

The complaint

Miss D complains that Revolut Ltd unfairly refuses to refund her money she lost in a recovery scam.

What happened

Miss D was contacted by someone about an old account she had, which she thought she had closed some years earlier. They said the account was frozen, but they could unfreeze the account and recover funds from it, which amounted to 2.83 BTC. In order to do that, they told Miss D she would need to make a payment via a cryptocurrency platform. Miss D agreed and made the payment. She was then given reasons why she would need to make a further, larger payment. She agreed to this, but when she had completed the payment, she was asked to make another payment, this time for 'anti-money laundering purposes'. When Miss D attempted to make that payment, Revolut contacted her through her online banking application and asked some questions about the payment. Based on Miss D's answers, Revolut told her it thought she was being scammed and so the payment was cancelled.

Miss D made or attempted the following payments as part of the scam:

Date	Amount	Payment type	Payment destination
02/10/2025	£480.00	Bank transfer	Own cryptocurrency account
07/10/2025	£2,500.00	Bank transfer	Own cryptocurrency account
07/10/2025	£2,500.00	<i>Bank transfer</i>	<i>Declined</i>

Miss D says Revolut should have done more to recover her money and considers it should provide her with a refund.

Revolut says the payments are not covered by the APP scam reimbursement (ASR) rules because the payments were made to another account Miss D controlled and such payments are not covered by the rules. It said it sent Miss D a new beneficiary warning when she set up the payee and made the first payment. It also intervened when Miss D attempted to make a third payment and it asked her questions, which uncovered the scam and prevented any further losses. It was not able to obtain a refund from Miss D's cryptocurrency account.

The complaint was considered by one of our investigators, but they did not uphold Miss D's complaint. Having considered various factors, the Investigator thought Revolut had intervened appropriately and proportionately in relation to the payments, with intervention starting with a general automated warning for the first, low value payment, and escalating to person-person questioning when Miss D attempted a third payment to her cryptocurrency account, the second that day, with a total value of £5,000. The Investigator also explained that Revolut had attempted to recover Miss D's money by contacting her cryptocurrency provider, but her money had already been moved on to the scammers and there were no funds available for recovery.

Miss D did not accept the Investigator's assessment and asked for an ombudsman's decision. She said she could not accept that Revolut could not do anything to retrieve her money.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

I was sorry to read about the circumstances of Miss D's complaint and about the impact this matter has had on her, not just in terms of the financial loss but also the distress this has caused her. There is no question that Miss D has been the victim of a cruel scam. But in order to fairly uphold this complaint about Revolut, I need to find that Revolut was responsible for Miss D's loss. Having considered all the available evidence and submissions, I am not persuaded Revolut is at fault here.

In broad terms, the starting position is that Revolut is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, in accordance with the accounts terms and conditions and with the Payment Services Regulations (PSRs). It is not in dispute that Miss D authorised these payments, although I accept that she was tricked into doing so. Revolut had an obligation to process the payments.

I have taken into account the regulator's rules and guidance; relevant codes of practice, along with what I consider to have been good industry practice at the time. Having done so, I consider Revolut should have fairly and reasonably been on the lookout for the possibility of Authorised Push Payment scams (amongst other things) at the time, and intervened if there were clear indications its customer might be at risk.

Revolut does have a difficult balance to strike in how it configures its systems to detect unusual activity that might indicate its customers are a higher risk of fraud. It would not be reasonable or possible for Revolut to intervene in every transaction it processes. I would expect intervention to be proportionate to the circumstances of the transaction.

In Miss D's case, Revolut sent her a warning when she made the first payment and while that was an automated, new beneficiary warning, it did contain some general warnings about scams. I consider that was a reasonable warning, given that the first payment was for a relatively low amount and it would not have appeared to be part of a wider pattern of suspicious payments, at that point. Revolut did not send a warning in relation to the second payment and, overall, I consider that was reasonable too. While that payment was larger than the first, it was not so large that I think it ought to have led Revolut to intervene. It was made several days after the first payment, so it would not necessarily have appeared to be part of a known fraud pattern, which might involve the rapid depletion of an account. I acknowledge the payment was to a cryptocurrency platform, which might have been a risk factor, as many scams do involve channelling payments through cryptocurrency. But, based on the particular combination of risk factors here, I do not consider there were enough risk factors to mean Revolut really should have intervened in payment two.

By payment three, Revolut intervened by asking Miss D a series of questions about the purpose of the transaction and these questions led to the scam being uncovered. Since that intervention uncovered the scam and prevented Miss D from sending any further money to the scammers, I think Revolut's intervention was reasonable and effective.

Revolut did contact Miss D's cryptocurrency provider to attempt to recover her money, but it was not able to recover anything. It is clear from the evidence provided that the money had already been converted into cryptocurrency and sent on from Miss D's cryptocurrency account to a wallet controlled by scammers. In those circumstances, there was nothing further Revolut could reasonably do to try and recover Miss D's money.

Overall, while I am sorry to disappoint Miss D, I find that Revolut intervened appropriately

and I would not have expected it to have intervened further than it did. I also consider that there was no reasonable prospect of Revolut being able to recover Miss D's money, since it had been moved out of her cryptocurrency account quite quickly and before Revolut became aware Miss D had been scammed.

My final decision

I don't uphold Miss D's complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Miss D to accept or reject my decision before 9 April 2026.

Greg Barham
Ombudsman