

## **The complaint**

Mrs K complains that Revolut Ltd (“Revolut”) won’t refund the money she lost to a scam.

## **What happened**

In summary, in June 2025, Mrs K was contacted via a messaging app by someone offering her a job with a company (“V”). As she had been looking for work, the contact was not unexpected. She later discovered the person she was dealing with was a scammer.

For the work itself Mrs K was led to believe her role with V would involve reviewing films online and that she would receive commission by completing sets of “tasks”. To make the scam more convincing, she was added to a group chat with other “members” and given access to a “work” platform. The scammer then encouraged Mrs K to deposit her own funds to upgrade her account, unlock more tasks, and supposedly earn more money.

Believing the opportunity was genuine, Mrs K made payments through her Revolut account. The first was a “push-to-card” transaction of about £50. The rest was paid by exchanging her money into cryptocurrency and sending that on as crypto-withdrawals to the scammer. Mrs K realised she had been scammed when she was repeatedly asked to pay more money. By that point, almost £8,000 had unfortunately already been lost to the scam.

Mrs K reported the scam to Revolut on the same day it happened. A complaint was later raised and referred to our Service. Our Investigator didn’t uphold it. In short, he explained we have no jurisdiction to consider the crypto-withdrawals themselves, but that it was unlikely Revolut could have prevented Mrs K’s losses given the responses it received when it did intervene and the coaching Mrs K was receiving from the scammer to avoid detection.

As the matter couldn’t be resolved informally, it’s been passed to me to decide.

## **What I’ve decided – and why**

I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I’ve decided not to uphold it for similar reasons as the Investigator. Mrs K will understandably be disappointed, but these are the key reasons for my decision.

The operation of cryptocurrency services isn’t generally regulated by the UK’s financial regulator. And a complaint relating to the cryptocurrency withdrawals isn’t something we

have the power to consider. But Mrs K deposited fiat into her Revolut account. She also exchanged fiat into cryptocurrency (which was withdrawn through its platform). I think it’s arguable our Service can look at these earlier steps in relation to this complaint – whether Revolut should have intervened on the fiat deposits or on the exchanges of fiat into cryptocurrency – as well as Mrs K first “push-to-card” payment directly to an individual.

### *Authorisation and Prevention*

In line with the Payment Services Regulations 2017, firms are required to execute authorised payment instructions without undue delay. It is not in dispute that Mrs K authorised the transactions in question, so the starting position is that she is responsible for them.

However, considering relevant rules, codes and good practice, there are circumstances where a firm should reasonably take a closer look at a transaction – if, for example, it appears particularly unusual or suspicious.

In this case, I don't consider it unreasonable that Revolut didn't question the deposits, given their amounts and the fact they originated from Mrs K's own genuine account. While I think there was probably enough for Revolut to have intervened when Mrs K made her final (and largest) exchange of fiat into cryptocurrency on 27 June 2025, it's still relevant that Revolut's earlier interventions, albeit in relation to crypto-withdrawals, didn't prevent Mrs K from continuing to make payments as part of the scam.

As referred to by the Investigator, when Revolut intervened to find out more about some of the crypto-withdrawals, Mrs K was asked to answer honestly. She was warned that being pressured to hide details about a payment could indicate a scam. She was taken through a series of automated questions and she confirmed she acting alone, wasn't being pressured to make the payment, or being told what to say. When asked if she was "investing", Mrs K selected "Yes, I'm investing". In turn, Revolut asked follow-up question more relevant to investment scams. Mrs K then confirmed that she hadn't found the investment opportunity on social media, that it didn't promise high returns in a short period, that she was sending funds to her own account, and that she wasn't following any instructions.

The level of intervention was broadly in line with what I would have expected from Revolut. I'm not persuaded that events would have unfolded very differently if Revolut had intervened later that same day at the point (the exchange) I consider appropriate. I can't overlook that some of Mrs K's responses to key questions didn't reflect what was really happening. I'm not persuaded the circumstances were such that Revolut ought to have suspended the account, or that a 'live' intervention was the only proportionate response. And while I realise that the automated interventions did not result in warnings tailored specifically to Mrs K's situation at the time, I don't consider this to have been due to a failing on Revolut's part.

I'm very sorry that Mrs K was scammed and I recognise that the experience has affected her deeply. However, I can only hold Revolut responsible for her losses, in whole or in part, if I find that it missed an opportunity to prevent them. For the reasons I've explained, I don't think that it did. As for recovery, I agree with the Investigator that there was little Revolut could have done to retrieve the international "push-to-card" payment. I also agree that, once processed, the crypto-withdrawals couldn't have been reversed by Revolut.

### **My final decision**

For the reasons given, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs K to accept or reject my decision before 5 May 2026.

Thomas Cardia  
**Ombudsman**