

The complaint

Mrs S and Mr S' complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mrs S and Mr S were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Signature Collection' – which they bought on 5 September 2016 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy £1500 fractional points at a cost of £9,096 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Signature Collection membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs S and Mr S more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mrs S and Mr S paid for their Signature Collection membership by taking finance of £28,664 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). After paying £9,096 for the Signature Collection membership that is the subject of this complaint, Mrs S and Mr S used the balance of the Credit Agreement to pay off a loan they had taken – in the name of Mr S - to pay for an earlier fractional points purchase.

Mrs S and Mr S – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 2 December 2022 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

As the Lender and Mrs S and Mr S were unable to resolve the complaint, the PR referred the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs S and Mr S disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') dated 15 December 2025. In that decision, I said:

"Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction.

Our Investigator looked at the circumstances of this complaint and didn't think it would be fair or reasonable to uphold this part of the complaint, and I've come to the same conclusion.

Generally, creditors can reasonably reject Section 75 claims that they are first informed about after the claim has become time-barred under the Limitation Act. This is because it wouldn't be fair to expect creditors to investigate such claims so long after the liability arose and after a limitation defence would be available in court. In this case, the Lender says as the concerns have been brought to their attention more than six years after the loan was settled and more than six years after the sale of the fractional product, both of which are considered time-barred under the Limitation Act of 1980. So, I've considered whether it would be fair for me to consider Mrs S and Mr S' Section 75 claim

The PR first submitted a Section 75 claim on this Credit Agreement on 2 December 2022. This was submitted along with another complaint to the Lender about a Credit Agreement taken out in the name of Mr S only. I've seen a copies of both letters, and although they have the same PR reference number, they make it clear that Mrs S and Mr S are complaining about the loan they held jointly (referred to as 'SB2') as well as the loan held in Mr S's sole name (referred to as 'SB1'). So, I think it's reasonable for me to conclude that the Lender – although it didn't deal with the complaint about SB2 at the time – more likely than not received the complaint shortly after 2 December 2022.

In this case, Mrs S and Mr S entered into the purchase of this fractional product on 5 September 2016, and they took out the loan on the same date. As the loan from the Lender was used to help finance the purchase, it was when they entered into the Credit Agreement that they would have suffered a loss under Section 75.

A claim under Section 75 is a "like" claim against the creditor. It essentially mirrors the claim the consumer could make against the Supplier. A claim for misrepresentation against the Supplier would ordinarily be made under Section 2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967.

And the limitation period to make such a claim expires six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued (see Section 2 of the Limitation Act).

But a claim under Section 75 is also 'an action to recover any sum by virtue of any enactment' under Section 9 of the Limitation Act. And the limitation period under that provision is also six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

The Credit Agreement at the centre of this complaint (SB2) was taken out on 5 September 2016, and even if the Lender says it did not receive the complaint until 2024, I'm persuaded that Mrs S and Mr S first notified the Lender of their Section 75 claim on 2 December 2022. But, as more than six years had passed between the Time of Sale and when Mrs S and Mr S first put their Section 75 claim to the Lender, I don't think it is fair or reasonable for me to consider this part of their complaint.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I don't think I can consider that Signature Collection membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what

I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

- 1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;*
- 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale in relation to Signature Collection membership, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- 3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements;*
- 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;*
- 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant*
- 6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender given their circumstances at the Time of Sale.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mrs S and Mr S' complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs S and Mr S. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs S and Mr S was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for the Mrs S and Mr S.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs S and Mr S knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Signature Collection membership. And as the lending doesn't look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs S and Mr S experiencing a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs S and Mr S in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Signature Collection membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mrs S and Mr S say that the sales process went on much longer than they were led to believe it would, and that they felt under pressure to buy Signature Collection membership. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Signature Collection membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs S and Mr S made the decision to purchase Signature Collection membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs S and Mr S' credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that's the suggestion that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs S and Mr S' Signature Collection membership met the definition of a "timeshare contract" and was a "regulated contract" for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations.

Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Signature Collection membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale:

"A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract."

But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs S and Mr S were told by the Supplier that Signature Collection membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value.

The term "investment" is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs S and Mr S the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Signature Collection membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Signature Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Signature Collection membership was marketed or sold to Mrs S and Mr S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it

was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Signature Collection membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Signature Collection membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Signature Collection as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs S and Mr S, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Signature Collection membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Signature Collection membership was marketed and sold to Mrs S and Mr S as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs S and Mr S have been rendered unfair to them had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

In their witness statement recalling the events of this purchase, Mrs S and Mr S say they feel their purchase of the Signature Collection is more of a burden now than an investment. They say they were not told the true facts of making a purchase, and the only week they can guarantee at the Signature Collection suite is if they can beat the online bookers, so it does not feel like a great investment.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Signature Collection membership was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase. Mrs S and Mr S' witness doesn't provide any indication what they were told about Signature Collection membership that made them believe they would receive a financial gain or profit when the Allocated Property is sold. That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all,

that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs S and Mr S's own words don't persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs S and Mr S ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Signature Collection membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs S and Mr S' decision to purchase Signature Collection membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis."

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs S and Mr S' Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it.

The PR also responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered.

Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs S and Mr S as an investment at the Time of Sale. They've also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn't make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven't said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

The PR explained in their response to my PD that they hadn't shared the Investigator's view on this complaint with Mrs S and Mr S, saying "*this was done in order not to influence their recollections*".

The PR also said Mrs S and Mr S hadn't heard about the judgement handed down in *Shawbrook and BPF v FOS*¹. The PR said this means Mrs S and Mr S' recollections have not been influenced by either the Investigator's view or the aforementioned judgment.

I acknowledge the comments the PR has provided in this regard, but I would clarify that I did not refer to the date of Mrs S and Mr S's witness statement. Instead, I focussed on whether what it was Mrs S and Mr S said had motivated them to upgrade to Signature Collection membership.

In my PD, I explained that what Mrs S and Mr S recall the Supplier told them at the Time of Sale is an important consideration for me when deciding if a breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement.

The PR has reaffirmed their view that Mrs S and Mr S upgraded to Signature Collection membership because it was sold to them as an investment. I have thought about what the PR has said. But, as I said in my PD, it seems from what Mrs S and Mr S said in their witness statement about their motivation to upgrade to signature Collection membership, that there isn't any indication of what it was they were told, or shown, that made them believe they would receive a financial gain or profit when the Allocated Property is sold.

I note that in their witness statement Mrs S and Mr S refer to the Signature Membership as an "*investment*", and in their witness statement they say they feel the membership is more of a burden now than an "*investment*". They don't provide any further recollections of what the Supplier told them in this regard that I consider adds any weight to their assertion that they could expect a financial gain or profit when the Allocated Property is sold. And, on balance, on my reading of the evidence, Mrs S and Mr S's witness statement has not persuaded me that that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit.

That doesn't mean they weren't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint.

So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs S and Mr S' purchasing decision.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Signature Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I'm not persuaded Mrs S and Mr S' decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of

¹ *R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service* [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) ('*Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*').

a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender was unfair to them for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33* ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471*, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs S and Mr S in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs S and Mr S, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs S and Mr S into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs S and Mr S.

Based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs S and Mr S but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, the Lender didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs S and Mr S.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs S and Mr S and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs S and Mr S' Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA.

And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them.

My final decision

For the reasons set out above, I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs S and Mr S to accept or reject my decision before 2 March 2026.

Paul Lawton
Ombudsman