

The complaint

Mr and Mrs P's complaint is, in essence, that First Holiday Finance Ltd ('FHF') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mr and Mrs P purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 3 May 2018 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,380 fractional points at a cost of £16,631 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs P more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs P paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £16,631 from FHF (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mr and Mrs P – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to FHF on 13 August 2024 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

FHF dealt with Mr and Mrs P's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 22 August 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr and Mrs P disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'). In that decision, I said:

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the

arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. FHF doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr and Mrs P were:

1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value" when that was not true.
2. Told that they would own a share in a property that would increase in value during the membership term when that was not true.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't enough evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

So, while I recognise that Mr and Mrs P and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that FHF acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, FHF is also liable.

The PR says that Mr and Mrs P could not access the holidays that the Supplier led them to believe the membership would entitle them to. That was framed, in the Letter of Complaint, as an alleged misrepresentation. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement – i.e. a breach of contract.

Like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr and Mrs P stated that the availability of holidays was subject to demand. And Mr and Mrs P haven't given any specific details as to which holidays they were unable to book that they believe should have been guaranteed under the terms of their contract with the Supplier. So I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think FHF is liable to pay Mr and Mrs P any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think FHF acted unfairly or unreasonably in declining the Section 75 claim.

Section 140A of the CCA: did FHF participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

The PR also says that Mr and Mrs P were rushed into signing the contractual paperwork at the end of a long sales meeting, without having sufficient time to properly consider the implications of the agreement into which they were entering. I acknowledge and appreciate that Mr and Mrs P may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel the membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs P made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

So I don't think that Mr and Mrs P's credit relationship with FHF was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for this reason. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with FHF was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

FHF does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr and Mrs P's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

“A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.”

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr and Mrs P were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr and Mrs P the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs P as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs P, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs P as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come

on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationship between FHF and Mr and Mrs P have been rendered unfair to them had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

To help me decide this point, I've carefully considered what Mr and Mrs P have said in the course of their complaint about how the membership was sold to them and their motivation for purchasing it.

I would note first of all that the evidence in this respect is quite limited. Within the Letter of Complaint, it is said that Mr and Mrs P were told that they had purchased an investment that would increase in value. There was no further detail underpinning these statements within the Letter of Complaint, which are rather generic in nature. In fact, such assertions were made in an identical fashion by the PR in a number of other complaints.

When referring the complaint to us, the PR included a statement made by Mr and Mrs P with their recollections from the Time of Sale. In response to our Investigator's view, the PR highlighted that within the statement they said:

"After the presentation, when we were told it was an investment and that we can have a % of the price given back to us after the end of the contract [,] that's when we decided to join and we can book holidays anytime as and when we want."

While there is *some* reference to the Supplier having marketed the membership as an investment opportunity, I find the comments to be somewhat vague – lacking in detail and not providing a fulsome picture of what the Supplier actually said.

Moreover, I'm mindful that Mr and Mrs P only provided these comments in August 2024 – over six years after the Time of Sale and subsequent to the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*¹.

I'm aware that the more time that passes between a complaint and the event

¹ R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin)

complained about, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and influenced by discussions with others. It seems to me that there's a high risk that this is what has happened in this case.

Both the statement as a whole and those parts that relate to the investment element lack detail. This reflects the understandable difficulty Mr and Mrs P would have had in recalling events from some six years prior. And given the timing and content of the statement as I have described above, I find myself unable to place significant weight on these recollections. In the circumstances, and on balance, I think there's a high risk Mr and Mrs P's account was influenced by discussions they had with others or the widespread publicity following the outcome of the judicial review.

Put simply, I can't put enough weight on Mr and Mrs P's brief account to conclude that the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase. I accept they may well have been interested in a share in the Allocated Property, which would not be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs P themselves don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mr and Mrs P ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs P's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr and Mrs P were not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr and Mrs P sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as Fractional Club members in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr and Mrs P nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

The PR says that a payment of commission from FHF to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd*, *Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd* and *Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr and Mrs P in arguing that their credit relationship with FHF was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

Based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to

an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr and Mrs P but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

I recognise that FHF was and is part of the same group of companies as the Supplier. And I acknowledge that tie may not have been adequately disclosed at the Time of Sale. But I can't currently see why that renders the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF unfair to them – such that I should uphold the complaint. I say that because FHF has explained that the Supplier would share finance proposals among its approved external finance partners; the Supplier couldn't write all its finance business "in-house" [through FHF]; and FHF largely provided loans to customers whose circumstances fell outside of its external finance partners' lending terms. So, I'm not persuaded that Mr and Mrs P were led into a credit agreement with FHF because it was tied in some way to the Supplier.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, FHF didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and FHF were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr and Mrs P.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs P in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mr and Mrs P's credit relationship with FHF wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mr and Mrs P's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether FHF is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from FHF without telling Mr and Mrs P (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to FHF's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr and Mrs P a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that FHF failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on FHF's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that FHF acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs P's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that FHF was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct FHF to compensate them.

FHF responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

[The Consumer Credit Sourcebook \('CONC'\) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's \(the 'FCA'\) Handbook of Rules and Guidance](#)

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD only relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mr and Mrs P as an investment at the Time of Sale.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did FHF participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on FHF to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mr and Mrs P was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that FHF – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mr and Mrs P to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with FHF, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mr and Mrs P as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mr and Mrs P in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I

also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr and Mrs P to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mr and Mrs P to proceed with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mr and Mrs P in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted Mr and Mrs P's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS* and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mr and Mrs P to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, Mr and Mrs P were highly motivated by the holiday options offered by the Supplier – which was a factor in my overall conclusion in light of all the available evidence that they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase of the Fractional Club membership even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

So for the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mr and Mrs P's decision to purchase the Fractional Club membership.

I will also address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mr and Mrs P in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2032. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mr and Mrs P. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 14 and a half years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate." (my emphasis)

It seems clear to me that the contractual commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2032. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above. The Information Statement is, in my view, reflective of the fact that most fractional memberships were set up to run for nineteen years. But not all memberships attached to a given Allocated Property were sold at exactly the same time, so often the time left before the sale date was less than nineteen years at the actual time of sale. I accept that this could be confusing, however I do not think Mr and Mrs P were misled by this at the Time

of Sale. So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

Section 140A: conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs P and FHF under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that FHF acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs P's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that FHF was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct FHF to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons I've explained, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr and Mrs P to accept or reject my decision before 5 February 2026.

Ben Jennings
Ombudsman