

The complaint

Ms S complains Revolut Ltd won't reimburse money she lost when she fell victim to a scam.

What happened

The background to this complaint is well known to both parties and so I'll only refer to some key events here.

Ms S said she was contacted by an individual, who we now know to be a scammer, who offered her a remote job opportunity. As a result, in January 2024, she paid around £5,000 from Revolut to an account she held with an Electronic Money Institute (EMI), which I will refer to as W, and from there onto the scammers via a genuine crypto exchange provider and multiple other different payees, to what she was led to believe was a genuine job opportunity. Ms S realised she had been a victim of a scam, when she kept being asked to make more payments, even after she had used all her savings and borrowed money from friends, without being allowed to make any withdrawals.

Ms S has also raised a complaint against W, which I will address separately.

Revolut agreed to partially refund Ms S as a gesture of goodwill to try and bring the complaint to a resolution. However, Ms S didn't agree and raised the complaint to the Ombudsman Service and asked for a substantial refund of the funds she lost.

Our Investigator didn't uphold the complaint. He said the payments Ms S made were not large enough for Revolut to have intervened, and there was no obvious scam pattern forming, which would indicate Ms S was at risk of financial harm from fraud when she made the payments. The Investigator also went on to say, even though he didn't expect Revolut to intervene, Revolut did question Ms S twice when she attempted to make the payments to fund the scam. And on both occasions, Ms S provided inaccurate information, which prevented Revolut from providing her with warnings which were relevant to the scam she was falling victim to, or allowed Revolut to uncover the scam. So, the Investigator didn't feel Revolut needed to do anything else.

Ms S didn't agree, so the complaint has been passed to me to decide.

What I've decided – and why

I've considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what's fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint.

Having done so, I've come to the same outcome as the Investigator for largely the same reasons. I'll explain why.

I'm very aware that I've summarised this complaint briefly, in less detail than has been provided, and in my own words. No discourtesy is intended by this. Instead, I've focussed on what I think is the significant part here. If there's something I've not mentioned, it isn't because I've ignored it. I haven't. I'm satisfied I don't need to comment on every individual

point or argument to be able to reach what I think is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this. This simply reflects the informal nature of our service as a free alternative to the courts.

In line with the Payment Services Regulations (PSR) 2017, consumers are generally liable for payments they authorise. Revolut is expected to process authorised payment instructions without undue delay. As an Electronic Money Institution (EMI), they also have long-standing obligations to help protect customers from financial harm from fraud and scams. However, there are many payments made by customers each day and it's not realistic or reasonable to expect an EMI to stop and check every payment instruction. There's a balance to be struck between identifying payments that could potentially be fraudulent, and minimising disruption to legitimate payments.

Having considered the value of the payments Ms S sent, and the identifiable risk at the time they were made, I'm not convinced they were of a value that ought to have triggered Revolut's automatic payment checking process. None of the payments reached an amount that I think should have concerned Revolut, including those sent across the same day, especially as most of the payments were sent to Ms S's own account before being sent onto the scammers.

Having said that, Revolut did pause two payments on 21 and 22 January 2024, and asked Ms S to complete some automated questions. On both occasions, Ms S provided the following responses:

- She wasn't being assisted through the questionnaire.
- She's transferring funds to her other account.
- She hasn't been asked to install any remote access software.
- She wasn't told her account isn't safe.
- The funds are in her control and are being transferred to her existing account.

Ms S has acknowledged she answered the questions inaccurately, but she said she was under pressure from the scammer and was being manipulated in providing the answers she did. Unfortunately, this clearly impacted Revolut's intervention attempts, and the warnings they provided her based on the answers she provided were not relevant for the scam she was falling victim to.

Here, I'd expect the questioning to be proportionate to the risk involved, and based on the answers Ms S provided, I wouldn't have expected Revolut to have done anything else. And even if Revolut had asked more questions, I'm not convinced Ms S would have given more information, or decided not to make the payments, given how confident she was that she wasn't being scammed.

I've also considered whether, on being alerted to the scam, Revolut could reasonably have done anything to recover Ms S's losses, but I don't think they could. The only possible option for recovery here for the two payments Ms S made to a crypto exchange provider, would have been to have attempted a chargeback against the payee. But this likely wouldn't have had any reasonable prospect of success. This is because the payments were for the purchasing of crypto which has been provided to Ms S – so she received the service she paid for. But even if there were funds remaining, Ms S would've had access to them. In relation to the payments Ms S made to W, these payments had already been moved onto the scammer, so again, they wouldn't have been available for recovery. And, even if any funds did remain at W, they would have been accessible to Ms S directly. So, I wouldn't have expected Revolut to do anything else to recover Ms S's funds when the scam was reported.

I have a great deal of sympathy for Ms S and the loss she's suffered. But it would only be fair for me to direct Revolut to refund her loss if I thought they were responsible – and I'm not persuaded that this was the case. For the above reasons, I'm not going to tell them to do anything further.

My final decision

My final decision is that I do not uphold this complaint.

Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I'm required to ask Ms S to accept or reject my decision before 13 May 2026.

Israr Ahmed
Ombudsman