase in value.	As per the point above, there is insufficient evidence these representations were made. If they were, there's insufficient evidence they were anything other than statements of honest opinion.
It was falsely represented that the Fractional Club membership could be sold back to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.	There's very little colour or context to this allegation, meaning it's difficult to conclude the Supplier represented this to be the case. Mrs C also signed to say she understood the Supplier would not buy back the membership.
It was falsely represented that Mrs C would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round.	This is a vague allegation which also lacks sufficient detail, context or colour to demonstrate the Supplier made such statements.
Matters allegedly rendering the credit relationship unfair	Reason why this complaint doesn't succeed
Mrs C was pressured into making the purchase.	There is little evidence of what specifically the Supplier said or did which meant Mrs C felt she had no choice but to purchase. Mrs C also did not use the cooling-off period to cancel the purchase, which I would have expected had she only purchased because she was pressured into doing so.
The Lender failed to carry out the creditworthiness/affordability checks required by industry guidance or regulations.	Mrs C has not provided evidence that the loan was actually unaffordable, which would need to be shown if the complaint were to succeed on this point.
The Credit Agreement was arranged by self-employed individuals who were not authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority, meaning it was unenforceable.	It appears the entity which arranged the Credit Agreement held the appropriate permissions from the Financial Conduct Authority at the relevant time, so the agreement was not arranged by an unauthorised credit broker. The employment status of the Supplier's sales representatives is not relevant.
The Supplier marketed and sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.	While it's possible the Supplier marketed the product in this way, it would need to have played a material part in Mrs C's decision to buy the Fractional Club membership, to render the credit relationship between her and the Lender unfair. See further details below.

I'll now set out the expanded reasons for my decision relating to the Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, and the potential impact on the fairness of the Credit Agreement.

The primary difficulty I have with arriving at a conclusion that the Supplier, firstly, breached the relevant regulations and, secondly, that this had a material impact on Mrs C's purchasing decision, is a lack of persuasive supporting evidence.

Until December 2023 we had no testimony from Mrs C in her own words as to what happened at the Time of Sale or what her motivations were at the time. We had only PR's letter of complaint, which was in nearly all respects identical to other letters of complaint I have seen from PR relating to other complainants. In other words, it was generic in nature and of very little assistance in determining what happened at the Time of Sale.

It was only after the Investigator issued their view, and after the judgment in *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd* and *R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin)* ('*Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*') was handed down, that we received a witness statement from Mrs C in which she recalled that the Supplier led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain or profit. And as experience tells me that, the more time that passes between a complaint and the event complained about, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and/or influenced by discussion with others, I find it difficult to understand why the Financial Ombudsman Service was only given such evidence when it was.

Indeed, as there isn't any other evidence on file to corroborate Mrs C's very recent evidence about what was said and her motivations at the Time of Sale, there seems to me to be a very real risk that her recollections were coloured by the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that I can give her written recollections the weight necessary to find that the credit relationship in question was unfair for reasons relating to a breach of the relevant prohibition.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs C's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her.

My provisional decision

For the reasons explained above, I'm not minded to uphold Mrs C's complaint.

Will Culley
Ombudsman