

THE COMPLAINT

Miss B complains that Monzo Bank Ltd (“Monzo”) will not reimburse her money she says she lost when she fell victim to a scam.

Miss B is represented by CEL Solicitors in this matter. However, where appropriate, I will refer to Miss B solely in this decision for ease of reading.

WHAT HAPPENED

On 4 November 2025, I issued a provisional decision not upholding this complaint. I attach a copy of that provisional decision below – both for background information and to (if applicable) supplement my reasons in this final decision. I would invite the parties involved to re-read the provisional decision.

RESPONSES TO MY PROVISIONAL DECISION

CEL responded stating that Miss B accepted my provisional findings, but asked for confirmation on whether Monzo was prepared to honour its previous offer.

Monzo responded querying where payment should be made if it was prepared to honour its offer.

WHAT I HAVE DECIDED – AND WHY

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

For the avoidance of doubt, I need to make it clear that I did not indicate in my provisional decision that I was minded to direct Monzo to do anything further in this matter. Nor do I make such a direction in this final decision. It is a matter for Monzo to decide if it is prepared to honour its previous offer.

As I am not directing Monzo to do anything further, I have no power to direct Monzo where it should make payment to if it decides to honour its offer.

As no other issues were raised by either party, I see no reason to depart from my provisional findings.

MY FINAL DECISION

For the reasons set out above, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Miss B to accept or reject my decision before 18 December 2025.

COPY OF PROVISIONAL DECISION DATED 4 NOVEMBER 2025

I have considered the relevant information about this complaint.

The deadline for both parties to provide any further comments or evidence for me to consider is 18 November 2025. Unless the information changes my mind, my final decision is likely to be along the following lines.

If I do not hear from Miss B, or if she tells me she accepts my provisional decision, I may arrange for the complaint to be closed as resolved without a final decision.

THE COMPLAINT

Miss B complains that Monzo Bank Ltd (“Monzo”) will not reimburse her money she says she lost when she fell victim to a scam.

Miss B is represented by CEL Solicitors in this matter. However, where appropriate, I will refer to Miss B solely in this decision for ease of reading.

WHAT HAPPENED

The circumstances of this complaint are well known to all parties concerned, so I will not repeat them again here in detail. However, I will provide an overview.

Miss B says she has fallen victim to a safe account scam. She says scammers deceived her into thinking her Monzo account was compromised, and that she needed to move her money to safe accounts. The payment transactions in question are set out in the table below, which was not disputed by either party when set out in the investigator's findings (credits not included):

Payment Number	Date	Method	Beneficiary / Merchant	Amount
1	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£800.00
2	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£800.00
3	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£800.00
4	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00

5	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
6	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
7	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
8	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
9	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
10	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
11	15 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£950.00
12	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
13	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
14	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
15	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
16	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
17	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,500.00
18	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,000.00
19	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,000.00
20	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,000.00
21	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Miss B (Revolut)	£1,000.00
22	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Ramp	£1,741.00
23	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Ramp	£1,741.00

24	16 October 2022	Apple Pay	Ramp	£1,000.00
25	16 October 2022	Faster Payment	Banxa	£2,000.00

(According to Miss B, the funds that went to her Revolut account were then forwarded to safe accounts.)

Miss B first disputed the above with Monzo in October 2022. She then raised a complaint in January 2025, which she also referred to our Service.

One of our investigators considered the complaint and upheld it in part. In short, the investigator held that Monzo could have done more to protect Miss B from financial harm from Payment 6 onwards. Miss B accepted the investigator's findings, but Monzo did not. Monzo stated it would only be prepared to refund the crypto related payments – not those made to Miss B's Revolut account.

As Monzo did not accept the investigator's findings, this matter has been passed to me to make a decision.

WHAT I HAVE PROVISIONALLY DECIDED – AND WHY

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I find that the investigator at first instance was wrong to reach the conclusion she did. This is for reasons I set out in this decision.

I would like to say at the outset that I have summarised this complaint in far less detail than the parties involved. I want to stress that no courtesy is intended by this. If there is a submission I have not addressed, it is not because I have ignored the point. It is simply because my findings focus on what I consider to be the central issues in this complaint.

Further, under section 225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, I am required to resolve complaints quickly and with minimum formality.

When our Service considers complaints such as Miss B's, the first part of the exercise is to establish whether the complainant concerned has fallen victim to the scam alleged. This must be satisfied before assessing issues such as causation, or whether a complainant's payment(s) to fund an alleged scam ought to have triggered their bank's fraud detection systems.

In addition to testimony, evidence which assists with establishing whether a complainant has been scammed ordinarily takes the form of, for example, communication between the complainant and the alleged scammer, paperwork and/or information about the alleged scam company.

I have considered Miss B's testimony in this case. I have taken into account what Miss B told Monzo and Revolut when she first reported the alleged scam in October 2022. I have also taken into account screenshots of messages which Miss B provided Revolut in its in-app chat. Those messages show, according to Miss B, exchanges between her and the alleged scammer.

The screenshots of the messages are limited. That is, the entire message chain was not provided to Revolut. Miss B says she has changed her mobile phone, so the messages with the scammer are no longer available. Miss B also asserts she spoke to the scammer over the telephone on at least two occasions, but she has not been able to obtain evidence to support this.

Based on the above, it is difficult to determine, on balance, whether Miss B has fallen victim to a safe account scam in this case. However, I have identified other factors and inconsistencies which have assisted me with assessing this point. I set these out below.

Accounts

I have considered CEL's submissions to Monzo and our Service dated 20 January 2025. In them, CEL suggest, amongst other things, that the accounts Miss B's funds went to were not set up by her:

- *"The scammers told [Miss B] that her account was under threat and that immediate action was necessary to protect her funds. They convinced her that she needed to transfer her money into a new, 'safe' account that they had set up for her."*
- *"Under the guise of protecting her funds, the scammers instructed [Miss B] to transfer her inheritance money into the fraudulent account they provided."*

In response to follow-up questions from the investigator, CEL stated:

- *"Our client [Miss B] believed that the funds would be kept safe in the new 'safe' account set up by the scammers."*
- *"Our client does not have access to the accounts the funds were sent to."*
- *"Our client was not aware at the time of the payment that the funds were being transferred into accounts that were not in their name. This lack of awareness contributed to our client falling victim to the scam, as they believed they were following legitimate instructions to protect their funds, not realising they were being directed to fraudulent accounts."*
- *"Our client made payments [to Ramp and Banxa] through these websites using their email. It is important to note that our client did not create any crypto accounts; rather, they were instructed by the scammer to make these payments while under pressure during a prolonged phone conversation."*

The above is at odds with the below points, which suggest Miss B did in fact set up the accounts concerned. This is a point which Monzo has also raised.

Revolut

I have seen material from Revolut which contradicts CEL's submissions. Notwithstanding the necessary checks required to open a Revolut account, I have seen identification selfies of Miss B in Revolut's in-app chat. I have also seen in-app chat messages from Miss B to Revolut reporting the alleged scam on 17 October 2022, whereby she said, *"They convinced me to open this account and send it this way."*

I am satisfied, on balance, that Miss B opened the Revolut account.

Banxa

I have seen an email from Banxa Support to Miss B sent on 5 May 2025. In that email, Banxa states, amongst other things, “*To confirm, there is only one transaction associated with your account which is the one we referred to in our previous email.*” In response, on 8 May 2025, Miss B stated, “*Thanks for your patients [sic]. Are you able to provide a statement of my transactions. To prove that I don't currently have the money. In my account.*”

I am satisfied, on balance, that Miss B opened the Banxa account.

Ramp

By email sent on 16 October 2022, Ramp appear to be sending Miss B a confirmation code: “*... copy and paste it into the Ramp application to gain access to our crypto transacting tool.*”

By email sent on 8 May 2025, Miss B stated to Ramp, “*I seems [sic] to have had an account that was locked. Are you able to unlock it or provide transaction recovery for October 2022 please.*”

I am satisfied, on balance, that Miss B opened the Ramp account.

No interventions

The investigator asked CEL the following: “*Can you please advise whether any other businesses involved with the payment journey asked you any queries about the transactions to the scammer?*”

CEL responded stating, “*No other businesses queried the transactions to the scammer.*”

Again, having considered material from Revolut, I do not accept CEL’s response to the above point. I have seen that Revolut intervened on at least two occasions via its in-app chat to speak to Miss B about her payments to the alleged safe accounts. On both occasions, Miss B misled Revolut about the true purpose of her payments.

Based on the messages I have seen – mentioned above – the scammer appears to be telling Miss B that they are in partnership with Revolut. Given this, I find it unusual that Miss B felt she had to mislead Revolut.

Documents

In CEL’s initial submissions, they stated: “*The scammer provided official-looking documents or identification that appeared genuine, further convincing [Miss B] of their legitimacy.*”

The investigator asked CEL for copies of these documents. In response, CEL stated, “*Our client did not receive any documentation from the scammer*”.

£25,000

Miss B transferred £25,000 from her Halifax account to her Monzo account on 14 October 2022. This was one day before Miss B made the payments in question from her Monzo account. The investigator, quite rightly, questioned CEL about the timing of this. CEL responded:

“*... the client [Miss B] is unsure about the exact purpose of moving £25,000 a day before the scam payments were made. They mentioned that they were probably topping up their account, noting that they were spending too much and feeling manic at the time.*”

I do not find this response to be satisfactory. Miss B was spending on both her Halifax and Monzo accounts. Further, when the £25,000 transfer was made, this resulted in Miss B's Halifax account going into overdraft (-£138.93). However, three days later, Miss B transferred about £11,000 into her Halifax account and then transferred £8,000 out. This pattern of spending does not reflect what CEL have stated in their response on this point.

Hallmarks of a safe account scam

Miss B reported the alleged scam to Monzo on 16 October 2022 via its in-app chat. The day after, I can see that Monzo said to Miss B:

"You previously said yes to 'Did the scam involve you investing in, or thinking you were investing in, cryptocurrency?'. Just to confirm, did you make these payments thinking you were investing your money?"

Miss B responded, stating: *"No I was made to believe my money wasn't safe but yes some of the money went into crypto currency."*

I find this response to be somewhat contradictory. Miss B's testimony is that the alleged scammer told her that her Monzo account had been compromised. Therefore, I find it unusual that the alleged scammer instructed Miss B to transfer money from her 'compromised' Monzo account to her non-compromised Revolut account, and thereafter to at least two different payees. The following are all the payees involved in this case: Asad Arts Ltd and Reddy IT Solutions (from Miss B's Revolut account); and Ramp and Banxa (from Miss B's Monzo account). I find it even more unusual that the alleged scammer instructed Miss B to make payments from her Monzo account to crypto accounts in her name, particularly given the premise of the alleged scam.

In my view, the pattern of payments in this case is not consistent with the typical hallmarks one would expect from a safe account scam. Although sometimes the victim's funds may pass through more than one account before reaching the scammer's – it is unusual to see this occurring with several payees involved, along with four isolated crypto payments.

Nothing persuasive has been provided to explain why Miss B was asked to make payments to several different payees.

Lastly on this point, having looked up Reddy IT Solutions and Asad Arts Ltd online, I have not seen anything persuasive to indicate they were/are linked to a scam.

Conclusion

I have taken all the above points together and weighed them in the balance. Having done so, I am unable to safely conclude that Miss B has fallen victim to a safe account scam. To my mind, there is a lack of evidence in this case and too many inconsistencies.

It follows that I do not find that Monzo has done anything wrong in the circumstances of this complaint. Therefore, I will not be directing Monzo to do anything further. In my judgment, this is a fair and reasonable outcome in the circumstances of this complaint.

Monzo's offer

I note that in response to the investigator's findings, Monzo stated that it would be prepared to refund Miss B's crypto payments. Given my findings above, it is entirely a matter for Monzo as to whether it is prepared to honour its offer. I make no direction in relation to this point.

MY PROVISIONAL DECISION

For the above reasons, I am currently minded not to uphold this complaint.

Tony Massiah
Ombudsman