DRN-6052525

The complaint

Mr and Mrs B's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr and Mrs B were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – points in which Mr and Mrs B purchased on the dates below:

- 810 fractional points on 9 July 2017 for £14,910 ('Purchase Agreement 1')
- 1180 fractional points on 14 February 2018 for £6,197 – having traded in the first lot of 810 fractional points. ('Purchase Agreement 2').

As this complaint is concerned with the purchases on 14 February 2018 that is the 'Time of Sale' for the purposes of my decision.

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs B more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the relevant purchase agreement (which I'll refer to as the 'Allocated Property 2) after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs B paid for their fractional points by taking the following amounts of finance of from the Lender:

- £14,910 on 9 July 2017 ('Credit Agreement 1')
- £21,275 on 14 February 2018 ('Credit Agreement 2'). Of the £21,275 in finance Mr and Mrs B took out on 14 February 2018, they used £15,079 to settle Credit Agreement 1.

Mr and Mrs B – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 8 November 2011(the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mr and Mrs B's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 9 April 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr and Mrs B disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'). In that decision, I said:

"I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Times of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Times of Sale because Mr and Mrs B were:

1. *Told that they had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value".*
2. *Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.*
3. *Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.*
4. *Made to believe that they would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round.*

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.
As for points 3 and 4, while it's possible that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don't think it's probable. They're given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for these reasons, I don't think it was.

So, while I recognise that Mr and Mrs B and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in one or more unfair credit relationships?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Times of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales processes that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationships between them were likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. *The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Times of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
2. *The provision of information by the Supplier at the Times of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
3. *The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements;*
4. *Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Times of Sale;*
5. *The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant*
6. *Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the relevant credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Times of Sale

Mr and Mrs B's complaint about the Lender being party to unfair credit relationships was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to them. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr and Mrs B was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationships with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr and Mrs B.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreements were arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreements. However, it looks to me like Mr and Mrs B knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club

membership. And as none of the lending looks like it was unaffordable for them, even if the one or more of the Credit Agreements were arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to a financial loss for Mr and Mrs B – such that I can say that the credit relationships in question were unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loans weren't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreements. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mr and Mrs B in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mr and Mrs B may have felt weary after sales processes that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentations that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. Moreover, they did go on to increase their membership – which I find difficult to understand if the reason they went ahead with the purchases in question was because they were pressured into them. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr and Mrs B made the decisions to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr and Mrs B's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationships with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

Shares in the Allocated Properties clearly constituted investments as they offered Mr and Mrs B the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr and Mrs B as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Times of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr and Mrs B, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Properties along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr and Mrs B as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationships between the Lender and Mr and Mrs B have been rendered unfair to them had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Times of Sale, I now need to consider what impact such breaches had on the fairness of the credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender that were unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreements and the Credit Agreements is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr and Mrs B decided to go ahead with their purchases. That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Properties. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs B themselves don't persuade me that their purchases were motivated by their shares in the Allocated Properties and the possibility of a profit, I don't think breaches of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier were likely to have been material to the decisions Mr and Mrs B ultimately made.

What I am considering here, though, is whether any such positioning of the Fractional Club membership as an investment was material to Mr and Mrs B's decision to purchase it (and in turn, therefore, to enter into the Credit Agreement). Mr and Mrs B's comments do not lead me to think that it was. I'll explain why.

I've considered the chronology of the complaint including when Mr and Mrs B/their PR complained to the Lender, the date Mr and Mrs B gave authority to PR represent them, and when Mr and Mrs B were likely to have given their 'witness statement', which is undated.

The PR sent a Letter of Complaint to the Lender on 8 October 2022 and set out, amongst other things, that it considered the timeshare had been sold as an investment; no witness statement was attached. Mr and Mrs B's signed authority to the PR is dated 3 January 2024 and I think it likely that they also provided their 'witness statement' around the same time. Indeed, it was first sent to the Lender on 11 January 2024 – this is almost six years after the Time of Sale and at least 15 months after the dispute was first raised with the Lender. The timing of this is critical as I would've expected to see such evidence – if it was available – to be lodged along with the dispute at the outset; but this didn't happen, and it's not clear why. The witness statement is the only account I have from Mr and Mrs B.

I'm conscious that it was only after the judgment in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS was handed down in June 2023, that Mr and Mrs B stated that the Supplier told them or led them to believe that the Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain – in other words this is when they first said that it "We were informed that the purchase price for our timeshare fractional ownership products would be an investment which would see a profit when the properties were sold in 17 years' time…We were led to believe that we owned a fraction of the apartment…which had a monetary resale value that could be recouped at the end of the term…". And I'm cognisant that the more time that passes between the event complained about and a complaint being made, the more risk there is of recollections being vague, inaccurate and influenced by discussions with others.

In this case, given Mr and Mrs B's witness statement post-dated the judgment in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS - which established this Service's approach to these complaints – I simply can't rule out the latter. In the circumstances, and on balance, I think there's a high risk that Mr and Mrs B were influenced by discussions they had with others. Put simply, I can't put enough weight on their account that would enable me to uphold this complaint.

Direct testimony from Mr and Mrs B, in full and in their own words, is important in a case like this, because it allows me to assess credibility and consistency, to know precisely what was supposedly said, and to understand the context in which it was supposedly said. It's also important for the decision-maker to be able to see that the Letter of Complaint genuinely reflects the consumer's testimony. Again, that simply isn't possible in this case.

Nevertheless, I can't rule out the possibility that Mr and Mrs B may have been interested in a share in the Allocated Properties. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the products at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr and Mrs B themselves do not persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Properties and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision they ultimately made.

I have also borne in mind that Mr and Mrs B increased their points allocation and number of weeks in February 2018. This serves to underline Mr and Mrs B's interest in the holiday benefits the membership offered them, which leads me to think they would have gone ahead with the purchase even if it had not been presented to them as an investment opportunity. Mr and Mrs B's interest in the holiday benefits of membership is further underscored the fact they made ten reservations (only one of which they cancelled) between June 2018 and July 2022.

I've thought too about the PR's response to our Investigator's view which is principally concerned with comments about the marketing and sale of the time share as an investment but – as I have said above – I accept that it is possible that this is, indeed, what happened. But, as I have also explained here, it does not automatically follow that any such sales practises rendered the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender unfair for the purposes of s140A. And also, for the reasons I have given here, I can't put sufficient weight on Mr and Mrs B's account such that I could reasonably uphold his complaint.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr and Mrs B's decisions to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Times of Sale were motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchases whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender were unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationships between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements were unfair to them. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis."

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs B's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs B.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am

<u>The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance</u>

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

<u>The FCA's Principles</u>

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to them as an investment at the Time of Sale as well as comments about their motivation for making the purchase. It has also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The PR has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on the Lender to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mr and Mrs B was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that the Lender – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an onus on Mr and Mrs B to provide some evidence for the claim they are making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with the Lender, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, the PR has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mr and Mrs B as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in their decision to make the purchase.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mr and Mrs B in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I

also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. The PR's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mr and Mrs B to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led to Mr and Mrs B proceeding with their purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that their decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mr and Mrs B in the course of their complaint. I recognise the PR has interpreted Mr and Mrs B's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

I've thought about the concerns expressed by the PR in reply to my PD, specifically about there being no requirement to provide a witness statement at the same time as making claim. Whilst no formal requirement existed, providing testimony in support of a claim provides it credibility, context and consistency. As I said in my PD, it's important for the decision-maker to be able to see that the Letter of Complaint genuinely reflects the consumer's testimony which simply isn't possible in this case.

I have noted too the PR's comments about it being highly unlikely that Mr and Mrs B were aware of the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS* and/or if they were whether they were able to interpret it. But, as I said in my PD, the likely fact that their witness statement post-dated that judgment (which I note was not disputed by the PR) the greater the risk that their recollections could be influenced by discussions with others. And whilst I note that the PR does not consider Mr and Mrs B's recollections to be vague, I remain of the view that, given the passage of time between the Time of Sale and the witness statement being made, the greater is the *risk* they can be. In short, I remain of the view that I am unable to put enough weight on Mr and Mrs B's account that would allow me, in all reasonableness, to uphold this complaint.

I have thought about the PR's comment about the citing of an exact unit share percentage on the pricing sheet proving that the investment element of the Fractional Club was an important motivation for Mr and Mrs B when making their purchase. But, as I said in my PD, I accept the possibility that Mr and Mrs B may have been interested in a share in the Allocated Properties which wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the products at the centre of this complaint.

The possibility that they were however, doesn't mean it follows that Mr and Mrs B were motivated by their share in the Allocated Properties and the possibility of a profit. For the reasons I gave in my PD, I am of the view that Mr and Mrs B's interest in the holiday benefits the membership offered them leads me to think they would have gone ahead with the purchase even if it had not been presented to them as an investment opportunity. I say this because that interest is underscored by the fact they made ten reservations (only one of which they cancelled) between June 2018 and July 2022. It should not be inferred that I consider Mr and Mrs B's usage of their membership as excessive – as stated the PR – on the contrary, the membership was there to be used. Rather, I mention the number of holidays they booked and took to illustrate that the holiday benefits membership offered them leads me to think they would have gone ahead with the purchase regardless.

The PR objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*[1] and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mr and Mrs B to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. I said that, in my view, Mr and Mrs B were highly motivated by the holiday options offered by the Supplier – which was a factor in my overall conclusion in light of all the available evidence that they would, on balance, have pressed ahead with their purchase of the Fractional Club membership even if there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3).

So ,for the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mr and Mrs B's decision to purchase the Fractional Club membership.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33* ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was *"so high"* and *"a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair"* (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;

[1] R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr and Mrs B in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr and Mrs B, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led them into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr and Mrs B.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mr and Mrs B entered into wasn't high. At £1,063.80, it was only 5% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (4.63%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had they known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I'm not currently persuaded that they either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mr and Mrs B wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of their own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit they needed for a timeshare they wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think Mr and Mrs B would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr and Mrs B but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with

features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr and Mrs B.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mr and Mrs B and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mr and Mrs B's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mr and Mrs B's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mr and Mrs B (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mr and Mrs B a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to them. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr and Mrs B's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr and Mrs B.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, my final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs B and Mr B to accept or reject my decision before 13 February 2026.

Claire Woollerson
Ombudsman