

## The complaint

Mr V's complaint is, in essence, that Clydesdale Financial Services Limited (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

## What happened

Mr V and his partner were members of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which they bought on 19 June 2017 (the 'Time of Sale'). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to upgrade their existing membership by purchasing 26,500 fractional points at a net cost of £5,790 (the 'Purchase Agreement').

Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr V and his partner more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after their membership term ends.

Mr V paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance in his sole name, of £9,339.38 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). This consolidated a loan used to purchase another Timeshare product.

Mr V – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – referred a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service (the 'Letter of Complaint') on 5 June 2024, to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender was asked for its file. In response it said it had no record of a complaint having been made to it and asked for eight weeks to investigate the complaint. The PR provided a copy of an e-mail to the Lender dated 5 June 2023, in which it raised a complaint on behalf of Mr V.

When the Lender provided its file, it said it thought the section 75 claim had been made out of time. The complaint was then assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, considered the section 75 claim hadn't been made out of time, and rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr V disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me. Having reviewed the case, I issued a provisional decision. In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr V's Section 75 claims, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And

having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him. The Lender agreed with my decision and the PR said it had nothing further to add.

Following my provisional decision, I also communicated to the parties how I was not persuaded that Mr V's credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier. The Lender accepted what I had said, and the PR said in response that it had nothing further to add.

### **The legal and regulatory context**

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

### **The FCA's Principles**

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

### **What I've decided – and why**

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

As I have not been provided with any further submissions from either party, I remain of the opinion that this complaint shouldn't be upheld. I've set out my reasoning again below. Although the purchase agreement was in the joint names of Mr V and his partner, the finance was taken out in Mr V's name only. So, I will refer just to Mr V throughout the rest of this decision.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair

and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale**

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors"), a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers"), in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't now dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr V was:

- (1) not told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was in perpetuity
- (2) told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that was not true.

However, telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. After all, a share in an allocated property was, by its very nature, an investment.

And while the PR has alleged that the membership was in perpetuity, I haven't been provided with any evidence that suggests that. The Purchase Agreement that has been provided, indicates that the proposed sale date of the property attributed to the Fractional points allocation, had a proposed sale date of 31 December 2026. This indicates to me that the Fractional Club membership was for a fixed term of years. And as there's nothing else on file to support the PR's allegation, I'm not persuaded that there was a representation by the Supplier on the issue in question that constituted a false statement of fact.

So, while I recognise that Mr V and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim.

### **Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract**

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender.

So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

Mr V says that he could not holiday where and when he wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. I accept that Mr V may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

Regarding the lack of exclusivity of the accommodation, while I've no doubt the Supplier would have taken the opportunity to promote the quality of its resorts and services, I've not seen persuasive evidence that it made specific false statements about them.

The PR also says on Mr V's behalf that the Supplier breached the Purchase Agreement because it went into liquidation. And if certain parts of the Supplier's business were put into administration, I can understand why the PR is alleging that there was a breach of the Purchase Agreement as a result. However, neither Mr V nor the PR have said, suggested or provided evidence to demonstrate that he is no longer:

1. a member of the Fractional Club;
2. able to use his Fractional Club membership to holiday in the same way he could initially; and
3. entitled to a share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property when his Fractional Club membership ends.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr V any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

#### **Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?**

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr V and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale in relation to Fractional Club membership, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements;
4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale;
5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr V and the Lender.

#### **The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale**

Mr V's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance that:

1. the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr V; and
2. Mr V was pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale.

However, neither of these strike me as reasons why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr V was actually unaffordable, before also concluding that he lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr V.

I acknowledge that Mr V may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But he says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentation that made him feel as if he had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when he simply did not want to. He was also given a 14-day cooling off period and he has not provided a credible explanation for why he did not cancel his membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr V made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because his ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr V's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him as an investment in breach of the prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

### **The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations**

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr V the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what he first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the *marketing and selling* of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract *per se*.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr V as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to him as an investment, i.e. told him or led him to believe that Fractional Club membership offered him the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of *this* complaint.

I've been provided with very little information or documentation about how Mr V's Fractional Club membership was sold. And Mr V has said in his statement that he has no paperwork relevant to the loan taken out to purchase the Fractional Club membership. And the Lender has explained that despite numerous requests to the Supplier, it hadn't received a response. So, I don't know how it was positioned to him during the sales process.

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

### **Was the credit relationship between the Lender and Mr V rendered unfair?**

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr V and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr V and the Lender that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led him to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mr V decided to go ahead with his purchase. I say this because Mr V's partner said on his behalf in the statement provided in support of the complaint:

*"We were told that the 5-year exit plan had been mis sold to ourselves and this did not guarantee an exit after all. We were told that instead, it was a right to 'request' exit after 5 years. We were told that instead, we should purchase these Fractionals which were an investment and would be sold in 2026. We were told that we may get something back from these Fractionals (but if not, we would be out of this agreement)."*

This all suggests to me that Mr V's primary motivation for upgrading to the Fractional membership was as a means to exit his existing Timeshare because of the length of that product. Although he says he was told the Fractional Club membership was an investment, as I've explained already that wasn't untrue. But from what Mr V has said about his recollections of the sale, whilst he has said he was told he might get something back, it doesn't appear that he had the expectation of making a profit/financial gain from the purchase. And for the reasons I have set out above, I'm not persuaded the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when he decided to go ahead with the purchase.

That doesn't mean he wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr V doesn't persuade me that his purchase was motivated by his share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision he ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I

am not persuaded that Mr V's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests he would have pressed ahead with the purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr V and the Lender was unfair to him even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

### **The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale**

The PR says that Mr V was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier in order to make an informed choice.

It isn't clear what information the PR thinks the Supplier failed to provide at the Time of Sale. But as I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

So, while I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mr V sufficient information, in good time, in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'), even if that was the case, neither Mr V nor the PR have persuaded me that he was deprived of information that would have led him to make a different purchasing decision at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why they led to a financial loss.

The PR also said that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer-credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mr V in arguing that his credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mr V, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mr V into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mr V.

Based on what I've seen, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mr V but as the supplier of contractual rights he obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to him when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty.

What's more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, as I understand it, the Lender didn't pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I'm not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mr V.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr V's Section 75 claims. I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate him.

### **My final decision**

For the reasons set out above, my decision is not to uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr V to accept or reject my decision before 4 March 2026.

Simon Dibble  
**Ombudsman**