

The complaint

Mrs W's complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

Background to the complaint

Mrs W, along with her husband Mr W, was the member of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 26 October 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 2,610 fractional points at a cost of £8,184 after trading in their existing timeshare membership (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr and Mrs W more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr and Mrs W paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £10,227 from Shawbrook in Mrs W's sole name (the 'Credit Agreement'). Some of the funds were used to repay an existing loan taken with a different lender to fund the purchase of their prior membership.

As only Mrs W was named on the Credit Agreement, only she is able to refer a complaint about it to our Service. For ease I will refer to Mrs W only from here on, even where she and Mr W may have been acting jointly or the matter might otherwise apply to Mr W in some way.

Mrs W – using a professional representative ('PR1') – wrote to Novuna on 23 March 2023 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

Shawbrook dealt with Mrs W's concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 8 May 2024, rejecting it on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. By this time, Mrs W was assisted by a different professional representative ('PR2'). One of our Investigators reviewed the complaint and after considering all the information on file, did not think it should be upheld.

Mrs W disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision, so it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD'). In that decision, I said:

I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. Shawbrook doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs W was:

1. Told that she had purchased an investment that would "considerably appreciate in value" when that was not true.
2. Told that she would own a share in a property that would increase in value during the membership term when that was not true.
3. Told that she could sell the timeshare back to the resort or easily sell it at a profit.
4. Made to believe that she would have access to "the holiday apartment" at any time all year round when that was not true.

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than an honestly held opinion as there isn't enough evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for points 3 and 4, while it's *possible* that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for either or both of these reasons, I don't think it's *probable*. Neither allegation is given the colour or context I consider necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made a false statement of existing fact and/or opinion. The documentation that Mrs W was given (and signed) at the Time of Sale made it clear that the Supplier did not run a "resale" programme and that she was depositing her Fractional Rights – the rights of exclusive use of the Allocated Property – in exchange for her Fractional Points, to exchange for the booking of other holiday resorts. I find it unlikely that the Supplier would've made promises of the type

suggested in the Letter of Complaint, which would have been so starkly contradictory to the contractual paperwork and demonstrably false.

So, while I recognise that Mrs W and her representatives have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that Novuna acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 140A of the CCA: did Shawbrook participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs W's complaint about Shawbrook being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

PR1 said, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before Shawbrook lent to Mrs W. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that Shawbrook failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs W was actually unaffordable before also concluding that she lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to her for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs W.

Connected to this is the suggestion that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that Shawbrook wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs W knew, amongst other things, how much she was borrowing and repaying each month, who

she was borrowing from and that she was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for her, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs W suffering a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on her as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell Shawbrook to compensate her, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs W's credit relationship with Shawbrook was rendered unfair to her under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why her representatives say the credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to her. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

Shawbrook does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs W's Fractional Club membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But Mrs W's representatives say that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs W was told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs W the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what she first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs W as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club membership

offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs W, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs W as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationship between Shawbrook and Mrs W have been rendered unfair to her had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mrs W decided to go ahead with her purchase. That doesn't mean she wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs W herself doesn't persuade me that her purchase was motivated by her share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision she ultimately made.

I say this primarily because of the comments Mrs W made in her own words as to her motivation for purchasing the membership. When referring the complaint to us, PR2 included a statement from Mrs W within which, of relevance to the point at issue here,

she said:

“[The Supplier’s sales representative] knocked on the door to invite us for a coffee as valued members and then took us to the sales office, which we learned was to change our Platinum Vacation Club membership to a Fractional Property Owners Club (FPOC) one. The advantage was to be able to enjoy a flexible system to reserve holidays in worldwide locations. Another supposed advantage was a reduction in annual maintenance fees + our current points system was being phased out in 2020/21 mean[ing] we would be left with absolutely nothing including nothing to Will over to our sons (sic).

[The sales representative] told us we should exchange our Platinum Vacation Club points and buy into the Fractional Property Owners Club (FPOC) for 10 years and then be assured of a large lump sum, tripling what we had paid in. Also, we would eliminate the obligation to use the points over a 2 year period, which was proving very difficult for us to do, or lose the annual accumulation.

...

At this point, we were more inclined to damage limitation given that the maintenance fees under the Platinum Vacation Club were becoming ever more expensive each year. We felt we should accept this change as this should have worked out cheaper for us and we would have something to show for it at the end which we could Will our sons (sic) in the event we passed before [the] end date.”

On my reading of Mrs W’s statement, she was motivated to change her existing timeshare membership to the Fractional Club due to the reduction in maintenance fees it would offer and the prospect of having something that she could pass on to her children. While the investment element – and possibility of a profit on the money she put in – is noted, it is only giving passing reference. Although I can accept it may well have been an attractive feature to her, the final paragraph of those quoted above leads me to think that it was not, ultimately, material to her choice. Mrs W says, in quite explicit terms, that she felt the change was a necessary one given the lower fees and that the membership would be something she could bequeath to her family in the event she passed away before the term came to an end. There was also the benefit of retaining the use of her points for longer than under her existing membership, of interest to her given that she was evidently finding it “difficult” to derive maximum benefit under the existing two-year arrangement.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs W’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with her purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook was unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

PR1 says that Mrs W was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of Fractional Club membership. It also says that the

contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms.

As I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mrs W sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges she could have been subject to as a Fractional Club member in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'). But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mrs W nor her representatives have persuaded me that she would not have pressed ahead with her purchase had the finer details of the Fractional Club's ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier in compliance with Regulation 12, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances.

As for the argument that there were one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement, I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs W in practice, nor that any such terms led her to behave in a certain way to her detriment. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs W's Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that Shawbrook was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct Shawbrook to compensate her.

Shawbrook responded to the PD and accepted it.

PR2 also responded. It did not accept the PD and provided some further comments it wanted me to take into account.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's

(the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

PR2's further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook was unfair. In particular, PR2 has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs W as an investment at the Time of Sale. It has also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by Shawbrook to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, PR2 originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But it didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, it hasn't said it disagrees with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions on them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on PR2's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did Shawbrook participate in an unfair credit relationship?

PR2 has highlighted under Section 140B (9) of the CCA, the burden of proof falls on Shawbrook to disprove the allegation that its relationship with Mrs W was unfair. I agree that this is correct, placing a burden on lenders during the process of litigation. That does not mean, though, that Shawbrook – or I – should take a claim at face value. There remains an

onus on Mrs W to provide some evidence for the claim she is making, despite the overall burden of proof resting with Shawbrook, as was set out in the judgment in *Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc* [2023] UKSC 34 at paragraph 40. I also remind both parties that it is my role to make findings on what I consider to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of any given complaint.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

In its response to my PD, PR2 has reasserted its view that the Supplier marketed the Fractional Club membership to Mrs W as an investment and that this was a motivating factor in her decision.

I accepted in my PD that the membership may well have been marketed as an investment to Mrs W in breach of the prohibition in Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. I also explained that while the Supplier's sales processes left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment, it wasn't necessary for me to make a finding on this as it is not determinative of the outcome of the complaint. I explained that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness and that such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. PR2's response to my PD hasn't changed my view of this, and so whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led Mrs W to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement remains an important consideration.

In my PD I explained the reasons why I didn't think any breach of Regulation 14(3) had led Mrs W to proceed with her purchase. In short, I was not persuaded that her decision was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). In reaching that view, I took into account the testimony given by Mrs W in the course of her complaint. I recognise PR2 has interpreted Mrs W's testimony differently to how I have, and I have carefully considered its further comments. Ultimately though, they have not led me to a different conclusion.

PR2 objects to the approach I've taken in assessing this aspect of the complaint, believing that I have detracted from the judgment in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*¹ and the case law that contributed to it, by requiring Mrs W to have been "primarily or mainly motivated" by the investment element in order to uphold the complaint. But I did not make such a finding. Rather I did not find that the investment element had been *material* to Mrs W's decision, given how motivated I thought she was by other factors.

PR2 queried how it could be assumed that Mrs W was not motivated by the investment element in light of the Supplier's alleged assertion that she stood to triple what she paid in – and asserted that "*the only logical motivation*" to upgrade from her existing membership was this element of the Fractional Club. But as I explained in my PD, Mrs W herself set out that she felt the change was a necessary one given the lower fees and that the prospective membership was one she could bequeath to her family. And I thought she was drawn to the benefit of retaining the use of her points for longer than she could under her existing membership, given her apparent difficulty in utilising them within the existing two-year arrangement. PR2 did not comment on these points within its response and with no further information or evidence to weigh up in this respect, I have not reached a different view of things.

So for the reasons given in my PD and above, I still do not think that any breach of Regulation 14(3), if there was one, was material to Mrs W's decision to purchase the

¹ R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('Shawbrook & BPF v FOS').

Fractional Club membership.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

PR2 says that a payment of commission from Shawbrook to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd*, *Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd* and *Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs W in arguing that her credit relationship with Shawbrook was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that Shawbrook and Supplier were tied to one another

contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs W, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs W into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if Shawbrook and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs W.

Based on what I've seen, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs W but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, Shawbrook didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and Shawbrook were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs W.

Section 140A: conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs W and Shawbrook under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that Shawbrook acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs W's Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that Shawbrook was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct Shawbrook to compensate her.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs W to accept or reject my decision before 13 February 2026.

Ben Jennings
Ombudsman