

## **The complaint**

Mr T's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

## **Background to the Complaint**

Mr T purchased membership of a timeshare (the 'Fractional Club') from a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') on 4 July 2018 (the 'Time of Sale'). He entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,040 fractional points at a cost of £14,430 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr T more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after his membership term ends.

Mr T paid for his Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £14,430 from Shawbrook (the 'Credit Agreement').

Mr T – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to Shawbrook on 13 January 2024 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

Shawbrook dealt with Mr T's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 16 April 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr T disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision, which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'). In that decision, I said:

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

## **Mr T's claim under Section 75 of the CCA**

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The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. Shawbrook doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr T was:

1. Told that he had purchased an investment that would “considerably appreciate in value” when that was not true.
2. Told that he would own a share in a property that would increase in value during the membership term when that was not true.
3. Made to believe that he would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round when that was not true.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier’s sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn’t enough evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for point 3, while it’s *possible* that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for that reason, I don’t think it’s *probable*. It’s given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made a false statement of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn’t any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for that reason, I don’t think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mr T and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that Shawbrook acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

The PR also says that Mr T could not access the holidays that the Supplier led him to believe the membership would entitle him to. That was framed, in the Letter of Complaint, as an alleged misrepresentation. However, on my reading of the complaint, this suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork

likely to have been signed by Mr T stated that the availability of holidays was subject to demand. And Mr T hasn't given any specific details as to which holidays he was unable to book when he believes he should have been guaranteed under the terms of his contract with the Supplier. So I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think Shawbrook is liable to pay Mr T any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably in declining the Section 75 claim.

### **Section 140A of the CCA: did Shawbrook participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

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I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr T and Shawbrook along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr T and Shawbrook.

#### The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr T's complaint about Shawbrook being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before Shawbrook lent to Mr T. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that Shawbrook failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr T was actually unaffordable before also concluding that he lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to him for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr T.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that Shawbrook wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mr T

knew, amongst other things, how much he was borrowing and repaying each month, who he was borrowing from and that he was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for him, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mr T suffering a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on him as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell Shawbrook to compensate him, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also said in the Letter of Complaint that Mr T was rushed into signing the contractual paperwork at the end of a long sales meeting, without having sufficient time to properly consider the implications of the agreement into which he was entering. I acknowledge and appreciate that Mr T may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But he says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentation that made him feel as if he had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when he simply did not want to. He was also given a 14-day cooling off period and has not provided a credible explanation for why he did not cancel his membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr T made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because his ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr T's credit relationship with Shawbrook was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to him. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

#### The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

Shawbrook does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mr T's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

*"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."*

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mr T was told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr T the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more

than what he first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr T as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to him as an investment, i.e. told him or led him to believe that Fractional Club membership offered him the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr T, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr T as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

#### Was the credit relationship between Shawbrook and Mr T rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr T and Shawbrook under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr T and Shawbrook that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led him to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

To help me decide this point, I've carefully considered what Mr T has said in the course of his complaint about how the membership was sold to him and his motivation for purchasing it.

I would note first of all that the evidence in this respect is quite limited. Within the Letter of Complaint, it is said that Mr T was told that he had purchased an investment that would increase in value. There was no further detail underpinning these statements within the Letter of Complaint, which are rather generic in nature. In fact, such assertions were made in an identical fashion by the PR in a number of other complaints.

When referring the complaint to us, the PR included a statement from Mr T with his recollections from the Time of Sale. I've carefully considered what he said, and in particular the comments made around the appeal to him of the investment element:

*"[The Supplier] told us that the fractional (club) would be a great investment, because we would receive a part ownership of a property and that after the 19 year contract ended, the property would be sold and the receipts [sic] of the sale would be divided between the fractional share holders.*

*For us this was an offer that we could not refuse, because it provided us with the security for our future. In fact if they had not promoted the ownership in this way, then we would not have agreed to the purchase.*

*With the incentive that we would eventually see a monetary return on our investment, at the time the finance was affordable..."*

I note that, in his statement, Mr T has made little reference to any of the other matters of complaint raised in the Letter of Complaint. So this statement does not corroborate the majority of the complaint as originally made. I also find it surprising that such little mention of the holidays that could have been taken was made at all, given that those were the central part of the sales presentations given to prospective customers. Such references to the investment element as there are seem, to my mind, to be somewhat vague and generic – with little detail either as to what the Supplier said or did to promote the investment or what it was about those comments that were appealing to Mr T.

Moreover, I'm mindful that Mr T only provided these comments in 2024. As well as coming some significant time after the Time of Sale, they were only made following the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*. I cannot discount the possibility that Mr T's comments were influenced by this.

I'm aware that the more time that passes between a complaint and the event complained about, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and influenced by discussions with others.

In this case, especially in the absence of an earlier account nearer to the Time of Sale, I simply can't place significant weight on these recollections. In the circumstances, and on balance, I think there's a high risk that Mr T was influenced by discussions he had with others or the widespread publicity following the outcome of the judicial review.

Put simply, I can't put enough weight on Mr T's account to conclude that the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when he decided to go ahead with his purchase. I accept he may well have

been interested in a share in the Allocated Property, which would not be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr T himself doesn't persuade me that his purchase was motivated by his share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision he ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr T's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests he would have pressed ahead with the purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3) in order to access the holiday offerings by the Supplier. And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr T and Shawbrook was unfair to him, even if the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3).

#### The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr T was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr T sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges he could have been subject to as a Fractional Club member in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mr T nor the PR have persuaded me that he would not have pressed ahead with the purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

As for the PR's argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr T in practice, nor that any such terms led him to behave in a certain way to his detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

At the time of my provisional decision, I deferred my conclusions on the matter of commission disclosure in order to review that issue further. I've since written to the parties setting out my thoughts on why I wasn't persuaded to uphold this aspect of the complaint. I said:

Mr T's professional representative ('PR') says that a payment of commission from Shawbrook to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint

because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission – the aforementioned *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* judgment.

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair” (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’).

But I don’t think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr T in arguing that his credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to him for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven’t seen anything to suggest that Shawbrook and the Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mr T, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr T into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said above, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr T.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by Shawbrook to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mr T entered into wasn't high. At £721.50, it was only 5% of the amount borrowed and 7.42% as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had he known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not currently persuaded that he either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mr T wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of his own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit he needed for a timeshare he wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think he would still have taken out the loan to fund the purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr T but as the supplier of contractual rights he obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to him when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and Shawbrook were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr T.

### **Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint**

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While I've found that Mr T's credit relationship with Shawbrook wasn't unfair to him for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mr T's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether Shawbrook is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from Shawbrook without telling Mr T (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to Shawbrook's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr T a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be

available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to him. And while it's possible that Shawbrook failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on Shawbrook's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think Mr T would still have taken out the loan to fund his purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr T's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that Shawbrook was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct Shawbrook to compensate him.

Shawbrook responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR did not respond.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

### **The legal and regulatory context**

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

#### The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

#### The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

### **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, and with no new information or evidence for me to consider following my provisional decision, I see no reason to depart from the conclusions I set out therein. So this final decision simply confirms my provisional findings, as set out above.

### **My final decision**

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr T to accept or reject my decision before 26 February 2026.

Ben Jennings  
**Ombudsman**