

The complaint

Ms K complains that Revolut Ltd ('Revolut') won't reimburse the funds she lost when she fell victim to a scam.

What happened

The facts of the case are well-known to both parties, so I won't cover them in any detail here. In summary, Ms K fell victim to a task-based job scam. On the instructions of scammers, she made three transfers totalling £60 to an individual, two card payments totalling £560 to a cryptocurrency exchange, and a transfer to the same exchange of £1,350.

Ms K realised she was the victim of a scam and contacted Revolut via its chat function to raise a claim.

Revolut said that after taking into account credits, there was no loss from the transactions covered by the PSR's Authorised Push Payment scam reimbursement rules ('the Reimbursement Rules'). Turning to the card payments, Revolut noted that it had made a chargeback claim and was waiting for the outcome. Finally, Revolut noted that it provided scam warnings based on the information provided by Ms K when the transfer to her cryptocurrency account was made.

Ms K was unhappy with Revolut's response and raised a complaint with this service.

The investigator who considered Ms K's complaint didn't recommend that it be upheld. He said that there was no loss in respect of the transactions covered by the Reimbursement Rules or the card payments to a cryptocurrency exchange. Turning to the £1,350 transfer to the same exchange, the investigator noted that the Reimbursement Rules don't apply as the payment was to an account in Ms K's name. He went on to say that it wasn't so unusual that Revolut needed to do anything more than it did.

Ms K was unhappy with the investigator's findings and asked for a final decision. In summary, she raised the following points:

- Her transfer to the cryptocurrency exchange shouldn't be treated as a me-to-me transaction because it was made on the instructions of scammers.
- She doesn't agree the £1,350 transaction was too low in value to be concerning to Revolut. The funds came from a student maintenance loan and represented a significant proportion of her available funds.
- Revolut's intervention wasn't sufficient or proportionate.
- She provided some inaccurate responses to questions raised by Revolut because she was being coached and she doesn't agree that stronger intervention wouldn't have made a difference.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

In deciding what's fair and reasonable, I am required to take into account relevant law and regulations; regulators' rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice and, where appropriate, what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time.

I'm very sorry to hear of what happened to Ms K and of the impact it has had on her. I recognise that she is the victim of a scam, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Revolut is responsible for her loss. When I consider cases like this I am looking at whether Revolut – which was not party to the scam itself – should have done more and whether it could have prevented the payments from being made.

The only payment that is in dispute is a transfer to a cryptocurrency account for £1,350. Ms K made transfers to an individual but there is no loss in respect of these payments as Ms K received credits from scammers that exceed the payments she made. Revolut provided a temporary credit in respect of the card payments and has chosen not to remove the credit even though its chargeback was unsuccessful. It says it made a mistake in raising a chargeback when there was no right to one. So, in effect, Ms K has received £560 more than she should have.

I turn now to the transfer of £1,350.

The Reimbursement Rules I have referred to above don't cover this transaction as the rules require that the beneficiary's account isn't one under the control of the customer. I appreciate Ms K thinks that her payment shouldn't be treated as a me-to-me payment because it was made on the instructions of a scammer. I recognise this was the case, but this doesn't mean the payment was made to an account not under her control or that I can apply the Reimbursement Rules – which are specific about the types of payments it covers.

In broad terms, the starting position at law is that Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations and the terms and conditions of the customer's account.

There are some situations where we believe that businesses like Revolut, taking into account relevant rules, codes and best practice standards, shouldn't have taken their customer's authorisation instruction at 'face value' – or should have looked at the wider circumstances surrounding the transaction before making the payment.

I don't think a payment of £1,350 is so unusual and out of character that Revolut ought reasonably to have taken additional steps before processing it. There's a balance to be struck between identifying payments that could potentially be fraudulent and minimising disruption to legitimate payments. Whilst banks have obligations to act in their customers' best interests, they can't reasonably be involved in every transaction. To do so would involve significant disruption to legitimate payments. But, as I will discuss below, Revolut chose to intervene when Ms K made two payment requests.

Revolut stopped the first payment to an individual (for £10). It asked questions and provided warnings, including job scam warnings. But Ms K provided a negative response to a question which asked her whether she had been asked to complete a set of tasks to earn money. Revolut went on to provide tailored job scam warnings which covered, amongst other things, that fraudsters might offer commission based jobs that are often simple, flexible, and appear to pay well, and that, "Genuine companies don't ask you to transfer your money to Revolut, or to any cryptocurrency or trading platform, as part of a job".

When Ms K made the faster payment to a cryptocurrency exchange, Revolut again paused the transaction. The importance of answering Revolut's questions honestly was stressed, and Ms K was asked if anyone was pressuring her or telling her what to say. Ms K confirmed

that she was completing the transaction by herself. Revolut asked a series of questions including why the transaction was being made (“transferring money to my other account”), which type of account (“My account with another bank”) whether she had been told her account wasn’t safe and whether she controlled the account she was sending funds to. The warnings Revolut then gave to Ms K were based on safe account scams.

Given Ms K’s responses to Revolut’s questions I can understand why it provided safe account scam warnings. But Revolut will have known that the £1,350 transaction was going to a cryptocurrency account, given the payee. So, I think it should have provided cryptocurrency related warnings. But I’m not persuaded that warnings tailored to cryptocurrency or job scams would have resonated with Ms K and prevented her loss. She had already been given warnings that were directly relevant to her circumstances and had moved past them and provided Revolut with incorrect information. And when making the £1,350 payment Ms K also misled Revolut. So I can’t fairly conclude that shortly afterwards, Ms K would have chosen not to make the payment.

I recognise that Ms K had been coached to mislead Revolut but given the relatively low value of the transaction and the advice Revolut gave to Ms K, I don’t think it needed to do anything more.

Overall, whilst I’m sorry to hear about this cruel scam, I can’t fairly ask Revolut to reimburse Ms K.

My final decision

For the reasons stated, I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Ms K to accept or reject my decision before 9 April 2026.

Jay Hadfield
Ombudsman