

The complaint and background

Mrs M complains Revolut Ltd won't reimburse over €8,000 that she lost when she fell victim to a holiday rental scam.

Our investigator didn't uphold the complaint. Although he found Revolut ought to have enquired about the purpose of the largest payment, he wasn't persuaded that would have prevented Mrs M's loss and that she still would have proceeded with payments as she considered it was all above board and genuine.

Mrs M disagreed. She considered that the fraudsters suspicious behaviour began only after she had already concluded it was a scam and submitted her fraud report to both Revolut and the police. And the sequence of events disproves the notion she was fully convinced at the time of the transfer and that an intervention from Revolut wouldn't have changed anything. She said that her own subsequent due diligence immediately caused her to change her mind and alert the bank before the fraudsters suspicious actions. She believes that had Revolut provided a tailored warning, this would have landed during a critical period in the scam which would have allowed her to do further homework about the alleged holiday rental before making payment.

As an agreement couldn't be reached, the case has since been passed to me to decide.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

The details of this complaint are well known to both parties. So, if there's a submission I've not addressed; it isn't because I've ignored the point. It's simply because my findings focus on what I consider to be the central issues in this complaint – that being whether Revolut was responsible for Mrs M's loss.

Having taken into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, I agree Revolut ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances.

Revolut explained that it determined the transactions did not fall out of the pattern of Mrs M's account. Our investigator considered that it did and that it ought to have intervened. This was on the basis that prior larger value transactions were mostly sent to existing beneficiaries, whilst these payments were to a new beneficiary and in a new currency.

I think it's arguable whether the transactions ought to have been considered unusual. Whilst making a payment to a new payee is a factor that firms like Revolut ought to consider as part of its general fraud observations, what I can't ignore here is that the initial payment to this new payee was for €1. That meant that when the subsequent payment of €8,192 was made shortly after, it was no longer being made to a 'new' payee. Whilst this is a tactic often employed by scammers, when considering Mrs M's overall account history, it does show that

she utilises foreign currency transactions. Furthermore, her historic account activity also shows some sizeable transactions.

In any event, even if I did consider that Revolut ought to have intervened, for much the same reasons as our investigator, I'm not satisfied this would have prevented Mrs M's loss.

I've carefully considered the available evidence provided by Mrs M alongside the timeline of events available to me from the chat messages, emails, and the initial property rental website interactions. From Mrs M's responses, it's evident she is familiar with the use of the property rental website – which I'll refer to as A, where the villa was advertised. I say this because I can see that multiple enquiries were being made for different properties on A at the time. Furthermore, Mrs M has commented that she was aware that it was not uncommon to move communications outside of A's platform in order to bypass A's booking fees. Mrs M has explained that prior to making the payment, the listing on A was professional, the price was reasonable and made sense considering it was a last-minute booking. She said that when she reached out on A's platform, she was then sent a link to the agency's website – which I'll refer to as H, which included contact information. Interactions with H then took place through email and chat messages. She said those interactions were professional and that H had a great website. Mrs M also confirmed that she had carried out a review of H where she found photos of their office online alongside positive reviews.

Overall, whilst I have considered Mrs M's response to our investigator's findings, I don't think an intervention by Revolut would have made any difference here. By this stage, Mrs M had no reason to doubt everything wasn't above board.

Whilst Mrs M has undoubtedly been the victim of a cruel scam, I can only uphold her complaint if I'm satisfied Revolut's failings made a material difference to what happened. For the reasons given, I'm not persuaded it would have.

I've also looked at the steps taken by Revolut once it was aware the payments were the result of fraud. I'm satisfied that Revolut acted promptly. The payments were sent internationally, therefore such recovery attempts are done so on a best endeavours basis. Mrs M's contact with Revolut was made more than 12 hours after the payment was originally made and when Revolut did finally receive response from the recipient firm - some three weeks later, it was confirmed no funds remained. I appreciate that Mrs M doubts Revolut's actions here, but there's nothing more I would have expected it to do here.

My final decision

For the reasons given above, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs M to accept or reject my decision before 9 March 2026.

Mark O'Connor
Ombudsman