

The complaint

Miss O complains that J.P. Morgan Europe Limited trading as Chase (“Chase”) won’t refund the money she lost to a job scam.

What happened

The background is known to both parties, so I won’t repeat it in detail. In summary, Miss O says that, in October 2024, a friend introduced her to what she believed was a legitimate job opportunity. Her friend had apparently been doing the “job” for months without any issues. As Miss O had recently been made redundant, she was interested in earning an income.

Miss O was told the role involved earning a salary by “optimising apps” through completing sets of assigned tasks. As part of this process, she was given access to a convincing online platform that displayed her tasks and apparent earnings. She was also required to deposit her own funds to continue with the work. She later realised she was being scammed when she was repeatedly told she needed to make more payments to withdraw her funds.

By that point, more than £17,700 had been sent from her Chase account between October and November 2024. Some funds were sent via her account with a legitimate crypto-platform (“C”) before they were sent on and lost to the scam, while others were sent through her account with her personal bank. That bank (“H”) decided to refund some of her losses.

In September 2025, Miss O complained to Chase, but it declined to refund any of the money. When the complaint was referred to our Service, the Investigator noted there was a lack of evidence to support that all the disputed payments claimed had been paid and lost to the scam Miss O had described. The Investigator also considered it unlikely that an intervention would have prevented Miss O’s losses, given what happened when Chase did intervene.

What I’ve decided – and why

I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I’ve reached the same conclusions as the Investigator. Miss O will understandably be disappointed but these are the key reasons for my decision.

Under the relevant law – the Payment Services Regulations 2017 – the starting point is Miss O is responsible for payments she has authorised. And, in broad terms, Chase is expected to process payments and withdrawals that its customer has approved. While Chase is also expected to remain alert to the risk of fraud and, in some circumstances, carry out additional checks before processing a payment, I’m satisfied that it took appropriate steps in this case to understand more about what Miss O was involved in.

The first intervention was on 15 October 2024, when Chase blocked a payment attempt of £9,200. Miss O was told the questions being asked were intended to protect her account. She was warned about “safe accounts” and the risks associated with granting remote access. She confirmed she hadn’t been instructed on what to say to allow the payment to be

processed and she was told that, if she wasn't truthful about the payment purpose, it was unlikely she would be able to recover her money if it later turned out to be a scam.

Miss O was asked whether she was sending money to C as part of an investment. In reply, she said "kind of...because it's an account that I'm using for a business that I'm carrying on, that's why I opened it". When asked to explain what sort of business she was involved in, Miss O declined to answer. She was next asked why she was sending funds to C via Chase, rather than from her account with H. Miss O replied she had moved the maximum amounts from H to C and it was her preference to make the payment in this way. As the fraud team wasn't satisfied with the answers, Miss O was told that the payment wouldn't be processed.

In a call on 16 October 2024, following another blocked payment, Miss O was taken through a similar set of questions. She was reminded to be honest and warned that being told what to say to the bank can be a red flag for scams. Miss O said she hadn't been instructed by a third party. When asked for a payment purpose, she said it was for investment. When asked to explain more, she said the investment was something she was doing with her sister. She said she had spoken to friends or family who had made successful transactions, that she had researched the legitimacy of the platform, and that she had received money from the investment. She was then warned about investment scams, including the risks of social media adverts, promises of high returns, and requests to pay fees to withdraw funds.

Another intervention took place on 28 October 2024, following a blocked payment of £1,000. Miss O was again taken through a similar set of questions. She confirmed that no one had instructed her on what to say in order for the transaction to proceed, that she was sending money to her account with C, and that she had received earlier transfers.

When asked about the purpose of the payment, Miss O said it was for an investment and that she had found the opportunity through a family member. She said she had carried out her own due diligence, that she alone had access to the account she was paying into, and that no adviser or third party was assisting her. She also confirmed that she had not been promised high returns, such as 10% or more, and that she had checked the FCA Register.

Miss O was then given warnings relevant to investments and crypto-assets scams. These included warnings that online platforms are targeted by fraudsters, and that pressure to act quickly, promises of high returns, unexpected contact, social media adverts, and requests to pay fees to withdraw funds were indicators of a scam. She was told it was her responsibility to ensure that the person or company she was paying was genuine. She was advised to take time to review the "Take Five" guidance and was offered the opportunity to cancel the payment to carry out further research. Miss O said she wanted the payment to proceed.

There was a further intervention on 4 November 2024, following an attempted payment of £1,000. Miss O confirmed that she was sending the money to the same account as before and that she hadn't been asked or forced to make the payment. When asked about the purpose of the payment, Miss O again said it was for investment. However, when asked what type of investment she was making, she said this was a personal question she didn't wish to answer. When the adviser explained the question was intended to help protect her from scams, Miss O said she had been investing since October 2024. She confirmed that she hadn't found the opportunity through social media or public-figure endorsements.

Miss O also said only she had access to the funds, that other family members had invested, that she hadn't been promised unusually high returns, and that she had checked the FCA Register. When Miss O replied that she was buying cryptocurrency, the adviser said that Chase no longer supported those payments. In turn, Miss O sent the money back to H. And I think it's significant that, despite the various blocks and warnings, Miss O went on to make payments to the scam from that account instead.

When we first asked Miss O what she recalled about her conversations with Chase, she said she had been truthful with the bank. She said she told Chase the payments were for a job opportunity and that she had also explained she intended to “invest” the proceeds from that opportunity. In later correspondence, she said that describing the payments as “investing” or relating to a “business” reflected her belief that she was building something legitimate.

For me, it remains unclear why Miss O responded as she did. However, I’m satisfied that Chase’s interventions were proportionate to the risks presented by the payments. The largest payment was blocked because Miss O didn’t provide sufficient information. For subsequent, lower-value payments, and based on the responses she gave, Chase issued appropriate warnings about investment scams. At no point did Miss O indicate that the payments were being made as part of a job. While I recognise the warnings weren’t tailored to her specific situation and didn’t prevent her from continuing to make payments, I’m not persuaded that this was as a result of any significant failings on Chase’s part.

Given also how Miss O engaged during the interventions and the absence of scam-related chat from the relevant period (despite the Investigator explaining how deleted messages may be recoverable), I’m not persuaded that she would have been more forthcoming about the true nature of her situation even if Chase had asked additional questions. And given the apparent influence she was under (continuing to make payments despite some relevant warnings and account blocks), I’m not convinced she wouldn’t have found other ways to send her money had Chase stopped cryptocurrency payments sooner than it did.

I’m very sorry Miss O was scammed. I’m mindful of what she has told us about her personal circumstances and I understand why she wants to do all she can to recover her money. But for me to uphold this complaint, I would need to be satisfied Chase missed an opportunity to prevent what happened. For the reasons given, I don’t think it did. As for recovery, I agree there was little Chase could have done, given that the funds first went into Miss O’s accounts before being lost. If any funds remained, she would have been able to access them herself.

My final decision

For the reasons given, I don’t uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Miss O to accept or reject my decision before 20 May 2026.

Thomas Cardia
Ombudsman