

The complaint

Mr C's complaint is, in essence, that Clydesdale Financial Services Limited trading as Barclays Partner Finance (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with him under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mr C was an existing member of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier') – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is his membership of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' – which he bought on 15 May 2013 (the 'Time of Sale'). He entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 7,000 fractional points at a cost of £11,760 (the 'Purchase Agreement'), but after being given a trade-in value for his existing 6,000 points and a further discount, he ended up paying £4,896 for his Fractional Club membership.

Unlike his previous membership, the Fractional Club was asset backed – which meant it gave Mr C more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the 'Allocated Property') after his membership term ends.

Mr C paid for his Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £4,896 from the Lender (the 'Credit Agreement'). The outstanding balance of this loan was cleared by Mr C on 27 September 2013.

Mr C – using a professional representative (the 'PR') – wrote to the Lender on 4 April 2019 (the 'Letter of Complaint') to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven't changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn't necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender did not respond to Mr C's complaint (it later said it did not receive it) so the PR referred Mr C's complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. Following that referral the Lender sent its final response to his complaint, rejecting it on all grounds.

There was some doubt whether this Service had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr C's complaint due to the fact that the Lender said it had never received it, and that may have meant the complaint had been made too late. However, the Lender consented to this Service considering the merits of the complaint, so it was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mr C disagreed with the Investigator's assessment and asked for an Ombudsman's decision – which is why it was passed to me.

The provisional decision

I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the 'PD') setting out my initial thoughts on the merits of Mr C's complaint.

In the PD I said:

"I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld.

However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's misrepresentations at the Time of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers ("debtors") a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants ("suppliers") in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn't dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I'll come on to below, it isn't necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

As I have said, there is some doubt as to whether the Lender received the Letter of Complaint that the PR says was sent on 4 April 2019. And this is important because if a claim under Section 75 of the CCA is made more than six years after the event complained about, the Lender may have a defence to the claim under the Limitation Act 1980. However, I do not think it is necessary to explore that further because, as I go on to explain, I don't think the Lender was unfair when it did not accept the claim anyway.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mr C was:

- (1) Told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership had a guaranteed end date when that was not true.*
- (2) Told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was an "investment" when that was not true.*

However, telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. After all, a share in an allocated property was, by its very nature, an investment. And while, as I understand it, the sale of the Allocated Property could be postponed in certain circumstances according to the Fractional Club Rules, Mr C says nothing to persuade me that he was given a guarantee by the Supplier that the Allocated Property would be sold on a specific date when such a promise would have been impossible to stand by given the inevitable uncertainty of selling property some way into the future. And as there's nothing else on file to support the PR's allegation, I'm not persuaded that there was a representation by the Supplier on the issue in question that constituted a false statement of fact.

So, while I recognise that Mr C and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it did not accept this particular Section 75 claim.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier's Breach of Contract

I have already summarised how Section 75 of the CCA works and why it gives consumers a right of recourse against a lender. So, it is not necessary to repeat that here other than to say that, if I find that the Supplier is liable for having breached the Purchase Agreement, the Lender is also liable.

The Letter of Complaint says that Mr C could not holiday where and when he wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, potentially breaching the Purchase Agreement.

Yet, like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays for instance. Some of the sales paperwork likely to have been signed by Mr C states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. So whilst I accept that he may not have been able to take certain holidays, I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement.

So, from the evidence I have seen, I do not think the Lender is liable to pay Mr C any compensation for a breach of contract by the Supplier. And with that being the case, I do not think the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably in relation to this aspect of the complaint either.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, or that there was a breach of contract. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mr C and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

- 1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale;*
- 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;*
- 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and*
- 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances.*

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr C and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale

Mr C's complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was and is made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance that:

1. The right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mr C; and
2. Mr C was pressured by the Supplier into purchasing Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale.

However, as things currently stand, neither of these strike me as a reason why this complaint should succeed.

I haven't seen anything to persuade me that the right checks weren't carried out by the Lender given this complaint's circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mr C was actually unaffordable, before also concluding that he lost out as a result, and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for this reason. And I have seen that Mr C cleared the outstanding balance of the loan within four months of taking it out. So, from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mr C.

And as regards the allegation that Mr C was put under undue pressure at the Time of Sale, I acknowledge that Mr C may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But he says little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during his sales presentation that made him feel as if he had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when he simply did not want to. He was also given a 14-day cooling off period and he has not provided a credible explanation for why he did not cancel his membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr C made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because his ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mr C's credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to him under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR now says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to Mr C. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to him as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mr C the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what he first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mr C as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to him as an investment, i.e.

told him or led him to believe that Fractional Club membership offered him the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

And there is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mr C, the financial value of his share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

But on the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mr C as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach (if there was one) had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mr C and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mr C and the Lender that was unfair to him and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led him to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when Mr C decided to go ahead with his purchase. There is little actual evidence to support this allegation, because there is no direct evidence from Mr C as to what happened at the Time of Sale or what his motivations to make the purchase were.

The Letter of Complaint to the Lender provides information regarding the claim and complaint under the CCA, but this is not testimony from Mr C. It does not set out his first-hand recollections of what happened at the Time of Sale, nor does it help me in any way to understand his motivation to make the purchase. And that is important here. If I am to find that a breach of Regulation 14(3) was material, I need to be persuaded that Mr C's motivation to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was because it was an investment, with the possibility of a profit at the end.

So, in the absence of direct testimony, I have looked at the circumstances surrounding the sale, and Mr C's situation at the time.

As I've said, Mr C was an existing member of a points-based timeshare with the Supplier. And I've not seen anything which would suggest that he was unhappy with his membership, which begs the question, why would he change? So, I have considered what he got with the Fractional Club that he didn't have with his existing membership. As I've said, Fractional Club did have an investment element to it, but that was not the only difference it provided.

Mr C had 6,000 points with which to book accommodation from the Supplier's portfolio of resorts. And with his purchase of the Fractional Club he enhanced this membership with a further 1,000 points, so this would have meant he had improved access to holidays. But in addition to this, the membership term of the Fractional Club was significantly less than his previous membership, with a sale date of the Allocated Property commencing at the end of 2027 compared to an end date of 2054, meaning he would have to pay significantly less overall in annual maintenance fees with the Fractional Club. So it is for these reasons that I think it most likely Mr C decided to purchase the Fractional Club.

That doesn't mean he wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mr C himself doesn't persuade me that his purchase was motivated by his share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don't think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision he ultimately made.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mr C's decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, on the evidence available I think he would have pressed ahead with his purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mr C and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that Mr C was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier in order to make an informed choice.

It isn't clear what information the PR thinks the Supplier failed to provide at the Time of Sale. But as I've already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant.

So, while I acknowledge that it is possible that the Supplier did not give Mr C sufficient information, in good time, in order to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 12 of the Timeshare Regulations (which was concerned with the provision of 'key information'), even if that was the case, neither Mr C nor the PR have persuaded me that he was deprived of information that would have led him to make a different purchasing decision at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why they led to a financial loss for Mr C.

Mr C's Commission Complaint

*I note that one of Mr C's other concerns relates to alleged payments of commission by the Lender to the Supplier for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreement. The Supreme Court's recent judgment *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft')*

clarified the law on payments of commission – albeit in the context of car dealers acting as credit brokers. In my view, the Supreme Court’s judgment sets out principles which appear capable of applying to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, once I understand the commission arrangements relevant to Mr C’s complaint, I will address this aspect of the complaint before finalising my thoughts overall.

Conclusion

In conclusion, as things currently stand, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with the relevant Section 75 claims, and if I put the issue of commission to one side for the time being, I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mr C under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA – nor do I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr C.”

The responses to the provisional decision

The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it, and provided details of the commission that it had paid to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement. The PR, on Mr C’s behalf, did not accept it, but provided no further evidence that it wished me to consider.

Following this, and further to my PD, I set out to both sides why I was not persuaded that Mr C’s credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to him for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier.

The PR responded to say it had nothing further to add.

Having received the relevant responses from both sides, I am now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Office of Fair Trading’s Irresponsible Lending Guidance – 31 March 2010

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide greater clarity for businesses and consumer representatives as to the business practices that the Office of Fair Trading (the ‘OFT’) thought might have constituted irresponsible lending for the purposes of Section 25(2B) of the CCA. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 2.3
- Paragraph 5.5

The OFT's Guidance for Credit Brokers and Intermediaries - 24 November 2011

The primary purpose of this guidance was to provide clarity for credit brokers and credit intermediaries as to the standards expected of them by the OFT when they dealt with actual or prospective borrowers. Below are the most relevant paragraphs as they were at the relevant time:

- Paragraph 2.2
- Paragraph 3.7
- Paragraph 4.8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both sides, I've considered the case afresh. And having done so, and because no new evidence has been submitted or arguments made in response to my initial findings, I see no reason to depart from the outcome as set out in the provisional decision above.

Given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mr C's Section 75 claims, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with him under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to him for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mr C.

My final decision

I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 12 February 2026.

Chris Riggs
Ombudsman