

The complaint

Mrs O's complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the 'Lender') acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the 'CCA') and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA.

What happened

Mrs O was the member of a timeshare provider (the 'Supplier'). The products at the centre of this complaint are her memberships of a timeshare that I'll call the 'Fractional Club' and a timeshare I'll call the Signature Collection, which Mrs O purchased on the dates below:

- 810 Fractional Club fractional points on 13 March 2017 for £13,510 ('Purchase Agreement 1')
- 1100 Signature Collection fractional points on 14 March 2018 for £13,856 – having traded in the first lot of 810 fractional points. ('Purchase Agreement 2')

(When appropriate, I'll simply refer to the 'Purchase Agreements')

As this complaint is concerned with the purchases on 13 March 2017 and 14 March 2018, those are the 'Times of Sale' for the purposes of my decision.

Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships were asset backed – which meant they gave Mrs O more than just holiday rights. They also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the relevant purchase agreement (which I'll refer to as 'Allocated Property 1 and 2 - the Allocated Properties') after Mrs O's membership term ends.

The Signature Collection differed from other timeshares offered by the Supplier, in that members had preferential rights to stay in their allocated property, and the properties were said to be more luxurious.

Mrs O paid for her fractional points by taking the following amounts of finance from the Lender:

- £13,510 on 13 March 2017 ('Credit Agreement 1')
- £27,337 on 14 March 2018 ('Credit Agreement 2')

(when appropriate, I'll simply refer to as the 'Credit Agreements')

Mrs O purchased the memberships with another person. But as the finance used for the purchase at the Times of Sale was in Mrs O's sole name, only she is eligible to bring this complaint.

Mrs O – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 14 December 2021 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above.

The Lender dealt with Mrs O’s concerns as complaints and issued its final response letters on 13 and 21 September 2022, rejecting them on every ground.

The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits.

Mrs O disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me.

I issued a provisional decision (the PD) on 7 January 2026, which said:

‘I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it.

Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Times of Sale

The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here.

It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Times of Sale because Mrs O was:

- 1. Told that she had purchased an investment that would “considerably appreciate in value”.*
- 2. Promised a considerable return on her investment because she was told that she would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value.*
- 3. Told that she could sell her memberships to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit.*
- 4. Made to believe that she would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round.*

However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier's properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier's sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn't any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held.

As for points 3 and 4, while it's possible that Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships were misrepresented at the Times of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don't think it's probable. Mrs O has given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn't any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club or Signature Collection memberships were misrepresented for these reasons, I don't think they were.

So, while I recognise that Mrs O and the PR have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club and Signature Collections memberships were sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I've set out above, I'm not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don't think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with these particular Section 75 claims.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in one or more unfair credit relationships?

I've already explained why I'm not persuaded that Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships were actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Times of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales processes that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I'm to consider this complaint in full – which is what I've done next.

Having considered the entirety of the credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don't think the credit relationships between them were likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

1. The standard of the Supplier's commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Times of Sale along with any relevant training material;
2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Times of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;
3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements;
4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Times of Sale;
5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant
6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement.

I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the relevant credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender.

The Supplier's sales & marketing practices at the Times of Sale

Mrs O's complaint about the Lender being party to unfair credit relationships was made for several reasons.

The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren't carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs O. I haven't seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs O was actually unaffordable before also concluding that she lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationships with the Lender was unfair to her for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs O.

Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreements were arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn't permitted to enforce the Credit Agreements. However, it looks to me like Mrs O knew, amongst other things, how much she was borrowing and repaying each month, who she was borrowing from and that she was borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships. And as none of the lending looks like it was unaffordable for her, even if the one or more of the Credit Agreements were arranged by a broker that didn't have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can't see why that led to Mrs O suffering a financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationships in question were unfair on her as a result. And with that being the case, I'm not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate Mrs O, even if the loans weren't arranged properly.

The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreements. But as I can't see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs O in practice, nor that any such terms led her to behave in a certain way to her detriment, I'm not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership or Signature Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy.

I acknowledge that Mrs O may have felt weary after sales processes that she has stated went on for a long time. But she's said little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during the sales presentations that made her feel as if she had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when she simply did not want to. She was also given a 14-day cooling off period and she has not provided a credible explanation for why she did not cancel her membership during that time. Moreover, Mrs O did go on to upgrade her membership – which I find difficult to understand if the reason she went ahead with the purchases in question was because she was pressured into them. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs O made the decisions to purchase Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships because her ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

Overall, therefore, I don't think that Mrs O's credit relationships with the Lender were rendered unfair to her under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationships with the Lender was unfair to Mrs O. And that's the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to her as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations

Shares in the Allocated Properties clearly constituted investments as they offered Mrs O the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what

they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club and Signature Collection memberships included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn't prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se.

In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club or Signature Collection. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold.

To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs O as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club and Signature Collection membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Times of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations.

On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an 'investment' or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs O the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Properties along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier's sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it's equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs O as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it's not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision.

Would the credit relationships between the Lender and Mrs O have been rendered unfair to her had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations?

Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Times of Sale, I now need to consider what impact such breaches had on the fairness of the credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way.

Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender that were unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier's breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreements and the Credit Agreements is an important consideration.

But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from

Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mrs O decided to go ahead with her purchases. That doesn't mean she wasn't interested in a share in the Allocated Properties. After all, that wouldn't be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs O doesn't persuade me that her purchases were motivated by her shares in the Allocated Properties and the possibility of a profit, I don't think breaches of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier were likely to have been material to the decisions Mrs O ultimately made.

I say that having taken into account Mrs O's witness statement which the PR says was drafted in August 2018. In brief, there is very little mention in the statement of any reference to potential investments or returns. Instead, Mrs O stated that at the time of the first sale, the Supplier discussed her family's holiday habits and that she was looking for a better standard of accommodation than could be found on the High Street. She said that the Supplier offered her a number of inducements, such as cashback; a tablet; a waiver of the annual management fee and two years of free membership with Interval International, as well as a free upgrade each year.

Mrs O went on to say that due to booking difficulties and concerns with the quality of the accommodation, she began to believe she may have made a mistake in purchasing the Fractional Club membership. She said that in 2018, the Supplier highlighted the benefits of the Signature Collection and on that basis, she decided to upgrade her existing membership.

The Supplier has also provided evidence which shows that over the course of the two memberships, Mrs O booked a total of eight holidays, although the majority of those bookings were cancelled.

Taking everything into account, I think it's likely that Mrs O wanted to benefit from the accommodation Fractional Club membership offered, as well as the inducements she was offered at the first Time of Sale. And given she chose to upgrade to Signature Collection membership only a year later, which, as I've said, offered preferential allocated property rights and more luxurious properties, it seems to me that Mrs O was interested in the ability to benefit from the standard of holiday that membership of the Signature Collection could provide.

I've carefully considered all of the evidence. As I've said, I accept the possibility that Mrs O was sold the memberships as an investment and that this may have been a real consideration for her. But I think it's more likely than not that the main factor behind Mrs O's decision to purchase the memberships was the ability to make use of them to take holidays and to benefit from the inducements she was offered. So even if Mrs O was told that the memberships would result in a financial profit, I am not persuaded that anything she was told about this had a material impact on her decisions to take out membership.

On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs O's decisions to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Times of Sale were motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with her purchases whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender were unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3).

Section 140A: Conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationships between Mrs O and the Lender

under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements were unfair to her. And as things currently stand, I don't think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.'

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs O's Section 75 claims. I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreements and related Purchase Agreements that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs O.

The Lender did not respond to the PD.

The PR also responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered.

Having received the relevant responses from the PR, I'm now finalising my decision.

The legal and regulatory context

In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators' rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time.

The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service's website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

The Consumer Credit Sourcebook ('CONC') – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority's (the 'FCA') Handbook of Rules and Guidance

Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time:

- CONC 3.7.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.3 [R]
- CONC 4.5.2 [G]

The FCA's Principles

The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses ('PRIN'). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint:

- Principle 6
- Principle 7
- Principle 8

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and

reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Following the responses from both parties, I've considered the case afresh and having done so, I've reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons.

Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn't to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven't commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn't mean I haven't considered it.

Rather, I've focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision.

The PR's further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs O and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs O as an investment at the Time of Sale. They've also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship.

As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn't make any further substantive comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven't said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven't been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I'll focus here on the PR's points raised in response.

Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship?

The Supplier's alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

As I explained in my PD, I wasn't persuaded that the evidence suggested that Mrs O purchased Fractional Club membership in whole or in part down to any breach of Regulation 14(3).

That's because, as I already said in my PD, Mrs O's witness statement made very little reference to any potential investments or returns. Instead, she'd referred to seeking a better standard of accommodation and to the inducements she was offered to purchase membership. And she'd explained that the Supplier had highlighted the benefits of Signature Collection membership. I'd reiterate that the Supplier also provided evidence which shows that over the course of the two memberships, Mrs O booked a total of eight holidays, although the majority of those bookings were cancelled. So I find there is little persuasive evidence that any potential investment returns motivated Mrs O to purchase memberships.

I agree with the PR that just because a purchaser was interested in taking holidays with the Supplier, that does not preclude them also being motivated to take out Fractional Club or Signature Collection membership by any investment element – indeed I would find it surprising if any members were not interested in taking holidays, given the nature of the product. However, as I've said above and in my PD, I do not find any such investment element to be Mrs O's motivation for purchasing the memberships.

The PR says that as the Supplier's pricing sheet set out the 'unit share' Mrs O acquired under her Signature Collection membership, this shows the investment element played 'quite an important role' in convincing her to purchase it. But I don't agree with that analysis. The

pricing sheet was a proforma document that captured a number of details about the purchase in a standardised format. And the Supplier would have recorded that information irrespective of the customer's motivations for purchasing. So, I don't consider this document offers any insight into Mrs O's motivation for making her purchase.

So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs O's purchasing decision.

The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in *Shawbrook & BPF v FOS*, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances.

So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I'm not persuaded Mrs O's decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don't think the credit relationship between Mrs O and the Lender was unfair to her for this reason.

The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale

The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale.

As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: *Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd* [2025] UKSC 33 ('*Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*').

The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A "disinterested duty", as described in *Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly* [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough.

However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson's case it was 55%. This was "so high" and "a powerful indication that the relationship...was unfair" (see paragraph 327);
2. The failure to disclose the commission; and
3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA:

1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit;
2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);
3. The characteristics of the consumer;
4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and
5. Compliance with the regulatory rules.

From my reading of the Supreme Court's judgment in *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench*, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* is relevant law that I'm required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority's Dispute Resolution Rules ('DISP').

But I don't think *Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench* assists Mrs O in arguing that her credit relationships with the Lender were unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn't properly disclosed to Mrs O, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs O into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have.

I acknowledge that it's possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

But as I've said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn't necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don't currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs O.

In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson's case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreements that Mrs O entered into wasn't high. At £122.94 of the 2017 loan, it was only 0.91% of the amount borrowed and even less than that at 0.84% as a proportion of the charge for credit. And at £1093.48 of the 2018 loan, it was only 4% of the amount borrowed and 3.71% as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had Mrs O known at the Times of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at those levels, I'm not persuaded that she either wouldn't have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payments at that time. After all, Mrs O wanted Fractional Club and Signature Collection membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such low levels, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit Mrs O needed for timeshares she wanted doesn't strike me as disproportionate. So, I think Mrs O would still have taken out the loans to fund her purchases at the Times of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed.

What's more, based on what I've seen so far, the Supplier's role as a credit broker wasn't a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier's overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can't see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its

commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreements. And as it wasn't acting as an agent of Mrs O but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreements, the transaction doesn't strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of 'loyalty' to her when arranging the Credit Agreements and thus a fiduciary duty.

Overall, therefore, I'm not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationships unfair to Mrs O.

I will also address the PR's point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the 2017 Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mrs O in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of her share in the Allocated Property.

It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners' certificate, is 31 December 2032. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mrs O. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 15 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following:

*"The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in **19 years time** or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate."* (bold my emphasis).

It seems clear to me that the commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2032. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I've set out above.

So, I can't see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint.

S140A conclusion

Given all of the factors I've looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I'm not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs O and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don't think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis.

Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint

While I've found that Mrs O's credit relationship with the Lender wasn't unfair to her for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs O's complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I've considered those grounds on that basis here.

The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs O (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender's compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Times of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them.

However, for the reasons I set out above, I'm not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs O a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at

law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren't, in my view, available to her. And while it's possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Times of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don't think any such failure on the Lender's part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think Mrs O would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchases at the Times of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs O's Section 75 claims, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to credit relationships with her under the Credit Agreement that were unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs O.

My final decision

For the reasons I've given above and in my provisional decision, my final decision is that I don't uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Mrs O to accept or reject my decision before 19 March 2026.

Lisa Barham
Ombudsman